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SUMMARY
The thesis examines the interaction of labour and product markets in 
determining Income distribution.- It presents evidence on a marked shift in 
the distribution of income in the UK, in the early 1980s, towards profits 
and away from manual earnings, a shift which is attributed in part to a 
secular rise in manufacturing price-cost margins contemporaneous with a 
massive Increase in unemployment. Evidence that labour strength affects 
real wages and income distribution is contrasted with apparently 
contradictory theory and evidence of oligopolistic employers' ability to 
determine profit margins constrained only by product market conditions.
Oligopoly theory is examined along with an analysis of Stackelberg 
and Cournot duopoly. Results are derived illuminating the links between 
product market and labour market conditions on the one hand and Income 
distribution on the other. In particular it is shown that employers will 
generally prefer not to bargain over employment levels; but if they do 
bargain over jobs, then price-cost margins will be directly affected by 
workers' bargaining strength.
An empirical study examines the effect of labour strength on 
price-cost margins in UK manufacturing industry. The analysis uses cross- 
section regressions for the years 1975, 1979 and 1982. Qualified support 
is found for the hypothesis that workers and employers do bargain over 
employment. There is also some econometric evidence that unemployment has 
undermined the bargaining position of manual workers. Taken together, 
these studies Imply that unemployment has played an important role in 
shifting the distribution of income In the UK In the early 1980s.
A further empirical study examines changes in import levels and 
manufacturing margins between 1979 and 1982. While single equation 
estimates appear to show that Import penetration reduces domestic margins, 
simultaneous estimation shows no competitive Impact of Imports.
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CHAPTER 1
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND RECENT HISTORY IN THE UK
1.1 Introduction
Baran and Sweezy (1968) argue that conflict over the pay and 
process of labour will not affect the distribution of income since: "the 
working class as a whole is (not) in a position to encroach on surplus 
....under monopoly capitalism employers can and do pass on higher labour 
costs in the form of higher prices" (p.85). Kalecki (1971) adds the 
important qualifications that only if the economy is closed and the 
mark-up on direct costs is unchanged can we conclude "that a general 
increase in money wages in a closed economy does not change the 
distribution of national income" (p.16l).
However, the massive shift in the distribution of income in the UK 
during the recession of the early 1980s raises serious doubts over 
whether employers' power in product markets really does transcend 
conflict over the process and pay of labour. In particular, the 
coincidence of mass unemployment and record profitability pose the 
possibility that a severe decline in workers' bargaining strength 
consequent upon the swelling of the reserve army of labour has 
contributed significantly to the dramatic shift in income distribution.
In this Chapter I present and discuss evidence on recent changes 
in Income distribution in the UK and examine the extent to which these 
changes are attributable to movements in international terms of trade or
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to movements in domestic price-cost margins. X explore the question of 
the extent to which changes in margins reflect compositional changes, or 
changes in product market conditions, or changes in labour markets.
Chapter two sets out a more formal discussion of the determination 
of price-cost margins, referring to the empirical and theoretical 
literature, and investigates the implications of oligopoly price-setting 
for income distribution, class conflict and inflation. I examine the 
empirical evidence of the effect of workers' bargaining strength on 
mark-up pricing and look at a number of possible explanations of how 
labour market conditions might affect product market behaviours slow 
adjustment of pricing in response to wage rises; 'kinked demand' 
expectations which inhibit firms from passing on wage rises for fear that 
rivals will not do likewise; the threat of foreign competition; 
bargaining over employment as well as over wages. This chapter ends with 
a look at the reserve army hypothesis, that unemployment may have the 
effect of boosting profits at the expense of wages.
Chapter three examines in closer detail models of employer-union 
bargaining. I show that if workers and employers bargain over employment 
as well as over wages, then employers' relative bargaining strength will 
be directly reflected in the mark-up; I also argue that employers will 
generally prefer not to bargain over employment. I discuss some of the 
likely determinants of workers' bargaining power, and strategies 
employers may use to circumvent them.
In chapter 4 I report an empirical investigation Into the 
determinants of workers' bargaining power and its effect on price-cost 
margins in UK manufacturing industry, through cross-sectional analysis 
for the years 1975, 1979 and 1982. The bargaining model explored in 
chapter 3 suggests that workers can bargain up wages etc. only when 
employers are (potentially) earning economic surplus, so the empirical
work centers on estimating the amount of economic surplus that workers in 
an industry are able to win, the factors which determine workers' share 
of the surplus, and the question of whether or not employers do pass on 
higher labour costs into higher prices. This last question is central in 
considering whether or not workers' relative bargaining power is able to 
alter the distribution of income in aggregate.
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1.2 UK Income Distribution and the recession of the 19803
The early 1980s have seen massive deflation and unemployment in 
the UK. At the same time we have witnessed a dramatic rise in 
profitability and a shift in the distribution of income away from 
earnings. Table 1.1 shows that the share of company profits in GDP had 
risen by the beginning of 1985 to over 18%, nearly double the level of 
the mid 1970s, well above the levels of the 1960s, and higher even than 
the previous post-war record of 16% in 1955. The rise in the share of 
profits has come almost entirely at the expense of earnings, for the 
share of the remaining categories of income (the surplus of public 
corporations and government, and income from rent and self-employment) 
has remained remarkably steady in the range of 18-21% throughout the 
post-war period. The very latest figures for company profit shares in 
the beginning of 1985 are affected somewhat by the transfer of British 
Telecom to the private sector, but the share of earnings in GDP is still 
lower than at any time since 1946.
There are a number of possible explanations for this shift in the 
distribution of income: i) the rise and fall in the rate of inflation 
over the period of concern may have affected the measurement of profits; 
ii) the development of North Sea oil since the mid 1970s has brought in 
high rents; ill) restructuring of the non-oil economy towards high 
profit activities; iv) changes in International terms of trade and 
competitiveness; v) changes in domestic product market conditions; vi) 
changes in labour market conditions. I will consider these possible 
explanations in turn.
TABLE 1.1
UK PROFITABILITY 1960 - 85
YEAR SHARES IN GDP SHARE IN 
NDP
REAL RATE OF RETURN (4)
EARNINGS(l)
S
PR0FITS(2) PR0FITS(3)
%
AlL
COMPANIES
%
EXCLUDING NORTH SEA 
PRE-TAX P0ST-TAX(5) 
% %
1960-73 (av) 67.3 13.4 12.1 9.2 9.2 6.5
1974-79 (av) 69.3 10.5 8.0 5.7 5.3 5.4
1980-84 (av) 66.9 13.3 - - - -
1974 70.2 B.9 7.3 5.1 5.3 5.3
1975 72.5 7.9 5.4 4.0 4.3 3.5
1976 70.8 8.4 5.8 4.2 4.3 4.3
1977 67.5 12.4 9.7 7.0 6.4 7.0
1978 67.0 13.0 10.4 7.5 6.8 7.2
1979 67.7 12.6 9.3 6.5 4.9 5.0
1980 69.0 11.8 8.8 6.1 3.7 4.5
1981 68.5 11.5 9.5 6.5 3.4 4.2
1982 66.6 12.8 10.8 7.8 4.3 4.5
1983 65.7 14.2 13.0 10.0 5.8 5.8
1984 64.9 16.0 8.5 (7) 8.5 (7)
1985 Ql 63.8 18.5
Sources: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin September 1984, 352-359.
British Business, 21 September 1984, 119-120.
Central Statistical Office Press Release, CS0(85)59, Table C. 
Economic Trends April 1985, p.14, and Annual Supplement 1985, p.38. 
National Income and Expenditure 1984, Tables 3.5 and 5.4
Notea 1. Wages and salaries, forces' pay and employers' contributions.
2. Gross trading profits of companies, net of stock appreciation, including 
financial institutions.
3. Net trading profits and rent of industrial and commercial companies.
4. Net operating surplus on UK operations, before intereet and tax, on net 
capital stock of fixed assets (excluding land) at current replacement coat 
plus book value of stocks.
5. Estimated from BEQB chert p.358, backward-looking measure.
7. Bank of England estimate, BEQB p.353, for 1984 Ql.
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Price inflation can distort profit measures if the change in the 
nominal value of stocks is attributed to company profits; but the figures 
quoted in Table 1.1 are all net of stock appreciation. Accounting for 
depreciation of capital stock presents greater problems, but Hill (1979) 
recommends Judicious comparison of gross and net measures of rates of 
return. Table 1.1 shows that the share of company profits, net of 
depreciation, in net domestic product follows the same trend as the gross 
measures up until 1983, the last year for which the net series has been 
published. So it seems clear that the dramatic rise in company profit 
shares is not a distortion due to the vagaries of inflation accounting.
At the same time as profit shares were rising, real rates of 
return on capital had risen by the beginning of 1984 to ten-year record 
levels (see Table 1.1). These record profitability figures are not an 
artefact of the profits slump in the mid-1970s; the real rate of return 
for all companies stood at 10% in 1983, above the average return for the 
1960s. Some of the rise in profitability is no doubt due to the high 
profits on North Sea oil operations, which by 1984 account for around one 
third of company profits. But even if a substantial proportion of North 
Sea earnings is put down to 'natural resource rent' rather than profits, 
it is evident that the share of (redefined) profits in GDP is still well 
above the levels of the 1970s, and probably still above the average level 
of the 1960s. Indeed, the real rates of return on non-North Sea 
operations (see Table 1.1) at the beginning of 1984 were estimated by the 
Bank of England to be well above the levels of the 1970s, and Just below 
or above the average of the 1960s depending on whether one considers 
pre-tax or post-tax rates of return.(1)
The rise in real rates of return (excluding North Sea activities) 
in the 1980s might be due simply to a restructuring of UK industry, with 
the demise of the less profitable sectors in the deep recession of 1980
and 1981 leaving a lean rump of efficient, high profit industries. The 
Bank of England studied the performance of the large companies (Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin, September 1984, p.360-367) which account for 
75% of aggregate capital employed in the UK. They break down the rise in 
non-oil real rates of return by 23 sectors and find that only in two 
sectors (office equipment and 'shipping and transport') did real rates of 
return fall over the period 1980-83. Their figures do include the 
overseas activities of UK companies, but they Indicate nevertheless that 
profitability has risen in almost all sectors, indicating that we are 
observing more than just a restructuring of the economy towards high 
profit industries.
Moreover, although substantial restructuring of UK industry 
undoubtedly occurred in the early 1980s, and might account for some of 
the rise in rates of return above the levels of the 1970s, it does not 
account for the dramatic switch in the proportions of GDP accruing to 
capital and labour. There is ample evidence that high profit industries 
tend to pay higher wages (see Chapter 3), so we might expect that a 
straightforward restructuring towards profitable industries would lead to 
higher wages as well as higher profits.
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 summarise growth in productivity and real wages 
between 1965 and 1984 in the whole economy (based on weekly data) and in 
manufacturing (based on hourly data). It is apparent that the product 
wage grew roughly in line with productivity up until 1973, but has since 
fallen behind productivity growth, particularly after 1979. Real 
earnings (deflated by consumer price indices rather than producer price 
Indices) have also fallen substantially behind productivity growth since 
1979. Here we see confirmation of the previously observed shift in the 
distribution of income from earnings to profits, and can see that the 
shift away from earnings has been substantial in the manufacturing
sector, even if not as marked as In total production industries which 
include oil.
TABLE 1.2
GROWTH IN PRODUCTIVITY AND EARNINGS: UK ECONOMY 1965-84 
Average annual rate8 of growth
YEARS PROOUCTIVITY(l) AVERAGE EARNINGSÍ2) HANUAL EARNINGSC3) NON-MANUAL EARNINGSU)
PRODUCT REAL REAL WAGE ( 6 )______ ___  __________  REAL WAGE(6)
WAG£(5) WAGE(6) HALE(7Ï FEHALECB) HALETE-  T e'HALE(B)
1965-69 2.8 3.4 2.4 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6
1969-73 2.8 2.7 3.8 4.2 5.7 3.0 3.8
1973-79 1.1 0.4 0.5 0.0 2.0 0.1 2.3
1979-83/4 3.7 2.3 1.8 1.7 2.1 3.0 2.9
Notes,! 1. Output per 
industries,
person employed in whole economy 
1979-84.
1965-79, in total production
2. Average eaminga indices, average of April and October each year.
3. Weekly earnings, October each year.
4. Index of average earnings, April each year.
5. Deflated by GDP deflator.
6. Deflated by Retail Price Index.
7. Full-time men, 21 years and over.
8. Full-time women, 18 years and over.
Sourcest Employment Gazette and Economic Trends.
TABLE 1.3
GROWTH IN PRODUCTIVITY AND REAL HOURLY EARNINGS» UK MANUFACTURING 1965-84 
Average annual ratee or growth
REAL (3)
YEARS
PROOUCT-
IVITY(l)
PRODUCT 
WAGE(2)
AVERAGE
EARNINGS
MANUAL EARNINGSC4) NON-MANUAL EARNINGS(4)
MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE
% p.a. % p.a. % p.a. % P.a. % p.a. % p.a. i p.a.
1965-69 (av) 3.9 3.7 2.4 2.1 2.2 1.9 2.6
1969-73 (av) 4.3 4.6 3.8 4.4 6.0 2.7 6.2
1973-79 (av) 1.1 0.1 1.0 1.1 3.3 0.5 3.6
1979-84 (av) 3.8 2.9 2.1 0.9 0.4 2.8 2.4
1974 0.6 -4.5 1.0 -1.8 2.3 -2.8 1.6
1975 -1.9 3.4 2.4 4.0 8.9 1.1 11.3
1976 5.2 0.0 -0.3 2.5 7.5 1.7 5.0
1977 0.9 -6.7 -4.8 -6.8 -5.4 -6.7 -4.4
1978 1.1 5.5 7.0 5.5 5.0 7.4 5.5
1979 0.6 3.5 1.2 3.8 2.2 2.9 3.0
1980 -1.3 2.5 -0.9 -1.4 -1.4 1.0 0.4
1981 4.7 3.3 1.1 0.2 -0.8 1.8 2.0
1982 5.1 3.2 2.4 0.6 -1.1 1.6 1.5
1983 6.5 3.6 4.4 3.4 4.8 4.5 5.0
1984 4.0 2.0 3.5 1.8 0.5 5.0 3.4
Moteai 1. Output per peraon hour (pre-1970, per person) in manufacturing induatriee.
2. Average Earnings Index (average of April and October) deflated by manufacturing 
producer price index for home sales.
3. Average Earnings Index deflated by General Index of Retail Prices.
4. Hourly earnings deflated by RPI. Pre-1973, based on October series of manual 
hourly earnings and on April series of non-manual earnings indices. 1973-84 
figures are based on April series of adult hourly earnings, excluding overtime.
Sources» Employment Gazette and Economic Trends.
Table 1.3 shows that productivity in manufacturing has outgrown 
the product wage since 1979- This does not necessarily imply that profit 
margins have changed, since the relative cost of other Inputs, including 
imports of raw materials, may have risen over this period due to changes 
in terms of trade and/or exchange rates. But, in fact, the index of 
input prices for materials and fuels purchased by manufacturing Industry 
has grown, by 47%, slightly slower over the period 1979-84 than the index 
of output prices for home sales which rose by 50% over the same period 
(source: Economic Trends, April 1985). The apparent implication is that
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manufacturing profit margins have risen since 1979, reflecting the rise 
in productivity relative to earnings.
Indeed, the changing distribution of income in manufacturing is 
confirmed by Census of Production data - available only up to 1982.
Table 1.4 lists manufacturing price-cost margins defined alternately on 
gross and net revenues and with salaries treated alternately as fixed and 
variable costs. I also give estimates for 1983 and 1984 based on the 
rise in productivity in these years ahead of the growth in the product 
wage (a gap of 3% and 2% respectively), making the assumption that the 
ratio of materials costs to revenue remained the same as in 1982. It is 
evident that although the recession of the early 1980s was deeper than 
that of the mid 1970s, manufacturing profit margins did not fall so far, 
and they recovered by 1982 to levels above the late 1970s. The estimated 
profit margins for 1983 and 1984 are well above those even of the peak 
years in 1972 or 1973.(2)
It is evident that the dramatic shift in income distribution in 
the UK post-1979 is not simply due to a restructuring towards oil, but 
has been caused in part by a rise in profits in the non-oil manufacturing 
sector too. Moreover, the rise in non-oil rates of profit is seen to be 
not Just a consequence of increasing capacity utilisation, nor Just of 
changes in terms of trade, but of a substantial rise in profit margins.
I have already argued that the shift in income distribution cannot be 
attributed simply to compositional changes, for we expect more profitable 
industries to pay higher wages, and it is the falling of earnings behind 
productivity growth that is in need of explanation. In particular, is 
the change in price-cost margins and in income distribution attributable 
to changes in labour market conditions or to changes in product markets? 
Some insight can be gained if we break down the figures for wage growth 
to distinguish between manual and non-manual workers.
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TABLE 1.»
MANUFACTURING PRICE-COST MARGINS 1970-84
From 1970-79, manufacturing classified by SIC 1968, excluding coal and petroleum products.
From 1979 classified by SIC 1980.
YEAR (P + F + S) (P ♦ F) (P + F + S) (P + F)
Gross output Gross output Net output Net output
1970 (1) 0.256 0.183 0.621 0.443
1971 (1) 0.259 0.181 0.620 0.434
1972 (1) 0.274 0.197 0.633 0.455
1973 0.271 0.199 0.633 0.463
1974 0.267 0.194 0.642 0.467
1975 0.250 0.170 0.607 0.412
1976 0.257 0.182 0.625 0.444
1977 0.254 0.181 0.636 0.453
1978 0.262 0.185 0.637 0.449
1979 0.263 0.264 0.183 0.184 0.639 0.640 0.445 0.446
1980 0.261 0.172 0.625 0.413
1981 0.276 0.183 0.646 0.429
1982 0.281 0.192 0.661 0.450
1983 (2) 0.285 0.198 0.671 0.466
1984 (2) 0.288 0.202 0.677 0.477
Definitional P = profit = value added - mages - aalaries - employers' N.I. 
F = overhead coats = non-industrial coats.
S = Salaries * aalaries of non-manual employees + (eat) N.I.
Sourcei Census of Production, annual summary tables, 1970-82.
Notes» 1.
2. Assuming 10X employers' national insurance on mages and salaries.1983 and 1984 estimates - see text - based on rise in productivity compared with 
rise in earnings.
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Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show that post-1979 the earnings of non-manual 
employees have risen fairly well in line with the growth in productivity 
- both in manufacturing and in the combined production industries. It is 
the earnings of manual workers which have been held back, particularly in 
the manufacturing sector.
Between 1979 and 1984, hourly productivity in manufacturing rose 
by over 20%, and the non-manual hourly product wage rose 23% for males 
and 21% for females. But for non-manual male and female workers the 
hourly product wage rose only by 12% and 9% respectively - and their real 
hourly wage (relative to consumer prices) rose by only 4% and 2% over the 
five-year period.
The dramatic nature of this disparity between manual and 
non-manual earnings is illustrated by the figures in Table 1.5 which show 
the ratio of manual to non-manual earnings since 1963, both weekly and 
hourly, in manufacturing and in the whole economy. For the whole 
economy, manual workers in 1984 were in much the same position relative 
to non-manuals as they had been in the mid-1960s (with respect to weekly 
earnings) and in the same relative position as they had been in 1970 
(with respect to hourly earnings) - the changes in manual workers' 
relative weekly earnings between 1970 and 1984 were largely attributable 
to changes in hours. The substantial improvement of the position of 
manual workers in the early and mid 1970s was reversed post 1979. In 
manufacturing, the rise and fall in the relative fortunes of manual 
workers is more dramatic, with relative hourly earnings peaking in 1976 
and falling sharply post-1979 to leave both men and women manual workers 
substantially further behind their non-manual counterparts than they had 
been in 1970 and throughout the 1960s.
TABLE 1.5
RATIO OF MANUAL TO NON-MANUAL EARNINGS IN THE UK. 1963-84
A. WHOLE UK ECONOMY B. MANUFACTURING
YEAR INDEX OF WEEKLY ACTUAL HOURLY INDEX OF WEEKLY ACTUAL HOURLY
EARNINGS RATIO (1) EARNINGS RATIO (2) EARNINGS RATIO ill EARNINGS RATIO
MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE
1963 100 100 100 100
1964 101 100 100 100
1965 102 100 101 100
1966 102 100 101 98
1967 102 100 101 97
1968 102 101 101 97
1969 103 101 102 97
1970 103 100 0.63 0.70 102 96 0.67 0.83
1971 103 102 0.63 0.72 102 97 0.66 0.84
1972 105 104 0.63 0.72 103 100 0.67 0.85
1973 109 109 0.65 0.74 107 104 0.68 0.87
1974 112 115 0.66 0.77 111 107 0.69 0.88
1975 108 105 0.68 0.77 106 99 0.71 0.86
1976 106 104 0.67 0.76 106 100 0.72 0.88
1977 107 107 0.68 0.77 107 100 0.71 0.87
1978 106 109 0.67 0.78 103 98 0.70 0.86
1979 109 112 0.68 0.79 104 99 0.71 0.86
1980 101 104 0.67 0.77 97 94 0.69 0.84
1981 100 102 0.64 0.72 97 94 0.68 0.82
1982 100 104 0.64 0.72 95 93 0.67 0.80
1983 100 103 0.63 0.72 96 93 0.66 0.80
1984 99 104 0.62 0.71 95 92 0.64 0.77
Source« Employment Gazette.
Notea» 1. Based on ratio of (a) average of full-time manual weekly earnings in current 
and previous October, to (b) non-manual April indices of weekly earnings.
2. NES April series, excluding those whose pay was affected by absence,
excluding overtime, for full-time men and women over 21 years and 18 years.
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The significance of the relative decline of manual wages in 
manufacturing can be seen by estimating price-cost margins for 1982 
(reported in Table 1.4) with manual wages inflated to their 1979 relative 
level (ie. reversing the decline in manufacturing male manual hourly 
earnings, relative to non-manuals, as shown in Table 1.5). Table 1.6 
shows what 1982 margins would have been (ceteris paribus) if manual 
workers had maintained the position, relative to non-manuals, which had 
prevailed throughout the second half of the 1970s. It is evident, 
whichever definition of margins is used, that most if not all of the 
post-1 9 7 9  rise in price-cost margins could be accounted for by the 
decline in manual workers' relative pay.
TABLE 1.6
A COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL HARGINS IN MANUFACTURING - IF MANUAL WORKERS' PAY HAP 
NOT DECLINED RELATIVE TO NON-MANUALS’ BETWEEN 1979 AND 1982
PRICE-COST. MARGINS (1}
YEAR (P + F + S) (P + F) (P ♦ F + S) (P + F)
Gross output Gross output Nat output Net output
1979 actual 0.264 0.184 0.640 0.446
1982 actual 0.281 0.192 0.661 0.450
1982 hypothetical(2) 0.273 0.184 0.641 0.432
Noteat 1. Margins defined as in Table 1.4 for manufacturing classified by SIC 19B0.
2. Multiplying actual magea by the ratio of 71>67 (from Table 1.5, part B, column 3).
Definitional P s Profit
F s Non-industrial costs
S z Salaries of non-manual employees + N.I.
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The beginning of the decline in manual workers' relative pay in 
1976 coincides with a large increase in UK unemployment to a post-war 
record of over 1 million; and the accelerated decline in manual workers' 
position post-1979 coincides with the rise of unemployment to over 3 
million. This evidence appears to give the lie to the argument that mass 
unemployment in the UK has been the result of workers' pricing themselves 
out of jobs, indicating rather the reverse, that unemployment has 
undermined the bargaining position of manual workers. This supposition 
is supported by Layard and Nickell's (1985) econometric model of UK 
aggregate wages and employment over the period 1954-83 which is one of 
the first to cover the post-1979 period. They take account of any impact 
of real wages on employment in their 3-equation model, and they find that 
unemployment has a marked, and statistically significant, depressant 
effect on the real wages of manual workers.
The striking coincidence between the rise in manufacturing profit 
margins in the early 1980s and the decline in the relative earnings of 
non-manual workers does suggest that labour market conditions may have 
contributed significantly to the rise in profitability. However, the 
same period has seen changes in product market conditions which may 
provide alternative or complementary explanations. For instance, Cowling 
(1983) argues that in recessions most firms' level of excess capacity 
will rise, and therefore their actual and perceived ability to retaliate 
against price-cutting rivals will be enhanced, allowing an oligopoly 
group to maintain a higher mark-up after, perhaps, an initial price-war. 
This tendency may have allowed margins to rise somewhat during the deep 
recession of the early 1980s, but we would expect its effect to diminish 
as plants were scrapped and as output began to rise slowly in 1983 and 
1984.
Another significant factor which may have affected product market
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conditions is the decline in the nominal (and real) exchange rate since 
its peak in 1980. To the extent that foreign price competition restrains 
domestic price-cost margins, the decline in the exchange rate since 1980 
may have allowed margins to rise. But the real exchange rate(3) in 1982 
was still higher than it had been in the years 1976 and 1977 - a similar 
cyclical period of mild recovery from a deep recession - so the secular 
rise in margins in the 1980s does not appear to be attributable to 
exchange rate movements. Even by 1984, the real exchange rate was not 
significantly below its 1970-76 average.
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1.3 Summary
I have shown that the rise in profit margins in UK manufacturing 
since 1979 has contributed to the remarkable shift in income distribution 
that has occurred since then. The evidence for all production 
industries, and for manufacturing alone, indicates that profitability has 
increased mainly at the expense of manual rather than non-manual workers. 
In manufacturing, at least, the change in income distribution has its 
origins in rising price-cost margins rather than in changing terms of 
trade. The rise in margins reflects directly the weakened position of 
manual workers, and aggregate time-series analysis appears to suggest 
that this weakening of manual workers' position is attributable at least 
in part to the rise of mass unemployment. The shift in margins and in 
distribution of income may be due in part to changing product market 
conditions, viz. Cowling's (1983) argument that oligopolistic industries 
tend to more collusive (and jointly profitable) behaviour in the face of 
the mutual adversity of a slump and/or the decline in the real exchange 
rate after 1980. But these arguments alone do not appear to account for 
the rise of profitability to record levels, nor for the marked decline in 
the position of manual workers relative to non-manuals. There is indeed 
a prima facie case that the huge growth in the reserve army of labour in 
the UK since the late 1970s has undermined manual workers' bargaining 
position, contributing to a drastic shift in Income distribution towards 
profits.
The question posed by Baran and Sweezy still remains: whether, and 
how, workers' bargaining position can affect the profit margins set by 
oligopolistic Industries. This is the guiding question which runs 
through the following theoretical and empirical investigations.
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CHAPTER 2
OLIGOPOLY, PROFIT MARGINS AND LABOUR STRENGTH
2.1 Oligopoly and the Determination of Price-Cost Margins
One of the prime features of British industrial structure is the 
dominance of a relatively small number of firms. Prais (1976) finds that 
the share of manufacturing net output accounted for by the top 100 firms 
rose from 16% in 1909 to 41% in 1970. Hart (1982) reports a slight 
decline in aggregate concentration (by employment) in manufacturing over 
the period 1971-8. But when Hughes and Kumar (1984) investigate 
aggregate concentration by employment in the UK private sector (including 
financial and other non-manufacturing sectors) they find a rise in the 
share of the top 100 companies from 23.2% in 1968 to 25.8% in 1975, 
falling back slightly to 25.4% in 1980. These high levels of aggregate 
concentration are a reflection of the dominance of giant enterprises in 
the world economy. Dunning and Pearce (1981) measure the share of the 
top 25 firms as constituting nearly one third of the sales of the world's 
largest 500 industrial enterprises in 1962, falling in 1972, but rising 
back to the same level in 1977. Over this period, the average share of 
the world's top 3 firms in each broadly defined industry was over half of 
the total sales of the top 20 firms. The UN Centre on Transnational 
Corporations (1981) report that nearly half of the assets of the world's 
largest 300 banks were held in 1975 by only 43 transnational banks.
In the UK, the high degree of aggregate concentration is reflected 
also in a high degree of concentration in individual markets. George
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(1975) finds that the average share of the top 5 firms in 209 UK product 
groups in 1963 was nearly 60%, rising even further by 1968. Curry and 
George (1983) report that the growth in average concentration has since 
levelled off. The general picture is clear whether we examine individual 
markets, or the national and international economy: that the UK economy 
is dominated by a small number of giant companies.
The pricing behaviour of oligopolies can be analysed in terms of 
the tension between the conflicting motives of collective interest, which 
is to restrict industry output to maximise industry profits, and 
individual interest, to cheat or chisel by increasing a firm's own sales 
whilst rivals restrain their sales. A central concern to any firm in an 
oligopoly must be the question of how its rivals will react to its own 
decisions and strategies, and it is in the assumptions about such 
expectations that there lie the key differences between many models of 
oligopoly. The analysis of strategies and expectations can be 
illuminated by exploration of an oligopoly's underlying structure of 
information and uncertainty about costs, demand and behaviour - though I 
note the suspicions of Kreps and Wilson (1982, p.276) that "by cleverly 
choosing the nature of that ....uncertainty ....one can get out of a 
game-theoretic analysis whatever one wishes".
The simplest single-period models of non-cooperative duopoly are 
the Cournot and Bertrand models where each firm expects its rival's 
decision (on output or on pricing) to be independent of its own. But 
these solutions lose their Justification as Nash non-cooperative 
equilibria if firms are presumed to anticipate that their rival will 
treat their decisions as fixed, le. if firms can act as Stackelberg 
leaders. I show in Appendix A that firms will often conflict over the 
choice of roles of Stackelberg leader or follower, each preferring to 
lead or each preferring that the other should act as leader according to
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whether reaction functions are negatively or positively sloped (which in 
turn is likely to depend on whether the expected decision variable is 
quantity or price). But if both take the preferred role, the outcome, 
Stackelberg warfare, is the least profitable of all. Given choice over 
roles of follower and leader, the Cournot solution is no longer a Nash 
equilibrium. It will only hold if each firm desists from taking the role 
of leader, perhaps for fear that if it did not desist its rival would 
retaliate by acting as Stackelberg leader too. But if fear of 
retaliation can hold firms to the Cournot solution, it can also support 
more profitable collusive arrangements. In this case, the Cournot 
solution can be regarded as the lower bound to a range of possible 
collusive solutions which are held together by the threat of price-war, 
eg. by the threat of reversion either to the Cournot solution or to 
Stackelberg warfare.
Non-cooperative collusion requires monitoring, effective and 
credible threats of retaliation to stop chiselling, and entry deterrence. 
Cowling (1982) develops the notion of collusive rivalry, citing Stigler's 
(1964) argument that the effectiveness of monitoring is directly related 
to the numbers or concentration of firms in an industry, and citing the 
argument of Spence (1977) that investment in excess capacity enables the 
incumbents of an oligopoly to deter potential entrants with the threat of 
price war. I will return shortly to consider the question of whether 
such threats are likely to be believed or carried out, making the interim 
assumption that such deterrence is credible.
Given the protection of an effective strategy of entry deterrence 
based on threatened or potential behaviour rather than on current 
behaviour, oligopolistic collusion still has to deal with the problems of 
internal cohesion. A simple analytic approach to the complex of problems 
and interacting strategies of monitoring and retaliation over time is to
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reduce the oligopoly model to a static equilibrium and attempt to capture 
the complex in a single parameter representing the degree of effective 
collusion. Conjectural variation models are based on a single period, 
non-cooperative game to which the Nash equilibrium solution is known in 
advance, where each firm conjectures that any change in its own decision 
from the equilibrium would provoke a certain response from its rivals.
In these models the degree of effective collusion is captured in the sign 
and size of the conjectured response, leading to solutions which range 
from the competitive to the full monopoly outcome. For instance, the 
Bertrand or Cournot solutions arise when conjectured response is zero (in 
price or quantity). Increasing the size of the conjectured response 
tends to lead towards solutions on the profit frontier.
Cubbin (1983) shows that the conjectural variation term (which he 
measures in proportional terms, with price as the strategic variable) can 
equally well be interpreted as measuring the degree of retaliation by 
rivals, or the probability that such retaliation will occur, or the 
expected delay before the retaliation occurs. Presumably the conjectural 
variation term can capture the combined effect of magnitude, uncertainty 
and delay. So we can treat conjectural variation as a simple 
uni-dimensional index of the effectiveness of the complex strategy of 
mutual monitoring and threats which binds rivals into collusion.
Following Stigler (1964) we may expect this index, the degree of 
effective collusion, to be a positive function of the degree of 
concentration in an Industry. In Stigler's analysis, rivals' output is 
monitored imperfectly; he suggests that information will be clearer and 
monitoring more effective, the smaller the number of sellers in a market. 
Green and Porter (1984) extend and formalise this analysis in a 
multi-period non-cooperative game; Porter (1985, p.418) reports the 
prediction thati "the greater the number of symmetric firms or the 
greater the degree of demand uncertainty, the closer the cooperative
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price is to competitive levels". The general thrust of the argument runs 
as follows: higher prices and/or greater uncertainty/numbers raise the 
expected gains from chiselling, requiring a correspondingly greater 
threat of retaliation to support that price level; but the threat of too 
severe retaliation is not credible if it would be too costly to carry 
out; so as uncertainty and/or numbers in an industry Increase, the price 
level that can be credibly supported must drop.
Conjectural variation models provide a tractable means of 
modelling the effectiveness of rivalrous collusion, reducing it to a 
single period static equilibrium; but it does not follow that these 
models provide insight into the determination of such collusion. In 
particular I regard it as misguided to attempt to impose notions of 
internal 'consistency' in order to predict the degree of collusion, 
requiring that the adjustment of the (collusive) eqilibrium be consistent 
with the conjectured response to 'chiselling'. For instance, Bresnahan 
(1981) requires that the conjectured linear response by a rival to an 
arbitrary move by a duopolist from the equilibrium configuration should 
be locally consistent with the shifting of equilibrium which would occur 
if that duopolist's equilibrium position should be so moved. If a firm's 
conjectures relate to quantity decisions and are a function only of that 
firm's own output, Bresnahan shows that consistent conjectures will 
generally be non-positive and lead to a solution somewhere between 
Bertrand and Cournot depending on the shape of marginal costs and the 
degree of product differentiation, (nb. Boyer and Moreaux (1983) 
implicitly question the usefulness of this notion of consistency by 
showing that if conjectures are a function of the outputs of both 
duopolists, any output configuration can satisfy such a criterion of 
consistency.)
However, when we treat models of conjectural variation simply as
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convenient simplifications of a multi-period strategy of collusive 
rivalry, we see that there is no reason why a rival's response to 
perceived chiselling should be the same as their response to a change in 
cost or demand conditions which require that the duopolist's equilibrium 
output be increased. For instance, it is readily deducible from Seade 
(19 8 5, p-1 9 ) that, in a parametric conjectural variation model with 
homogenous output and many firms, a reduction in marginal cost for one 
firm alone will lead to a shift in equilibrium whereby that firm's output 
will increase whilst its rivals will decrease their output. Such 
behaviour is not inconsistent in any substantial sense with conjectures 
that a unilateral increase in output away from the equilibrium 
configuration would meet with a retaliatory response from rivals, who 
would increase their output in order to punish the chiselling firm. At 
least, there is no inconsistency if firms are able to distinguish changes 
in output which have been occasioned by shifts in cost or demand 
parameters from opportunistic attempts to Increase share in oligopoly 
profits.
Indeed, monitoring each other's cost and demand functions is an 
important prerequisite for firms to anticipate the oligopoly equilibrium. 
If such information is private, there is room for opportunistic behaviour 
by a firm in misrepresenting its cost and demand positions in order to be 
(implicitly) allocated a larger share of the equilibrium output. Roberts 
(19 8 5) analyses Incentive requirements in a cooperative duopoly game, 
showing that the cartel will generally choose to operate inside the 
profit frontier in order to reduce the incentive for firms to falsely 
claim lower costs. I would expect the same principle to hold true in 
non-cooperative models! that a lack of Information about cost and demand 
conditions should have the same general effect as difficulty in 
monitoring rivals' output, namely to increase the scope for opportunistic 
behaviour and thus to move the viable non-cooperative solution away from
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the profit frontier to a point where the gains from 'cheating' are lower. 
So we are again led towards the conclusion of Stigler and Porter that 
better information and smaller numbers in the industry will tend to raise 
the price level which can be supported by rivalrous collusion.
I have argued that models of conjectural variation capture the 
effectiveness of a strategy of threatened retaliation in response to 
chiselling. The important theoretical question is not whether such 
threats are consistent with shifts in equilibrium, but whether or not the 
threats are credible, ie. whether it will be in rivals' actual and/or 
perceived interest to carry out the threat if one firm does break ranks. 
The same question must be raised in relation to the effectiveness of 
excess capacity as a deterrence to entry. (Indeed, the issues of entry 
deterrence and oligopolistic collusion can be considered alike if we 
treat potential entrants as non-producing incumbents who face fixed 
costs, or an entry fee, before starting up production.) Threats of 
retaliation against incumbents or potential entrants are only effective 
if they are believed.(1 )
Friedman (1971) shows that the threat of price-war can make an 
apparently collusive strategy a non-cooperative equilibrium, essentially 
a multi-period game-theoretic extension of the single period conjectural 
variation model. But this still begs the question of whether retaliation 
will be an optimal response if an incumbent does break ranks or a new 
firm enters the market. Dixit (1982) follows Kreps and Wilson (1982) and 
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) in arguing that fighting entrants may be an 
optimal sub-game strategy if a successful fight will help deter future 
entrants by establishing a 'strong' reputation. Temporary losses 
suffered during the price war may be expected to be offset by future 
gains from higher oligopoly profits as long as there is not expected to 
be a continuous or protracted price-war against successive challengers,
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hence the Importance of reputation. Green and Porter (1984) show that it 
can be optimal for firms to carry out threats against Incumbent rivals 
who are suspected of chiselling on a collusive strategy, for reasons of 
reputation and credibility of the collusive equilibrium. They go further 
to explain the occurrence of occasional price wars as a rational response 
to imperfect information about random demand conditions which make it 
impossible to be sure whether an observed price drop is the result of 
rivals' cheating or not - in which case occasional short bursts of 
price-war are not signs of collapsing collusion, rather they are 
essential to maintain the credibility of the incentive to collude.
I conclude that strategies of threatened retaliation against 
chiselling incumbents and potential entrants are likely to be credible 
and effective in raising oligopoly prices above competitive levels, and 
that the effectiveness of such rivalrous collusion will tend to be the 
greater the smaller the number of firms in the industry and the better 
the information incumbents have about each other. Complex models of 
repeated interactions can be conveniently approximated by single-period 
models where conjectural variation is a negative function of numbers and 
uncertainty. For instance, Clarke, Davies and Waterson (1984) develop 
the Cowling and Waterson (1976) oligopoly model to derive a testable 
prediction of the relationship between Industry profitability, 
concentration, collusion and product differentiation. Each firm in the 
industry conjectures that the proportional response of rivals to any 
deviation from their equilibrium output is given by the effective 
collusion parameter a. They capture the extent of product 
differentiation with a parameter k which measures the ratio of the 
marginal response of price to rivals' output relative to its 
responsiveness to own price; so that k = 0 implies complete product 
differentiation and k : 1 implies product homogeneity. In order to 
derive testable propositions, they assume either product homogeneity or
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that the own price elasticity of demand for each differentiated product 
is inversely proportional to its market share. In the latter case, 
denoting the constant of proportionality as e and assuming constant 
marginal costs, we can write their equation 3a for industry price-cost 
margins as:
P + F = (ak ♦ (1-ak),H) / e 
R
2 .1
where P is profits, F is fixed costs, R is revenue, e is the industry 
elasticity parameter (the absolute value of demand elasticity in the case 
of homogeneous products), a represents the conjectured response of rivals 
(the degree of effective collusion), k represents the degree of product 
differentiation and H is the Herfindahl index of industry concentration.
Following the line of my previous argument, we should expect 
collusion to be greater in more concentrated industries where monitoring 
and retaliation are likely to be more effective and credible. There is a 
clear prediction that industry margins should be positively correlated 
with both collusion and concentration. Increased product differentiation 
(lower k) has contradictory effects: it reduces the collusive effect of 
threatened retaliation, but at the same time it reduces the Incentive to 
chisel (because it is relatively more difficult to win customers from 
rivals with highly differentiated products). As product differentiation 
increases (in response to design and marketing strategies) we might 
expect firms to approach monopoly positions irrespective of rivals' 
behaviour; but it is not obvious from the Clarke, Davies and Uaterson 
formulation whether or not the relationship between margins and product 
differentiation is monotonlc. A clearer picture is provided by the 
approach of Schmalensee (1982) who incorporates the effect of product 
differentiation into the measure of market concentration. He defines a 
measure of 'effective concentration' based on firms' shares of their
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'effective markets', where rivals' shares of the total market are 
weighted by cross-elasticities of demand. Effective market concentration 
exceeds the Herfindahl index to the extent that product differentiation 
is significant. So, given the argument that margins are positively 
related to concentration, it seems reasonable to conclude that margins 
are also a monotonically increasing function of product differentiation.
Clarke and Davies (1982) stress that the relationship between 
margins and concentration is derived from an analysis of industry 
equilibrium which does not imply causality in either direction. Indeed, 
the exogenous parameters in the derivation of equation 2 .1 Include 
industry numbers and the coefficient of variation of marginal costs 
rather than concentration per se. However, to argue that there is no 
direction of causation is to ignore the underlying processes which 
generate the parameters which appear as exogenous in this short-period 
static equilibrium analysis. The number of firms in an industry and 
their relative cost structures are not accidental data.(2) The thrust of 
this analysis, in the tradition of Marxist theories of monopoly 
capitalism, is that it is precisely because size, technological change 
and market power are necessary for survival and offer the possibility of 
increasing profits that capitalists pursue the long-term strategies of 
growth, take-over and merger which (in conflict with competitive 
tendencies) determine the numbers and costs in an industry.(3) Indeed, 
the Impetus to win and exercise market power is also the driving force 
behind product differentiation and attempts to influence demand 
elasticities. So whilst at any one time we can analyse the equilibrium 
conditions which give the proximate determinants of market shares, the 
underlying causal relationship runs from the degree of centralisation of 
capital to profitabilityi collusion and industrial concentration can be 
seen as proxy measures for the success of that tendency towards 
centralisation.
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2.2 The Interaction of labour and product markets In determining Income
distribution
In Chapter 1 I referred to Kalecki's argument that price-cost 
margins fully determine income distribution in a closed economy. Here I 
will examine more fully the conditions under which, and the extent to 
which, wage pressure is able to alter income distribution in an open 
economy. I also examine the effects of wage pressure on the real 
(product) wage.
I start with the Kaleckian identity which expresses the share of 
wages in value added (W/VA) in terms of the ratio (k) of output price (p) 
to average variable costs (c), where unit variable costs consist of 1 
units of direct labour, at wage w, and n units of 'materials' (including 
components and energy supplies as well as raw materials) at price p*:
W/VA = ___________1__________
1 + (k-1) (p*n/wl +1)
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It is convenient to measure values in relation to unit costs; so I 
define the share of direct labour and the share of other inputs in unit 
costs as:
a = wl/c 
b = p*n/c 
a+b = 1
in which case we can rewrite the wage-share identity as:
W/VA = a/(k - b)
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and the product wage w/p, can be written
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w/p = w/kc
2.3
It is clear that wage share is inversely related to the mark-up, 
but positively related to the ratio of direct labour to other variable 
costs. If the margin is fixed, workers can affect income distribution 
only to the extent that they can alter the composition of costs. The 
effect of, for instance, a wage rise on the composition of costs depends 
on the degree of substitution between labour and other inputs; this can 
be broken down into a scale effect and a pure substitution effect. In 
chapter 4 I argue that there is substantial evidence that the UK economy, 
particularly manufacturing, approximates constant returns to scale when 
operating below capacity. So I make the simplifying assumption of 
constant returns, in which case the cost-minimising mix of Inputs, is 
independent of scale and the input ratio (1 /n) depends only on relative 
input prices (w/p*). I define the elasticity of input substitution, for 
a given technology, as:
s = - d(l/n) . (w/p*) 
d(w/p**) (l/n)
I also note that with constant returns to variable inputs, average unit 
costs are the same as marginal costs; so we cam regard k as the mark-up 
on marginal costs.
Under what circumstances will a wage rise alter the composition of 
costs? First, consider the impact of a nominal wage rise if the ratio of 
input to output prices (p*/p) is fixed. This situation might occur if we 
are dealing with an open economy where p* represents the domestic price 
of imports; if the nominal exchange rate is floating, domestic import 
prices may move in line with output prices to maintain a fixed real 
exchange rate. In this case, if the mark-up is fixed, Import prices will 
rise at the same rate as wages and both the product wage and wage share
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will be independent of nominal wage rises - since none of the real 
variables are affected by equiproportional rises in w, p and p*.
Next, consider the impact of a wage rise if the real terms of 
trade are not fixed. This would be the case in an open economy where 
nominal exchange rates are stable (or sticky) it is also the case which 
applies to one sector or industry within an economy where we are 
considering a wage rise above the general level of inflation. Now, since 
relative input prices can be changed, wage pressure is capable of 
affecting real magnitudes through alteration of the composition of 
variable costs.
Without loss of generality, take the price of 'materials', p*, to 
be fixed and consider the response of wage share and the product wage to 
a wage rise (more generally, a wage rise relative to the price of other 
inputs). I will write all differentials and elasticities with respect to 
the wage, i.e.
X' = dX'/dw and e(X) = X'. w/X.
From equation 2.3 we can derive the elasticity of the product wage 
with respect to a wage rise:
e(w/p) = e(w/kc) = e(w) - e(c) - e(k)
but, given constant returns and cost minimisation the elasticity of unit 
costs with respect to the wage 1 st
etc) s c '. w
c
s  1_W =
C
e (w/p) = b - e(k)
2.4
2 .1 3
From equation 2.2.1, the elasticity of wage share with respect to 
the wage is given bys
e(W/VA) = eta) + e(b) . b/(k-b) - e(k).k/(k-b)
but a = (1 /n)
(1 /n) + (p*/w)
so eta) = e(l/n) - a.e(l/n) - b.e(p*/w)
but e(l/n) = -s, and e(p*/w) = - 1
so eta) = b (1 - s)
and e(W/VA) = b.(1-W/VA).(1-s) - _k_ . etk)
k-b
2.5
The results of equations 2.4 and 2.5 contain a number of points.
A rise in wages (relative to other input prices) will obviously Increase 
both the product wage and wage share if the wage rise has the effect of 
depressing margins, i.e. if etk) < 0. However, if margins are fixed - 
etk) = o - then the effect of wage rises depends on the composition of 
costs, the degree of substitution, and the size of the margin. In 
particular, we can draw the following conclusions for the case where 
margins are fixed:
1. The product wage responds to nominal wage rises only to the extent 
that non-direct labour costs are significant (b > 0). In the extreme 
case of a closed economy, where b = 0, wage rises are marked up in 
full. Any rise in the product wage depends on turning the terms of 
trade against suppliers of other inputsi so the magnitude of this 
effect is directly proportional to the size of imports.
2. The same conclusion holds true for the effect of wage rises on the 
share of wages in value added. But any effect in an open economy
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(where b > 0 ) Is modified by the degree of substitution and by the 
size of the mark-up. If there is unitary elasticity of substitution 
(s = 1 ), then wage pressure will not affect wage share - for the 
input ratio will always be adjusted to keep constant the ratio of 
labour to other variable costs. However, if the degree of 
substitution is less than unity, wage rises will result in an 
increase in wage share - but only to the extent that non-labour 
inputs (b) are significant.(A)
So the conditions under which wage pressure can alter the 
product wage and income distribution are either that profit margins 
can be eroded, or else that it is possible to turn the terms of trade 
against the suppliers of other inputs. In the latter case, wage 
share can be increased only if the elasticity of substitution is less 
than one. With this exception, Baran and Sweezy's claim is true: 
that workers cannot directly alter aggregate income distribution in 
the face of employers' monopoly power - unless workers' pressure is 
able to erode profit margins. Thus Rowthorn (1981) and Cowling 
(19 8 2) can argue that aggregate wage share may be Invariant to wage 
rises, given a fixed mark-ups in the former case because there are no 
non-direct-labour inputs; in the latter case, if the elasticity of 
substitution is unity.
However, it is only at the aggregate level that monopoly power 
appears to be able to neutralise conflict over wages and over the 
process of production. As Cowling (1982), p.99) points out, an 
individual employer (firm or industry) can raise profits by imposing 
(relative) pay cuts and/or by increasing work effort - and workers in 
a particular Industry can increase their real wages at the expense of 
profits.(5)
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The effect of disaggregating conflict when profit margins are 
fixed is illustrated in diagram 2 .1 , an adaptation of Rowthorn's 
(1981) presentation of Baran and Sweezy's (1968) profitability 
schedule. The diagram represents the profitability of the "typical" 
employer (firm or industry) which mirrors the whole corporate 
economy. Simplifying to a closed economy where labour is the only 
variable input, there are constant returns to labour below full 
capacity, and the price-cost margin is fixed, we can write:
the margin (p-c)/p = m
the value of the capital stock = pK 
the full capacity output is Y' 
actual output is Y
the (normalised) level of employment L = Y/Y'
the full capacity capital output ratio K/Y' = a
the ratio of fixed real operating costs F to the 
capital stock is F/K = f
nominal profits = P
The rate of profit is P/pk = r = (m/a).L - f
The rate of profit is an increasing function of the level of 
real aggregate demand as reflected in the level of employment and 
capacity utilisation. If the economy is kept (by the government) at 
a given level of real aggregate demand, giving employment L', then 
average profitability in the economy is r'. If workers force one 
employer to concede higher real wages, that employer raises price 
(given the assumption of a fixed margin) and demand for that product 
falls so that the employer reduces the number of Jobs to, say, L''. 
But the price rise reduces the real wage and relative prices in other 
sectors, where employment rises to L "  ’ and profit to r'".
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DIAGRAM 2.1
THE PROFITS CURVE
The rate of profit lss r = (m/a).L - f
In a period of wage and price Inflation, where oligopolistic 
employers maintain fixed margins, workers can win a rise in real 
wages in one sector only by winning a higher than average pay rise. 
But it is not Just employers' profits in that sector which suffer.
For monopoly power allows an employer to pass part of the costs they 
are forced to concede on to consumers through higher prices.
The ability of employers to maintain aggregate profitability 
in the face of worker pressure rests crucially on the real level of 
aggregate demand and on industries maintaining a stable mark-up. If 
each industry faced with militant workers were to reduce its margins, 
perhaps in an attempt to maximise their (conjectured) profits, then 
the whole economy would move to a lower profits curve. The 
maintenance of price-cost margins is a collective good for employers.
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Given stable margins, it should be in employers* interest to 
run the economy at full capacity. Whether or not there is any 
trade-off between unemployment and Inflation (or the rate of change 
in inflation), aggregate real profits would be maximised at full 
capacity. So the evidence described in Chapter 1, of rising 
profitability in a period of mass unemployment, suggests that a key 
question to be investigated is whether (and, if so, how) worker's 
strength is able to erode profit margins - for apart from changes in 
international terms of trade, this is the only route by which labour 
market conditions can affect aggregate income distributions.
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2.3 The stability of price-coat margins and the effect of workers'
strength
In section 2.1 I argued that there are sound theoretical reasons 
to expect oligopolistic industries to set, generally, monopoly margins 
which are a function of industry concentration and demand elasticity. If 
so, we would expect cost and demand conditions to affect margins only 
indirectly through any resultant changes in industry structure and demand 
elasticities.
Time-series studies of UK industrial pricing indicate that margins 
are fairly stable in the face of changes in demand. Coutts, Godley and 
Nordhaus (1978) report that: "if demand affects industrial prices, it 
does so only through factor prices". Sawyer (1982, p.90) finds: 
"considerable support for the view that price changes relative to cost 
changes are not strongly influenced by short-run variations in demand 
....if we look at the actual price-cost margins, then we find 
considerable stability. Over the period 1970 to 1978 for British 
manufacturing as a whole, the ratio of gross profits to sales fluctuated 
between 0.194 and 0.2 1 7 ".
We can interpret their results not as evidence that demand is 
unimportant in pricing, but rather in support of the hypothesis: a) that 
oligopolistic Industries operate in general with excess capacity and 
fairly constant short-run marginal costs; b) that they act as profit 
maximisers; c) that the factors which determine the optimal mark-up of 
price over marginal costs are fairly stable over demand changes. Given 
the assumption of constant returns to variable Inputs and if the industry 
mark-up is stable, we can see that industry pricing will appear to depend 
on cost changes rather than on demand shifts. For example, an industry 
may experience a cost rise without knowing whether this is merely a
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nominal, inflationary rise (with inverse demand rising in proportion) or 
whether it is a rise in costs relative to demand. In either case, the 
best response of the monopolistic industry is to apply the optimum 
mark-up to costs.
However, although these studies do indicate that profit margins 
over unit costs are fairly stable in the face of demand changes, there is 
a significant and surprising difference between the mark-up on labour and 
that on non-labour costs reported in the study by Sawyer (1983). It is 
important to note that while for the UK economy as a whole direct labour 
accounts for most of unit variable costs, at plant level in manufacturing 
direct labour accounts for only 20% of variable costs. This indicates a 
high level of vertical disintegration whereby the majority of inputs are 
raw materials, energy, intermediate goods and services, rather than 
direct labour (although the degree of integration will be somewhat higher 
at firm rather than plant level). Sawyer's surprising result is that 
although non-labour costs are fully marked-up, changes in wages do not 
have a significant effect on pricing. The implication is that wage 
pressure can cut into margins.
This suggestion is backed up by cross-sectional studies of the 
determination of price-cost margins and/or income shares, most commonly 
using unionisation as a proxy measure of wage pressure. Cowling and 
Mol ho (1982) and Henley (1984) find that unionisation tends to increase 
wage-share. This could be a result of union pressure increasing labour's 
share in variable costs, but Cowling (1982, p.170) reports that the 
aggregate materials i wage-bill ratio for UK manufacturing plants has 
shown little variability. So there is an apparent implication that 
unionisation can reduce price-cost margins.
Similar conclusions are drawn from US studies. Freeman (1983) 
studied a cross-section of 139 US industries 1958-76 and reports that:
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"unionism has a statistically significant quantitatively important 
depressant impact upon the relevant profit Indicators ....limited to the 
more concentrated industries" - the profit indicators being both the 
price-cost margin and the rate of return on assets. His general 
conclusions are backed up by the studies of Clark (1984) and Karier 
(1985) which I discuss in Chapter 4.
Most of these studies measure workers' strength only by the degree 
of unionisation. Of course other factors such as labour legislation, 
union morale and resources, and the level of unemployment will probably 
be significant too. Nevertheless, the evidence does strongly suggest 
that workers' strength can erode profit margins.
But why should employers who exercise a degree of market power cut 
their profit margins in response to wage pressure? Maintaining margins 
is in the collective interest of employers; but of course individual 
employers may find it advantageous to cut margins in some circumstances.
The earlier analysis of oligopoly pricing suggests that margins 
are a function of industrial concentration, demand elasticity and 
collusive forces. If these are the only determinants, we should expect 
industry margins to be Independent of costs (and workers' strength) 
except to the extent that industrial structure, demand or collusion are 
systematically related to cost factors.
Cowling (1983) suggests that employers will recognize their 
collective interest most clearly in a slump, following an initial bout of 
price-cutting, leading to "an underlying tendency to raise the degree of 
collusion in the face of mutual adversity" (p.354). His main argument is 
that the increase in excess capacity, due to the slump, will make more 
credible the threats of retaliation which bind the members of the 
oligopoly to their collusive arrangement. In the terms of the argument
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presented in section 2 .1 , we might say that an oligopoly solution closer 
to the profit frontier is sustainable if the perceived costs of 
retaliation to chiselling are lower in the slump. If workers' strength 
is correlated negatively with the business cycle, e.g. if unemployment 
weakens unions' bargaining power, we might then expect to observe a 
cyclical inverse correlation between workers' strength and profit 
margins. But this inverse correlation would appear only in a time-series 
context. Indeed, to the extent that workers' strength in an Industry 
enables them to push the wage up the labour demand curve, resulting in a 
temporary increase in excess capacity, we would expect to find a positive 
(rather than inverse) correlation in cross-section studies between 
workers' strength and profit margins.
What about the relationship between costs and the other 
determinants of oligopoly margins? It is not at all obvious whether the 
elasticity of industry demand is likely to be systematically related to 
costs, eg. whether demand elasticity is likely to increase or decrease as 
an industry is moved up its demand curve by cost increases. However, 
cost increases may be expected to tend to reduce rather than increase 
industry numbers if the less efficient producers are squeezed out of the 
market when they hit some minimum profit constraint; with the result that 
industry concentration will tend to increase, and so will profit margins, 
in response to cost increases. For instance, Seade (1985 p.28) shows 
that profit margins must rise in response to an overall cost increase in 
an industry characterised by a model of parametric conjectural variation 
oligopoly with a fixed number of firms producing with linear costs, 
facing iso-elastic demand for a homogeneous good.
So, Inasmuch as workers' strength is likely to have a systematic 
effect on the prime determinants of oligopoly margins - industry 
structure, collusion and demand conditions - the general expectation (in
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cross-section comparisons) is that if there is any direct correlation 
between workers' strength and margins, it will tend to be a positive 
relationship. Although a cost rise specific to one firm may squeeze the 
margins of that particular employer, the average industry margin should 
not generally be eroded by wage pressure. However, there are a variety 
of amendments to the underlying oligopoly model which might provide some 
explanation for the contrary evidence cited earlier. I will examine some 
of these potential explanations:
i) members of an oligopoly may have asymmetric conjectures about their 
rivals' response to price cuts and price increases, viz. the 'kinked 
demand curve', which inhibit them from passing on wage increases for 
fear that their rivals will not do likewise;
ii) slow adjustment of prices in response to wage rises; 
iil) the threat of foreign competition;
iv) bargaining between employers and workers over the level of
employment as well as over wages, which might restrain employers 
from raising price (cutting output and employment) in response to 
bargained wage rises.
Kalecki (1971, p.161) argues that wage pressure may cause 
industries to lower the mark-up to avoid losing sales through excessive 
price rises. But there is no particular reason to expect a cost rise to 
reduce the optimal mark-up unless we introduce some other hypothesis such 
as that firms conjecture a kinked demand curve, expecting rivals to 
respond aggressively to price cuts but not to respond to an increase in 
price. This hypothesis may apply to a loose-knit, uncoordinated
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oligopoly group; but it is less plausible for more concentrated or more 
collusive industries, especially where we are concerned with the impact 
of wage rises which are bargained over at the industry level. When all 
firms in an industry are aware of each other's wage rises, we should 
expect pricing to be adjusted accordingly.
However, if there are (anticipated) costs to immediate price 
changes, we might expect some delay in the response of price to wage 
changes, hence a temporary reduction in margins. The cost of rapid, 
unexpected price changes might arise from imperfect information between 
producers and customers; for example, customers' initial response to a 
price rise might be to search elsewhere, expecting to find cheaper prices 
(ie. sticky prices might be explicable in much the same way as search 
theory tries to explain sticky wages). Alternatively, imperfect 
information amongst producers may result in a temporary 'kinked demand 
curve' if it takes time for information about each others' cost rises to 
become common knowledge within the oligopoly group.(6 )
Whatever the reason for slow adjustment of prices, we have here a 
possible mechanism by which workers' pressure might, at least 
temporarily, erode price-cost margins. But I note that this explanation 
implies that it is the unanticipated rate of change of wages, rather than 
the level of wages, which would be expected to affect margins.
The threat of foreign competition might put a ceiling on domestic 
prices, so that cost rises cannot be marked up beyond a certain point. 
This is the argument put forward by Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972) in their 
analysis of the decline of UK profitability in the late 1960s. Such 
arguments tend to suppose that foreign suppliers do not act, and 
anticipate other producer's reactions, as part of the collusive oligopoly 
group. But this ignores the International Interdependence of 
transnational corporations and the extent of intra-firm International
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trade - viz. the example of the United States in 1977, where Helleiner 
and Lavergne (1979) found that 48% of imports were transactions within 
international corporations.(7) Moreover, Glyn and Sutcliffe's evidence 
on the "profits squeeze" does not adequately confront the argument that 
margins over variable costs may be stable, and that it is the existence 
of quasi-fixed overhead costs (eg. of some salaried staff) which causes 
profit share to be reduced when capacity utilisation declines.
However, I note the implications of Seade's (1985, p.19) analysis 
of asymmetric cost changes in conjectural variation oligopoly, namely 
that if one section of international oligopoly (in this case, say, the UK 
producers) experiences a cost rise, the industry equilibrium tends to 
shift to give UK producers both lower output and lower margins. So, we 
might expect transnational oligopoly adjustments in favour of the more 
efficient foreign producers to squeeze domestic margins and market share 
in a similar manner to the effects of a fully competitive foreign threat. 
(The main difference in the collusive oligopoly model is that the margins 
of foreign producers would rise in response to UK cost rises.) On the 
other hand, the floating of exchange rates since 1972 has made it 
possible (in theory at least) for UK international competitiveness to be 
maintained by depreciation of the currency in response to domestic cost 
rises, in which case nominal cost rises do not necessarily squeeze 
margins. I discuss in Chapter 4 some of the empirical evidence 
concerning the impact of imports and price competitiveness on UK margins.
Bargaining between employers and unions over employment might also 
account for any observed tendency for labour strength to squeeze profit 
margins. It is commonplace to observe that if workers are concerned 
about the level of employment as well as about wages, and in particular 
if the union wishes to maximise wage-rent (ie. the total of wages above 
some minimum, opportunity cost, level) then any bargain which is pareto
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efficient between unions and a profit-maximising employer will set output 
and employment independent of the bargained wage-premium. For if both 
sides wish to maximise their portion of economic surplus, an efficient 
bargain must maximise that surplus; conflict occurs only over the wage, 
reflected in the division of that surplus. The essence of the efficient 
bargaining hypothesis is that employers should be able to get lower wage 
settlements than would otherwise occur by offering unions some form of 
explicit or implicit Job guarantees. Such guarantees remove employers* 
ability to cut output and employment and to pass on wage rises into price 
rises, but the resultant squeeze on margins is offset for the individual 
employer by the lower bargained wage and a higher level of output.(8 )
Evidence on the extent of bargaining over Jobs is mixed. US 
studies by Svejnar (1984), MaCurdy and Pencavel (1983) and Clark (1984) 
provide indirect evidence that bargaining does cover jobs - though both 
Svejnar and MaCurdy and Pencavel have to assume particular forms of 
firm's production functions to derive their results. On the other hand, 
Oswald (1984b) surveys actual union-employer deals in the UK and US and 
finds that explicit bargaining over jobs is conspicuously absent - but he 
does not deal with the possibility that Job bargaining is implicit, nor 
with the possibility that Job bargaining may be more prevalent in periods 
when workers are strong. It does appear that the question and 
implications of whether or not workers and employers do bargain over Jobs 
is worthy of further investigation.
In Chapter 3 I will examine in some detail models of 
union-employer bargaining; and in Chapter 4 I present evidence from a 
cross-sectional study of UK manufacturing industry which examines the 
extent to which workers' strength does erode profit margins and tries to 
distinguish between the various explanations of such a phenomenon as 
discussed above.
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2.4 The Reserve Army Hypothesis
In the last section I have presented some empirical evidence that 
workers' strength can erode profit margins, and some possible 
explanations of why this may occur in spite of employers' market power.
I note here some of the implications, in particular for the 'reserve army 
of labour' hypothesis: that mass unemployment may actually have the 
effect of boosting profitability at the expense of workers' pay and 
conditions.
The Marxist theory of a reserve army of labour acting as a brake 
on labour's strength might appear not to be relevant under monopoly 
capitalism, for if employers maintain stable profit margins, class 
conflict is transformed in aggregate into price inflation without 
affecting aggregate real profitability. In which case, capitalists would 
make the highest real profits by running the economy at full capacity, 
viz. the upward-sloping profits curve in Diagram 1. However, if workers' 
strength can erode profit margins, it opens up the possibility that 
employers would choose to maintain a pool of unemployed in order to 
protect profits by weakening workers' bargaining power. This argument is 
illustrated in diagram 2.2. At increasing employment levels (Li to L4) 
workers' bargaining strength and wage pressure increase, with the effect 
of lowering the average mark-up from mi to m/, so lowering (from PC1 to 
PC4 ) the appropriate notional profits curve which would hold if the 
mark-up was constant. We can trace out the actual profits curve (APC).
If APC peaks below full employment, the reserve army hypothesis is 
validated. Of course it does not mean that increasing unemployment will 
always increase profitability, only that there will be, for capital as a 
whole, an optimal level of unemployment.
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DIAGRAM 2 .2
THE ACTUAL PROFITS CURVE - WHEN RISING EMPLOYMENT SQUEEZES MARGINS
PCj = the notional profits curve r = m(L^).L/a - f
where the margin m is a function of employment t m = m(L) ; m'(L)<0
APC = the actual profits curve r = m(L).L/a - f
The crux of this argument is that unemployment should have a 
debilitating effect on workers' bargaining strength, which in turn should 
affect employers' price-cost margins. I report in Chapter 4 an empirical 
investigation into this thesis, based on an explicit model of bargaining. 
Here I note some time-series studies of the impact of unemployment on 
real wages, or on wage and profit shares, which clearly have some 
relevance to the reserve army hypothesis.
Welsskopf (1979, p.371) concludes in his study of the US economy 
thati "evidence on labour market conditions - both in a cyclical and in a 
longer-run context - was fully consistent with the argument that the
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strength of labour vis-a-vis capital Increases when the reserve army of 
labour is relatively depleted". The late stages of each of five 
successive cyclical expansions saw a fall in the rate of profit in the US 
non-financial corporate business sector. (The same is certainly true of 
the UK economy in 1979.) Weisskopf goes on to argue that his evidence 
also supports the reserve army hypothesis in the longer-run secular 
context.(9 )
Many studies of wage growth have concentrated on the effect of 
unemployment on nominal values, particularly with regard to inflation in 
the 'Phillips Curve' literature,without directly examining the effect of 
unemployment on real wages.(10) In a survey on the literature concerning 
cyclical variation in real wages, Schor (1985) reports mixed evidence 
from other authors, but a tendency to find pro-cyclical patterns prior to 
the 1970s. Her own study of 9 OECD countries leads her to conclude 
(p.465): "in the period 1955-70 real wages displayed a strong procyclical 
pattern, a finding which is consistent with Marxian reserve army models, 
as well as neoclassical and Keynesians models, under certain 
assumptions"; but she finds this procyclical effect diminished in the 
1970s. Unfortunately, her data goes only up to the mid to late 1970s - 
missing out the dramatic rise in unemployment which occurred in the UK 
and other countries at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 
1980s.
Foster, Henry and Trinder (1984) analyse real earnings by sectors 
in the UK, 1965 to 1982. They find that sectoral unemployment reduces 
earnings growth significantly. An even more recent study by Layard and 
Nickell (1985) covers UK manual wages 1954-83, taking in the rise of mass 
unemployment. Taking account of the impact of real wages on employment 
in their 3-equatlon model, they also study the direct Impact of 
unemployment on real manual wages - finding confirmation of the reserve
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army effect.
These studies tend to confirm the argument I put forward in 
Chapter 1 that the recent UK experience of mass unemployment has shifted 
income distribution away from manual workers. Knight (1983) argues that 
the effectiveness of the reserve army has weakened as the unemployed lose 
(or never get the chance to acquire) the skills and motivation with which 
to threaten workers in employment. But his evidence of a rising product 
wage over the recession does not take account of the fact that the 
product wage has risen slower than productivity in the whole economy - 
ie. the share of wages and salaries has fallen. Even in manufacturing, 
where the share of wages and salaries rose 19 79-8 1, this rise occurred 
when manufacturing output slumped by some 15% - and wage and salary share 
has fallen sharply since then (see Tables 2.1 and 1.3). This is entirely 
compatible with the hypothesis that the bargaining power and income share 
of production workers in manufacturing has fallen throughout the 
recession, whilst the salaries of many non-manual workers represent fixed 
overhead costs which inevitably constitute a bigger share of income when 
output falls. Moreover, in terms of real post-tax pay, manual workers in 
manufacturing made only minimal gains in hourly earnings and suffered a 
cut in weekly earnings between 1979 and 1983. Set against the strong 
rise in productivity, it is evident that manual workers' position has 
weakened considerably over the recession.
Nevertheless, it is not so evident that it is Just the level of 
unemployment which weakens workers' position. Knight (1983) argues that 
it is the rate of increase of unemployment which strengthens capital. In 
particular, workers may be weakened by the threat of the sack which is 
directly related to the rate of loss of employment. If this is the case, 
workers may begin to restore their bargaining power and share of income 
as unemployment levels off. Kalecki (1971, p.140) argues that "under a
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regime of permanent full employment, 'the sack' would cease to play Its 
role as a disciplinary measure". But if the reserve army is debilitated 
by long stretches of unemployment, it may be that this effect occurs at 
any stable level of employment.
TABLE 2.1
GROWTH IN UNEMPLOYMENT. OUTPUT AND MANUFACTURING WAGES 1979-83 
S growth over whole period, then annual 8 growth on previoua year
1979-83 1980 1981 1982 1983
UK unemployment 139 25 55 16 6
GDP -1.1 -3.2 -1.9 1.6 2.5
M a n u f a c t u r i n g  o u t p u t -12.3 -8.5 -6.3 0.3 2.3
real D o s t - t a x  waaes (1.2)
a l l  a d u l t a 7.7 4.0 -1.0 0.3 4.3
m a l e  m a n u a l 3.0 2.5 -2.9 -0.3 4.2
f e m a l e  m a n u a l 1.6 2.5 -4.0 -1.6 4.9
m a l e  n o n - m a n u a l 10.3 5.5 -1.1 1.3 4.5
f e m a l e  n o n - m a n u a l 10.4 4.7 -0.9 1.2 5.1
Sources: Employment Gazette, February and Auguat 1984, Blue Book 1984, Economic Trende 
No.371, September, 1984.
Notea: 1. April hourly earninga of full-time men, 21 yeara and over, and women, 18 years 
over, all occupations, excluding those whose pay was affected by absence, 
excluding overtime pay and overtime hours.
2. deflatad by Tax and Price Index
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Kalecki goes on to argue (p.141) that "under a regime of full 
employment ....even the rise in wage rates resulting from the stronger 
bargaining power of the workers is less likely to reduce profits than to 
increase prices". However, if the arguments of section 2.3 hold, that 
workers' strength can in fact erode margins, then unemployment may well 
tend to increase profitability. But it is not clear whether the reserve 
army effect depends on a high level or a rising level of unemployment.
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2 .5  Summary
A considerable empirical and theoretical literature supports the 
hypothesis that oligopoly groups can generally sustain a price above 
marginal costs. Single period conjectural variation equilibrium models 
can be regarded as a convenient simplification of a non-cooperative 
dynamic strategy based on threatened retaliation to deviations from the 
equilibrium configuration. We can expect the deviation of price from 
marginal cost to be an increasing function of the elasticity of demand, 
of product differentiation, of industry concentration and of the level of 
public information about firms' costs, demand and behaviour.
If an oligopoly group does keep a stable margin over costs, and 
if there are constant returns to scale in production, then workers' wage 
rises can increase the product wage only to the extent that they can turn 
the terms of trade against the supplier of the other inputs, and the 
impact of wage rises on income distribution is further lessened by the 
degree of substitutability in production. Given stable margins, 
employers' collective interest should be to run the economy at full 
capacity. A key question is whether or not workers' pressure can erode 
price-cost margins.
There is apparently contradictory evidence that UK manufacturing 
margins are generally stable with respect to demand conditions and costs, 
but that, on the other hand, they are vulnerable to measures of workers' 
strength such as unionisation. US studies also find that unionisation 
tends to reduce margins. This apparent contradiction may be explicable 
by the hypothesis that prices are slow to respond to wage rises, in which 
case the rate of change of wages (or rate of acceleration) might explain 
erosion of margins] or the explanation might lie in the hypothesis that 
foreign competition restrains price rises or the hypothesis that workers
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and employers bargain over employment as well as over wages. In either 
of the latter cases, we might expect margins to be eroded by a high level 
of wages rather than a high rate of change. These alternative hypotheses 
are the subject of further Investigation in an empirical study to be 
reported in chapter 4.
Finally, a number of UK and US studies on real wages and Income 
shares do support the reserve army hypothesis that unemployment may shift 
the distribution of income towards profits, although these studies do not 
generally address the question of the mechanism by which this occurs. 
There is an important but unresolved question of whether it is the level 
of unemployment or its rate of Increase which affects workers' bargaining 
power.
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CHAPTER 3
UNION-EMPLOYER BARGAINING ; THEORY AND EVIDENCE
3.1 Evidence on bargaining over economic surplus
I have argued that oligopolistic industrial structure allows the 
generation of economic surplus, defined here in the neo-classical sense 
of a surplus of revenue over and above the opportunity costs of capital 
and labour, rather than in the Marxist sense where surplus value is the 
gross return to capital, including its opportunity cost. An immediate 
implication of the generation of economic surplus is that workers have 
the potential to bargain for better wages, conditions etc. without the 
threat that the employer will necessarily move their capital elsewhere. 
In a fully competitive environment workers would be able to make only 
temporary gains, based on some short-run immobility of capital, for in 
the longer run employers paying higher wages would be bankrupt or could 
choose to switch out of that area.
Of course economic surplus is only a precondition for workers to 
be able to bid up wages etc; an employer may be able to hold on to all 
the surplus themselves and to pay in wages no more than the alternative 
(expected) wage which the workers would be able to earn elsewhere. 
Workers' ability to encroach on surplus at the micro-level of the 
individual employer is a question of relative bargaining strengths. So 
we might expect that workers' ability to raise wages (taking, for the 
moment, the conditions and pace of work as given) would be the joint 
product of the size of economic surplus and the balance of bargaining 
strengths.
3.1
A classic study of the relationship between monopoly rents, 
workers' strength and wages is Weiss' (1966) investigation of individual 
earnings in the US in 1959. He proxies workers' strength by the degree 
of unionisation and monopoly rents by the level of industrial 
concentration, finding that both unionisation and concentration tend to 
increase earnings. He reports (p.114-115) that "concentrated industries 
pay high incomes for given occupations" and that "the relationship is 
strongest for male production workers where the threat of unionisation is 
undoubtedly greatest". However, he goes on to argue that the higher 
wages found in concentrated industries are largely accounted for by the 
'skill' characteristics of the workers: "the monopolistic industries do 
get superior 'quality' for the incomes they offer ....The labourers in 
concentrated industries seem to receive no more for their services than 
they might in alternative employment for persons with similar 
characteristics. The earnings contain little or no monopoly rent". But 
this final conclusion rests on his identification of economic surplus 
with industry concentration and of workers' strength with unionisation, 
and also on his assumption that variables such as ethnic origins and 
family size measure the 'quality' of labour. When we consider that 
factors other than concentration will affect the size of the Industry 
surplus over which workers can bargain, and that unionisation is only one 
of the determinants of workers' bargaining strength, Weiss' findings that 
these two variables still do have a positive impact on wages (even if not 
statistically significant when a full range of personal characteristics 
are Included as explanatory variables) could well be taken to give 
qualified support to the view that workers d£ bargain over monopoly 
rents. A recent US study by Adams and Brock (1984) finds that where 
monopoly power has been supported by state regulation, for example in the 
airline industry between 1963 and 1976, wages rose much faster than the 
US average. And in 1972, both wages and revenues (per ton-mile) were
substantially higher in the regulated rather than non-regulated sectors 
of the trucking industry.
Evidence on UK wages is mixed. Tylecote (1975) reports a positive 
correlation between industry wage growth over the period 1954-70 and 
industry concentration. Wabe and Leech (1978) look at wage differentials 
amongst adult male manual workers in UK manufacturing industries in 1968, 
finding a generally positive effect of collective agreements on wages, 
but a generally negative effect of concentration and of profitability, 
(although none of these effects are statistically significant at the 5% 
level). Stewart (1983) investigates individual earnings of full-time 
manual males in UK manufacturing in 1975, with comprehensive information 
on training and personal characteristics. His main concern is to isolate 
the effects of individual union membership on earnings, finding an 
average union/non-union differential of 7.7% and a positive effect of 
collective agreement coverage. He reports that concentration has a 
positive impact on earnings (but the effect is statistically significant 
only for non-union members). Geroski, Hamlin and Knight (1982) look at 
UK manufacturing by industry in 1968 for the effects of strike activity 
on wages; they find that Industry profitability does have a positive 
impact on wages when union activity and work-force characteristics are 
accounted for. A recent study of individual earnings in Australia in 
1974 by Brown, Hayles, Hughes and Rowe (1984) also finds that wages are 
affected positively by employers' product market power. But 
Blanchflower's (1984) study of UK 1980 earnings of 'typical' employees 
(by skill groups and by establishment) reports similar conclusions to 
those of Weiss, ie. that the higher wages found in more concentrated 
Industries are largely 'explained' by labour quality variables. But he 
finds a positive effect for the interaction of concentration and 
unionism; and he comments on the finding that wages are negatively 
correlated with rates of return on capital (in the industry in which the
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establishment is located) that: "it is uncertain whether this 
relationship appears because workers are able to obtain higher wages 
where there are potentially high profits causing rates of return to be 
lower than they would otherwise be, or if high rates of return result 
from paying low wages". Moreover, some of his control variables - such 
as the percentages of the work-force who are manual workers, female or 
black - appear to be more relevant to bargaining strength than to labour 
quality.
All in all, there is support for the view that unionisation and 
industrial concentration tend to be correlated positively with earnings, 
and there is agreement that this correlation is diminished when a variety 
of skill and personal characteristics are taken into account. The 
disagreement is generally over whether or not this correlation diminishes 
altogether when personal characteristics are accounted for, and how we 
should interpret the diminution.
If some of the 'personal characteristics' are related to 
bargaining strength rather than to the productivity of labour, or if they 
simply capture some of the effects of higher earnings on behaviour, then 
a diminution of the correlation between earnings and concentration does 
not disprove the bargaining hypothesis. Moreover, unionisation may be a 
poor proxy for workers' bargaining strength and concentration a poor 
proxy for the size of the economic surplus. So I find the evidence gives 
qualified support to the view that workers bargain over economic surplus, 
but there is clearly a need to examine more closely the determinants of 
economic surplus and of workers' bargaining strength, and we need to 
model the process of bargaining.
3.A
3 .2  B a rg a in in g  models
If unions and employers bargain over economic surplus, the 
bargaining must have some of the characteristics of cooperative games, 
rather than the (predominantly) non-cooperative game theory in terms of 
which I discussed the interaction between members of industrial 
oligopolies in the previous chapter. I use the term 'cooperative' in the 
technical sense defined by Roth (1979, p.20, footnote 1) of a game where 
"players can conclude a binding agreement as to what outcome should be 
chosen". For whereas oligpolists can choose output or pricing strategies 
independently of their rivals (although they may build interdependence 
into these strategies), employers and employees cannot function 
independently: they need at the very least to agree to work together, and 
they usually strike enforceable agreements on wage rates. If they do not 
agree on at least the minimum conditions for production to take place, 
then the potential economic surplus over which they might bargain will 
not be realised. So, in the technical sense, wage-bargaining is 
co-operative, even though there may be a high level of conflict over the 
division of surplus between wages and profits. Important elements of the 
worker-employer relationship may be decided non-cooperatively$ for 
example, the level of work effort and the level of supervision may be set 
non-cooperatively by workers and employers respectively, viz. Reich and 
Devine (1981). But I wish to discuss first the cooperative, or 
contractual, aspect of bargaining over economic surplus.
Of course, union-employer bargaining is only one part of the 
process by which are determined wages, prices, profits, etc. The outcome 
of any particular bargain will be heavily conditioned by the economic 
alternatives available elsewhere to employers and to workers. The 
opportunity costs of labour and capital will determine the boundaries 
within which bargaining occurs, for neither side will settle for a
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bargain inferior to what it could obtain elsewhere; and there is room for 
bargaining only if the industrial structure and behaviour allows the 
creation of surplus.
We can decompose bargains into: a) the base position where 
employers have full bargaining power and the union can win no share in 
the surplus; this may be thought of as the market-determined, 
no-bargaining position; and b) the bargained variation from the base 
position, reflecting the division of surplus. The base position is 
determined by the alternative wage which workers can expect to earn 
elsewhere and by the constraints which the employer faces in production 
and in product markets. The bargained variation depends on the size of 
the (potential) surplus, the scope of bargaining and each side's 
preferences and bargaining strength. (In general the outcome of 
bargaining will have macro-economic repercussions which will in turn 
affect opportunity costs. So in a macro-economic analysis the base 
position and the bargained variation are not independent. But for 
micro-economic analysis, we can assume independence).
For example, Diagram 3.1 shows the range of possible bargains over 
the wage and number of Jobs - assuming convex preference sets and taking 
other variables such as hours, work effort and capital stock as given. 
Faced with a given alternative wage and demand and production 
constraints, both employer and union can rank their preferred outcomes 
relative to their no-bargaining alternatives. For instance, the diagram 
shows the alternative wage w as a lower bound to the union's preferred 
bargains and the lower bound for the employer is set by the indifference 
curve Vq which corresponds to the opportunity cost of capital. If the 
employer is a profit maximiser, their indifference curves are the 
iso-profit lines which peak on the labour demand curve LDC. The base 
position is point C where the employer has to pay workers only the
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DIAGRAM 3.1
THE RANGE OF WAGE-JOB BARGAINS
w = alternative wage
Uq = union's minimum utility indifference curve 
V0 = employer's minimum utility indifference curve 
Vi = employer's maximum utility indifference curve 
LDC = labour demand curve
C'C = contract curve 7 ' 7
B = an actual bargain / 7 ' = the range of bargains
/ • /
alternative wage. The actual outcome might be any point B within the 
union's and employer's lower bounds, and it may or may not lie on the 
labour demand curve. The outcome can be thought of as the result of 
superimposing the bargained variation BC on to the base position C. The 
bargaining problem is, of course, to choose the point B given that the
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union's preferred outcome is some point C' on the employers minimum 
utility indifference curve and the employers' preferred bargain is at C 
on the unions' minimum utility indifference curve (and there is no 
mutually preferred outcome).
Roth (1979) describes the solution to the bargaining problem 
arrived at by both Edgeworth and von Neumann-Morgenstern as the contract 
curve (C'C in the diagram) which is the entire set of pareto-efficient 
outcomes which are also individually rational (ie. within the bargaining 
range). If any point off the contract curve was proposed, a bargain on 
the contract curve could be found which would be preferred by both sides. 
But although it is appealing to argue that bargaining outcomes should be 
'efficient' (in the limited, pareto sense) the unresolved problem of 
'equity' is to choose the point on the contract curve - and we can expect 
the two parties to conflict over that choice. If the 'equity' problem is 
somehow resolved first (as, for example, in McDonald and Solow's (1981, 
p.903) notion of a historically determined "fair" division of surplus) 
then the case for an efficient solution is overwhelming. But if 'equity' 
is in dispute, then either party may gladly settle for a solution which 
is inefficient but which they find preferable to the point on the 
contract curve which they would expect otherwise to prevail. 'Strategic' 
tactics aimed at winning a larger share of surplus may dominate the 
mutual advantages of efficiency.
However, Roth (1979) provides a series of models of bargaining 
which lead to a specific solution on the contract curve: the Nash 
solution. This is characterised as the point which maximises the product 
(or geometric average) of the incremental utilities (incremental to some 
alternative non-agreement outcome, with utility measured on some cardinal 
scale, eg. by a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function) of 
each of the parties to the bargain.
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Roth shows how this solution can be derived from Nash's four
axioms s i) independence of equivalent utility representations to 
linear transformations (viz. the arbitrary origin and scale of the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern functions); ii) a principle of symmetry, such that if 
all players have the same no-agreement utilities and if the range of 
possible outcomes is symmetric, then the solution must give each player 
the same utility; iii) the addition or subtraction of "irrelevant 
alternatives", ie. possible outcomes which are not the solution, should 
not affect the solution; iv) that the solution be pareto-efflcient. Roth 
demonstrates that axioms ii) and iv) require the Nash solution to be 
chosen in a symmetric game, for there is only one pareto-efficient 
outcome where all utilities are equal, and that must satisfy the Nash 
solution; but axioms i) and iii) allow any game to be transformed into a 
symmetric game, and the solution to the maximisation of the product of 
utilities is invariant to linear transformations. Moreover, Roth shows 
that the axiom of pareto-efficiency - which, I have argued, is a strong 
and perhaps unwarranted assumption - can be replaced by the much weaker 
assumption of individual rationality, whereupon pareto-efficiency can be 
deduced rather than assumed (with the only alternative to the Nash 
solution being the no-agreement outcome).
The appeal of the Nash solution, apart from its simplicity, still 
rests on the appeal of its axioms. But Roth shows that the same solution 
can be derived from models of a process of two-person bargaining, as 
developed by Harsanyi from Zeuthen, where each player can announce, 
simultaneously, a demand and an offer (ie. a proposed solution). If the 
respective demands and offers are compatible, each player's demand is 
met. If demands exceed the other's offer, each player has the chance to 
either repeat their proposal or accept the other's proposal. If the 
proposals are still not compatible, the disagreement outcome holds. The 
key to Harsanyi's model is that if each player maximises expected
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utility, they will hold out if and only if the ratio (this ratio is 
called the 'risk limit') of the potential gain to the potential loss from 
holding out is greater than their subjectively held expectation of the 
probability that the other will hold out. The critical assumption is, 
then, that each player knows that the player with the lower risk limit 
will concede, which is tantamount to assuming that the players hold 
symmetric subjective expectations. The solution is characterised by the 
non-cooperative equilibrium condition that each player makes the best 
possible proposal given the other proposal - and the Nash solution 
emerges. A player cannot do better than propose the Nash solution if the 
other does just that, since the Nash solution maximises the product of 
the potential losses, so to propose any individually better deal would 
involve lowering one's risk limit below the other players', which would 
(by assumption) require one to concede in the next round.
Roth goes on to expound the argument of Aumann and Kurz that at 
the Nash solution the "fear of disagreement" of each player is the same - 
where fear of disagreement is defined as the ratio of the Incremental 
utility to marginal utility at a point - a measure of the value placed on 
a marginal gain relative to the threat of total loss. Svejnar (1984) 
generalises from the restrictive assumption of symmetry in Nash's axioms, 
which is paralleled by the assumption of symmetric expectations about 
each other's probability of holding out in the Harsanyl-Zeuthen model.
He replaces the symmetry axiom with an assumption that, at the bargaining 
solution, the fear of disagreement of each player is proportional to some 
exogenously determined measure of each player's bargaining power. (This 
notion can presumably be paralleled in the Harsanyi-Zeuthen model by an 
assumption that the stronger player is more likely to 'hold out' than the 
weaker player.)(1) The result is the 'asymmetric Nash solution' which 
maximises the weighted geometric average of utilities, where the weights 
are the players' bargaining powers, and the symmetric Nash solution is
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the outcome of the special case where bargaining powers are equal.
The asymmetric solution has the considerable appeal of allowing us 
to model formally the notion of asymmetric bargaining power which is 
particularly relevant in the case of union-employer bargaining where - 
whatever the union's preferences and the range of feasible outcomes - we 
expect to find at least some situations where the employer clearly holds 
the upper hand. Once we can model asymmetric bargaining power, we can 
then begin to investigate its determinants.
Svejnar (1984) provides a story of the bargaining process to back 
up his solution: any proposal is evaluated by each party in terms of 
their 'fear of disagreement' relative to their own bargaining power; the 
player with the greater relative fear then makes a concession, and 
bargaining converges on the asymmetric Nash solution.
A convenient way of grasping this bargaining solution is to first 
define the bargaining frontier, the set of outcomes which may be reached 
depending on the distribution of bargaining strength. These points will 
be pareto-efficient within the constraints of the bargain. If all the 
variables which enter the two sides' utility functions are subject to 
bargaining, then the result will be fully efficient. But there may well 
be some variables such as effort, supervision and the level of employment 
which are determined unilaterally - in which case the bargaining frontier 
is efficient only in the limited sense of not being pareto-dominated by 
any other bargain given that the 'non-cooperative variables' are 
determined outside the scope of the bargain. For Instance, if the wage 
and the level of employment enter the utility functions of both union and 
employer the bargaining frontier is the contract curve CC' in Diagram 
3.1. This may be efficient only in the limited sense If, for example, 
work effort and supervision are set non-cooperatlvely. Efficiency may be 
further limited if cooperative bargaining is restricted further to cover
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only the wage, ie. if the employer sets the level of employment 
unilaterally (conditional on the bargained wage). If the employer 
chooses the number of Jobs to maximise profit, then the bargaining 
frontier becomes the labour demand curve LDC (or at least that part of 
the labour demand curve along which the union prefers to raise the wage).
So, the bargaining frontier is given by: a) the (institutional) 
factors which determine the scope of bargaining; b) the non-cooperative 
behaviour of each party with respect to variables outside the scope of 
bargaining; and c) the preferences of the two parties, which influence 
the shape of the bargaining frontier. For example, if the scope of 
bargaining covers wages and jobs and the employer aims to maximise 
profits, the bargaining frontier is the contract curve C'C which slopes 
upwards/backwards as the union is more or less concerned about Jobs 
rather than wages - and the contract curve is vertical if the union aims 
to maximise rents from employment.
The solution point on the bargaining frontier is determined by 
each side's fear of disagreement - a function of preferences and of the 
disagreement or 'threat' points - and by their relative bargaining 
strengths. The solution is characterised (see Svejnar (1982)) by the 
condition that the elasticity of substitution of utilities along the 
bargaining frontier equals the ratio of the bargaining strengths:
- dU . V = _1_-b
W  U b
3.1
where U and V are the incremental utility functions of the two parties 
along the frontier and b and (1 —b ) are their respective bargaining 
strength indices.
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Alternatively, we can write
V(x) = Jl^b . Vj (x) vj
U(x) b Ui(x)
3.1.1
where V(.) and U(.) are cardinal indices of utility incremental to the 
disagreement outcome, and functions of the bargaining variables vector x 
(indexed by i).
This simple formulation clarifies the important points which 
influence bargains between an employer and union facing a given set of 
demand and production constraints:
i) opportunity costs are represented as the zero-utility levels of the 
incremental utility functions; they define the upper and lower 
bounds to feasible bargains.
ii) preferences are represented by the utility functions.
iii) the scope of bargaining - whether, for example, bargaining deals 
with the wage only or whether it includes the number of jobs, 
effort, supervision, etc. - acts as a constraint on the utility 
frontier, so Influencing the marginal rate of transformation of 
utilities.
lv) bargaining strengths are represented by the parameter b.
The intuitive appeal of this model of bargaining lies in its 
identification of these four elements which together determine the 
outcome. The solution still implies efficiency (within the scope of 
bargaining) which arises, essentially, from the assumption of full 
information. Svejnar (198A) suggests that disagreements - strikes, 
lock-outs etc. - are potentially explicable by relaxing the assumption of 
full Information with regard to bargaining strengths, hence a period of
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trial and error (and perhaps bluff) may occur during which the parties 
test out each others' strengths. Equally, I would suppose that imperfect 
information concerning each other's preferences and threat points could 
explain failure to agree. Moreover, there may well be scope for 
'strategic' behaviour in determining the scope of bargaining.
The four elements of bargaining are, however, not entirely 
independent of each other. For instance, there is some overlap between 
the concepts of preferences and bargaining power. Even in the symmetric 
Nash solution, the utility gained by one player increases as his opponent 
becomes more risk averse - ie. one is better off if one's rival becomes 
more timid (fear of disagreement increases) (see Roth (1979)). This same 
effect is, in general, mirrored by assigning less bargaining power to the 
rival. It might seem, then, that bargaining power could be captured 
solely by the degree of risk aversion in each player's utility function. 
But each player's preferences with regard to their choices - eg. the 
union's degree of 'risk aversion' as displayed by their preferences 
between wages and jobs - is not necessarily a reflection of their 
relative 'boldness' or their expectation that their rival will concede 
before they do. So, for instance, a rent-maximising union's objective 
function can be represented as U = L.(w-w) and the symmetric Nash 
solution, when the firm is a profit maximiser, is the point mid-way up 
the vertical contract curve C'C in Diagram 3.1. The asymmetric solution 
moves up and down the contract curve as the union's bargaining power 
rises or falls (see later section for mathematical proof). This effect 
can be mimicked in the case of the symmetric Nash solution by 
representing the union's utility as U' = V[L(w-w)], where Increasing the 
convexity/concavity of the function V(.) has the same effect as varying 
bargaining power. The advantage of treating bargaining power separately 
is that it helps us to distinguish the factors which determine the shape 
of the bargaining frontier - the ordinal preference rankings - from the
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factors which determine the bargained position on the frontier. The 
former factors may be regarded as more subjective, eg. a union's attitude 
towards unemployed members and prospective members, and the latter as 
more likely to be external and institutional, eg. the legal and 
historical framework which conditions bargaining and the relative size 
and resources of union and employer. Of course some factors may 
influence both the shape of preferences and the balance of bargaining 
strength: unemployment may make unions more concerned about jobs, but 
give them less bargaining strength.
Svejnar (1984) argues that factors which determine bargaining 
strength may have spill-over effects on the disagreement outcomes, eg. if 
an increase in the union wage leads to an increase in the alternative 
(non-union) wage as well. I argue later that the scope of bargaining may 
well be influenced by some of the same factors which influence bargaining 
strength, in particular that strong employers may choose not to bargain 
over jobs. So the four elements of bargaining may well be 
interdependent. Nevertheless, their identification and separation gives 
us some analytic grasp on the problem of bargaining.
The asymmetric Nash solution has the added advantage of subsuming 
a number of other approaches to and models of bargaining. The 
traditional symmetric Nash solution is one example, where the bargaining 
parameter b is set to 0.5, as used by de Menll (1971), McDonald and Solow 
(1981) and Osborne (1984). Treatment of monopsony and of wage-bargaining 
(eg. Mulvey, 1978) can be dealt with by allowing the 'alternative wage' 
to be a function of labour supplied (viz. an upward-sloping labour supply 
function) and by restricting the scope of bargaining to cover only the 
wage, assuming that employers set the level of employment to maximise 
profit. The (unlikely) case of the 'monopoly union' which can set 
whatever wage it chooses - as analysed by McDonald and Solow (1981),
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Oswald (1982, 1984a, 1984b), Sampson (1983), Gylfason said Lindbeck (1984) 
- is modelled by Imposing the further restriction that employers' 
bargaining power is zero and the opposite case of pure monopsony can be 
dealt with by setting union bargaining strength to zero. Grout (1984) 
extends the model to multi-period bargaining, analysing the implications 
of immobility of capital for bargaining over both the wage and levels of 
employment.
There are other models of bargaining which are not readily 
subsumed into the asymmetric Nash model, for instance the models of Hicks 
(1963) and the later developments of Cross (1969) and Coddington (1968) 
which focus on the bargaining process as a sequence of offers over time 
where expectations of the others' concessions are adjusted by some 
error-correction mechanism. Hicks' analysis does not readily lead to a 
determinate solution, rather exploring the range of indeterminacy of the 
solution and the costs which different lengths of strike might impose on 
employers and unions; these are concepts which might inform analysis of 
the determinants of bargaining power.
The asymmetric Nash model has a number of attractions and 
advantages: its analytic separation of opportunity costs, preferences, 
bargaining scope and bargaining power; the intuitive appeal of its 
axioms, backed up by plausible stories of the bargaining process; its 
generality which allows it to incorporate as special cases a variety of 
other bargaining solutions; its mathematical tractibility. It offers the 
most appealing and productive means of investigating bargaining. (2 )
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3.3 Implications of Bargaining over Employment
Leontief (1946) and Fellner (1947) both point out that if unions 
are at all concerned with the level of employment, then efficient 
contracts must cover jobs as well as wages. Fellner goes on to argue 
that bargaining over Jobs is unlikely, however, because uncertainty over 
product demand would put too much risk on an employer who is bound by a 
contract which prevents her from reducing employment in recession. The 
bargaining model presented in the previous section, however, refers to 
bargains over one period only and allows for recontracting when revenue 
conditions change. The problems of cyclical fluctuations in demand, 
wages and employment and the sharing of the consequent risk are dealt 
with in the literature on 'implicit contracts' which is conceptually 
quite different from the single period bargaining problem, though no 
doubt the two problems can (and perhaps should) be dealt with together.
There is some disagreement over the empirical evidence of whether 
employers and unions bargain over Jobs as well as wages. Oswald (1984b) 
reports survey evidence that most US and UK employers do not bargain 
(explicitly) over employment levels. Nevertheless, there may be implicit 
agreement on Jobs, backing up formal wage-bargaining. Indeed, MaCurdy 
and Pencavel (1983) study employment in US newspaper composing rooms 
comparing models of wage-only bargaining and wage-job bargaining, 
concluding that the latter "comes closer to providing a satisfactory 
explanation" (p.31). Ashenfelter and Brown (1983), on the other hand, 
examine the implications of bargaining on a (vertical) contract curve and 
find the prediction, that the wage and employment should be uncorrelated, 
dlsproven. But both Svejnar (1984) and Clark (1984) report evidence from 
the US in favour of the existence of bargaining over jobs. I seek here 
to explore some of the implications of the hypotheses that bargaining 
does or does not cover Jobs.
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First, suppose that the workers' collectively expressed 
preferences over jobs and wages can be represented by the commonly used 
utility function (see de Menil, 1971; McDonald and Solow, 1981; Svejnar, 
1984):
V (L,w) = L. [u(w) - u (w)]
where L is the level of employment, v7 the alternative wage, and the 
function u(.) captures the relative importance to workers of jobs and 
wages. This function could express the ex-ante risk attitude of a 
typical worker facing the threat of random lay-offs (see Oswald, 1982), 
or, alternatively, the ex-post inequality attitude of the union. For 
instance, concavity of u(.) implies risk- (inequality-) aversion; the 
indifference curves illustrated in Diagram 3.2 become steeper as 
risk-aversion increases and workers require relatively large wage 
increases to compensate for job losses. Attitudes to risk or inequality 
can be conveniently paramaterised (adapting the approach of Svejnar, 
1984) by assuming constant relative risk aversion of the incremental 
utility function:
let -v"(W) . W / v'(W) = r
3.2
where W is the wage increment, W = (w-w); and v(W) is the incremental 
utility function, v(W) = u(w) - u(w). In this case we can write:
v(W) = W1-*7 (1-r)
3.2.1
and see that 1 > r > 0 implies risk aversion, r = 0 implies 
risk-neutrality, and r < 0 implies risk-loving. As r approaches minus 
infinity, indifference curves become horizontal and workers' collective 
utility is a function of the wage alone.
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DIAGRAM 3.2
Comparison of bargaining on the labour demand curve with bargaining on 
the contract curve.
LDC
C'C
B
XY
labour demand curve 
contract curve 
a bargain on the ldc
the range of pareto-superior efficient bargains
iso-profit lines
the union's indifference curves
Second, let the employer's incremental profit function be:
P(L,w) = R(L) - wL - F j R"(L)<0
where concavity of the revenue function can result from decreasing 
returns to the labour input and/or from a down-sloping marginal revenue 
schedule in the product market.(3)
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If the employer alms to maximise profits P(x) and the union to 
maximise a utility function U(x), the asymmetric Nash-bargaining 
problem is:
max. w.r.t.x [P(x) ]1-b. [ U(x) ]b
where x is the vector of variables which are subject to bargaining and 
the ratio (1 —b)/b is the parameter representing the bargaining strength 
of the employer relative to that of the workers. The solution is 
characterised by the condition:
P(x) = (1 —b ) . - Pi(x) / Ui(x) Vi
U(x) b
3.3
If bargaining covers both jobs and wages, the partial derivatives of the 
incremental profit and utility functions of employer and union are as 
follows:
P(w,L) = R(L) - wL - F 
PL(w,L) = R'(L) - w 
Pw (w,L) = -L
V(w,L) r L .[ u(w) - u(w) ]
Vl (w ,L) = u(w) - u(w)
Vw (w,L) = L.u'(w)
3.A
Defining the division of surplus as the ratio of employers' 
incremental profit to workers' incremental wage bill, we can write the 
division of surplus as:
D(w,L) = P(w,L) / Uw-w)
So the bargaining solution (3.3) can be written:
D(b) . b = w - R ' ( L )  = u(w) - u(w)
1-b w - Xt ( w-y ). u ' ( w ) 1 -r
3.5
We see here the established result that if the union is 
risk-neutral (r = 0 ) the level of employment is independent of bargaining
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strength (since R'(L) = w). In this case, the division of surplus 
between union and employer is in direct proportion to their bargaining 
strengths. So the wage will be a positive linear function of workers' 
bargaining strength and the employers' profit (and profit margin) will be 
a negative function of workers' strength. The stronger the union, the 
higher up the contract curve will be the outcome. If the union is 
risk-averse (the case analysed by McDonald and Solow, 1981), ie. if r >
0 , then we can see that the marginal revenue of labour must be less than 
the alternative wage, ie. the level of employment must be greater than 
the 'competitive' level; and the level of employment will be less if the 
union is risk-loving, as it is more prepared to sacrifice employment in 
order to win higher wages.
Many authors restrict their analysis of bargaining to the 
'efficient' case which Includes Job-bargaining. But we may equally well 
investigate the results of bargaining over wages alone - in which case 
the bargaining frontier is the labour demand curve (LDC in Diagram 3.2). 
We can then write the incremental profit and utility functions as 
functions of either the bargained wage w or the level of employment given 
by the labour demand curve: L(w) = L# .
P[w,L(w)]=Q(L*)=R(L*) - R'(L»).L* - F ; U(L«)=L«.[ u(R'(L«)) - u ]
Q ' ( L * ) = - L * . R " ( L * ) ; U ' ( L » )  = L » . u ' . R "  + (u -  u )
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Equation 3.3 allows us to derive the division of surplus d(b) which 
results from bargaining on the labour demand curve:
d(b) = Q(L*) = 1-b . ___________ _____________
L*.(w-fl) b L*.(w-0).u' + (w-U).L'(w)
T umjI---
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From 3.2 we can write the elasticity of the incremental utility function:
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E(w) v'(W).W/v(W) (w-w).u'(w)/(u-u) ( 1 - p )
and we can define the elasticity of the labour demand curve with respect 
to the wage increment as e(w) = L'(w).(w-wj/L*. So
d(b) = 1 -b . 1
b E(w) + e(w)
3.7.1
The division of surplus - the ratio of incremental profits to wage 
rents - cannot be negative; the labour demand elasticity, e, is negative; 
so we can see from 3.7.1 that the bargained outcome must be at a point on 
the labour demand curve where the elasticity of incremental utility 
exceeds the absolute value of the elasticity of labour demand. The more 
elastic is labour demand, the greater is the share of surplus won by the 
employers as they present workers with a less favourable trade-off 
between jobs and higher wages - whereas in the case of wage-job bargains 
(equation 3.5) the division of surplus is a function only of bargaining 
power and the union's attitude to risk or inequality. In both cases, the 
more risk-averse the union the greater is the share of surplus won by the 
employer (though this last result depends on the definition of bargaining 
power, see the discussion on page 3.1 A).
In the case of bargaining on the contract curve, we have seen that 
as employers' bargaining strength rises, the bargaining solution moves 
down the contract curve - giving employers higher profits. The same will 
generally be true for bargaining on the labour demand curve, at least if 
labour demand has a constant elasticity (with respect to the wage 
increment) less than unity and if the unions' risk-aversion parameter is 
fixed. In this case, a rise in employers' bargaining strength will 
unambiguously increase the share of surplus accruing to profits, which 
must Involve a move down the labour demand curve - increasing profits and 
decreasing wage rents.
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With this preliminary analysis, we are now in a position to 
explore critically McDonald and Solow's (1981) conclusion that: "Our 
partial-equilibrium bargaining models ....do quite generally confirm a 
tendency for fluctuations in real product demand at the firm or industry 
level to be accompanied by large correlated fluctuations in employment 
and small changes in real wage rates that could go in either direction."
(p.908)
Their conclusion rests crucially on their assumption concerning 
changes in the reservation wage, and on an implicit assumption that 
bargaining strength is independent of the business cycle. Following 
their presentation, the employers' revenue R(L,B) is a function of the 
level of employment L and of the parameter B which represents the state 
of product demand such that Rg > 0 and Rjjj > 0. Their bargaining problem 
and solution is defined as above, except that bargaining strength b is 
set to one half. The locus of efficient outcomes, the contract curve, is 
defined by the first order condition: w - R^ (L,B) = [u(w)-u(w)]/u'(w).
Extending their results, note that the contract curve slopes up or 
down as u(.) is concave or convex. As product demand rises, both the 
labour demand curve L*(w,B) and the contract curve Lc(w,B,vi) (HC and CC' 
in diagram 3.3) shift to the right if the reservation wage is unchanged:
labour demand L»g(w,B) = - Rlb t rLL > 0
contract curve Lcg(w,B,'w) = - Rlb t rLL > 0
3.8
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DIAGRAM 3.3
Wage find Job Changes over the Business Cycle
HC = labour demand curve
CC' = contract curve
D = an efficient bargain
w s reservation wage
subscript 0 = recession
subscript 1 = boom
But, as the reservation wage rises, so the contract curve shifts left as 
its base point C moves up the labour demand curvet
contract curve L^tw.B.w) = u'(w) /[u'(w).Rii ] < 0
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The first crucial assumption made by McDonald and Solow (p.908) is 
that "cyclical changes in product markets dominate those in the effective
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reservation wage", which I interpret to mean that the move illustrated in 
Diagram 3.3 from one base position to another, from C q  to C i, exhibits a 
greater change in employment than in the wage. Since the bargained 
outcome is some deviation from the base position, fluctuations in 
bargained outcomes must be strongly influenced by the assumed 
fluctuations in the base position. The assumption of a sticky 
reservation wage (which does not move enough to keep employment steady) 
begs precisely the macro-economic question which this micro-analysis 
seeks to illuminate, the relationship of the wage to fluctuations in 
demand and unemployment.
The significance of variable bargaining strength can be 
illustrated by considering the simple case of a risk - or inequality - 
neutral union which reaches an efficient bargain with the employer, in 
which case the contract curve is vertical. In diagram 3.3 the outcome is 
some point D whose position between the base position C and the top of 
the contract curve C* (the point where profits are driven to zero) 
measures the union’s relative strength. In McDonald and Solow's example 
where union and employer strength are assumed to be equal, D lies 
half-way between C and C'. Now, if C' rises by as much as C during the 
boom, and if bargaining strength is unchanged, then DqD^ is parallel to 
Cq Ci and the changes in negotiated wage and Job levels are exactly the 
same as the (assumed) changes in the reservation wage position. But if 
union strength declines in recession, then the change in the negotiated 
wage is enhanced, for D will move closer to C in recession. Furthermore, 
if the contract curve slopes backwards (or if bargaining is restricted to 
the down-sloping labour demand curve) then the recession-induced fall in 
union strength decreases the fluctuation in Jobs as well as Increasing 
the fluctuation in wages. If unions are more concerned about Jobs in 
recession than they are in boom - eg. if they are more concerned about 
current workers than potential recruits, viz. the point made by Chapman
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and Fisher (1984) - this last tendency will be reinforced.
It appears then that the implications of bargaining for wage and 
Job movements are highly dependent on movements in the reservation wage, 
on the scope of bargaining, on union attitudes to Job losses, and on the 
impact of unemployment on union and employer bargaining strengths. There 
is no general tendency for bargaining to cause Jobs to fluctuate more 
than wages.
We can be somewhat clearer with regard to the effect of variable 
bargaining power on movements in profits. In general, whether or not 
bargaining covers employment, an increase in an employer's bargaining 
power will increase their profit - even in the case analysed by Grout 
(1984) where non-binding labour contracts and sunk investment make 
bargaining inefficient. If unions are weakened by unemployment, there is 
a possibility that profits may move antl-cyclically. For even though the 
total (potential) surplus may decline in recession, profits may rise if 
an employer is enabled to win a sufficiently large increase in their 
share of surplus. (In the macro-economic context, this is only true in 
aggregate if average profit margins rise sufficiently in recession to 
offset the decline in capacity utilisation).
The possibility that employers might actually prefer a higher to a 
lower level of unemployment is also argued by Osborne (1984) who makes 
the same point by assuming a symmetric Nash bargain, but makes the 
employer's no-deal pay-off dependent on the number of unemployed.
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3.A The determination of Bargaining Power
The analysis of the previous section suggests that the relative 
bargaining strength of unions and employers has highly significant 
implications for the relationship between wages and employment and for 
the distribution of income. So it is important to investigate the 
determinants of bargaining power. However, much of the literature on 
union-employer relationships avoids this question by simply assuming a 
given balance of power.
On the one hand it is common, eg. in the industrial economics 
literature, to assume that wage costs are taken parametrically by 
individual employers and are not related to the firms' strategies and 
performance in product markets. This approach is often tantamount to an 
assumption that unions have no bargaining power. On the other hand, some 
authors investigating union behaviour make the extreme contrary 
assumption that unions can set whatever wage they choose within the 
bargaining range - eg. Oswald (1982, 1984a, 1984b), Sampson (1983), 
Pencavel(1984), Gylfason and Lindbeck (1984). Law (1977) and Greenwald 
(19 7 9) show that in this case, if the union's objective is to maximise 
the wage, the outcome is the same as that for a worker-controlled firm 
pursuing the same objective, reaching the highest point on the labour 
demand curve which allows non-negative profits. If union utility depends 
on the level of employment too, an all-powerful union would usually 
choose some point lower on the labour demand curve. But as long as the 
union-preferred wage exceeds the reservation wage, any reduction in that 
wage would simultaneously reduce the unions' utility and increase the 
employers' profits. There is a direct conflict of interest over the 
distribution of surplus. To assume that unions have full bargaining 
power is to beg all the questions of the determination of relative 
bargaining strength. Moreover, such an assumption flies in the face of
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evidence that employers use, and carry out, threats to close down 
factories, lock out unions, employ non-union labour, sub-contract work, 
reduce wages, Intensify the pace of work, etc. Employers are far from 
powerless. The assumption that unions can choose the wage stems, 
perhaps, from a confusion between a necessary precondition for 
all-powerful bargaining - that workers should have some collective 
organisation - and the sufficient conditions for such success.
Rather than assume that either unions or employers are all 
powerful, both de Menil (1971) and McDonald and Solow (1981) model 
union-employer bargaining with the symmetric Nash bargain, equivalent to 
assuming an equal balance of strength between the two sides. But this 
approach still avoids examination of the determination of bargaining 
power, though I note McDonald and Solow's (1984, p759) comment that "in 
the absence of any direct measure of bargaining power, it becomes one of 
these self-sealing explanations. Do wages rise in an upswing? The 
union's bargaining power has increased. Do they not? Ah, this time it 
didn't". However, the bargaining model described here does lead to 
empirically testable hypotheses which can, in principle, lead to direct 
measures of bargaining strength. Svejnar (1984) investigates changes in 
wages, profits and employment in twelve major unionised US companies 
between 1954 and the late 1970s. He reports two-thirds of his point 
estimates of union bargaining strength (b in equation 3.3) lying in the 
range of zero to one-quarter.
I will examine a number of hypotheses concerning the determination 
of bargaining strength.
One hypothesis is raised in a survey of literature on worker 
participation in management by McCain (1982, p.22). He suggests the 
hypothesis that the degree of participation, in particular in the 
"extreme" form of co-determination in the German Montanindustrie, may be
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positively correlated with workers' bargaining power. But this 
proposition appears to stem from a confusion between the form of conflict 
(industrial dispute, or round-table bargaining, or formal participation 
schemes) and the relative strengths which underlie the conflict over the 
distribution of surplus. A firm may be formally co-determined, yet the 
owners of capital may hold all the bargaining cards; or an employer may 
shun formal participation yet be forced to concede union demands. If 
there is found to be an empirical link between participation and union 
strength, the direction of causality is ambiguous. I would suggest that 
participation may be correlated with the potential gains to be made from 
bargaining over non-wage variables - however those gains are to be shared 
out between employer and union - in response to the costs of contracting 
under uncertainty. For instance, if the contract curve diverges sharply 
from the labour demand curve there may be significant gains to be made by 
a strong employer trading job increases in return for a lower wage; and 
some partlcpation scheme may be introduced in order to allow the union to 
monitor the agreement. Or participation may be introduced to remove some 
of the inefficiencies arising out of non-cooperative behaviour over work 
effort and supervision . But such participation schemes motivated on 
efficiency grounds are not necessarily either the cause or the product of 
union strength.
Alternatively, we might suppose that a significant influence on 
bargaining outcomes is exerted by costs of search, selection, hiring and 
training. These raise the cost to employers of hiring new workers
above the alternative wage. For example, Doyle (1984) analyses the 
implications of hiring costs for the evolution of wage bargains over 
time; but, even in his dynamic framework, the overall distribution of the 
present value of surplus still depends on the assumed degree of 
competition or monopoly in both the supply of and demand for labour. 
Hiring costs drive a wedge between the alternative wage available to
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workers and the alternative cost to the employer of labour. But this 
wedge is not won automatically by either labour or capital; rather, it 
constitutes part of the surplus (of revenue over opportunity costs) which 
may be won by either side. If there is sufficient competition amongst 
employers, unions may be able to drive the wage above the alternative 
wage to the level of the alternative cost of labour. On the other hand, 
a monopsonistic employer who can easily hire new workers may be able to 
keep the wage down to the alternative wage. Indeed, hiring costs may act 
as a barrier to entry and enhance employers’ monopoly/monopsony power.
I conclude that neither participation nor hiring costs are primary 
determinants of bargaining strength. We need to examine union and 
employer control over labour supply and demand,(A) and each side's 
(perceived) ability and determination to impose and suffer sanctions. I 
put forward here only some tentative suggestions.
A preliminary point to clarify is a distinction between: a) the 
sanctions which may be threatened in a dispute - strike, lock-out etc. - 
which are essentially short-term threats; and b) the 'disagreement 
outcomes' which set the limits to the range of feasible bargaining 
solutions. The latter 'disagreement outcomes' I see as essentially 
medium- to long-term factors, determined by the opportunities available 
to unions and employers in the eventuality of being unable to reach 
agreement in the longer term. Workers will have some notion of what they 
can expect to earn elsewhere in the longer term (taking into account both 
union and non-union wages and the extent of unemployment and the level of 
benefits) and will presumably not settle for less than this 'alternative 
wage' - but in the short term, in furtherance of an immediate dispute and 
in anticipation of winning a wage above the alternative, they are often 
prepared to suffer a temporary loss of earnings well below the 
alternative wage. Similarly, employers will have some view of the rate
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of return they can expect to earn on their realisable capital, setting a 
minimum profit constraint on bargaining. But they will be prepared to 
suffer temporary losses in the expectation of a better bargain. Hence 
the need to distinguish short-term sanctions, which influence bargaining 
strength and the division of surplus, from the longer-term alternatives 
which determine the boundaries to bargaining and the size of the surplus 
- a distinction which is all too often confused.
The effectiveness of the short-term sanctions of strike and 
lock-out will depend partly on the magnitude of the losses each side can 
threaten on the other, partly on the (perceived) ability of each side to 
both carry out and withstand such threats, and partly on perceptions of 
each other's 'toughness'. So, for instance, labour legislation, union 
and employer history and morale and the political climate will presumably 
influence each side's ability and willingness to carry out threats. 
Pronouncements and legislation on unions and industrial relations coming 
from governments may be seen as an attempt to influence the real outcomes 
of bargaining between wages and profits. Furthermore, employers will be 
at an advantage if they have numerous sources of supply of labour and are 
able to switch production and investment between one bargaining unit and 
another. So there will be an important effect on bargaining due to the 
size and scope (national or transnational) of firms and employers' 
organisations relative to the size and scope of union organisation.(5)
I want to pay particular attention here to the impact on 
bargaining strength of unemployment. The level of unemployment will 
affect workers' expectations of the wage they can receive elsewhere, 
hence their reservation wage. But high unemployment will also lower 
workers' ability to finance a strike through temporary alternative 
employment; and unemployment will generally enhance employers' ability to 
withstand a strike or impose a lock-out on the union by making it easier
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to employ temporary non-union labour or to temporarily sub-contract work. 
The level and rate of change of unemployment will also affect employers' 
attempts to lower the efficiency wage through intensification of work, by 
sharpening the threat of dismissal for those workers who do not comply 
(see Kalecki, 1971, p.140).
Svejnar (1984, p-17) finds in his empirical study of bargaining in 
a sample of unionised US corporations that "union bargaining power is 
affected ....positively by unemployment". He points out that this result 
is a corollary of the observation that the union/non-union wage 
differential varies positively with unemployment. But there is no 
explanation why unemployment should increase workers' bargaining power 
when there is an obvious expectation that unemployment should have the 
reverse effect. It is possible that his finding is the result of 
inter-temporal wage contracts (implicit or explicit) which provide some 
cushioning against cyclical fluctuations in the wage of unionised 
workers.
In summary. I have argued in this section that neither the 
existence of unions, nor the form or scope of bargaining and 
participation schemes, nor the existence of hiring and training costs, is 
necessarily any indication of the balance of union-employer bargaining 
strength. Rather, we should look to employers' and unions' relative 
sizes and financial resources, to labour history and legislation, and to 
the level of unemployment and its rate of change.
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3.5 The scope of bargaining (or why employers prefer not to bargain over 
jobs)
I have reported the disagreement in the literature on whether or 
not the level of employment is in fact usually subject to bargaining 
between unions and employers. The question I raise here is whether there 
may be a conflict of interest over the inclusion of Jobs in bargaining.
Bargaining over the wage alone leads to inefficient outcomes if 
the union is at all concerned with the level of employment.
Nevertheless, employers may prefer not to bargain over jobs if the 
consequent lessening of the threat of job losses (in response to any 
bargained wage rise) would enable workers to win a larger share of the 
economic surplus. I will show that this is often the case if bargaining 
is characterised by the (asymmetric) Nash co-operative game where the 
bargained outcome is affected not just by the exogenous bargaining 
strengths of the two parties, but also by the marginal rate of 
transformation of utilities along the bargaining frontier. Changing the 
shape of that frontier by including or excluding jobs from the bargaining 
agenda will alter the division of surplus. Thus, the evidence cited by 
Oswald (1984b) that most US and UK employers do not explicitly bargain 
over employment levels may be the result of an employers' strategy to 
pre-set the bargaining agenda in their own favour.
In principle, a move towards an efficient bargaining solution 
could be facilitated by compensating side-payments. But agreements to 
make such payments may be unenforceable and unreliable. Workers need 
only know that they will be able to win Job guarantees (implicit or 
explicit), then they will press wage demands more strongly than if they 
are faced with a trade-off between wages and Jobs.
Oswald (1984b) argues an alternative explanation for the
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prevalence of explicit bargaining over wages alone, namely that unions 
are indifferent to the threat of Job losses since lay-offs are often 
characterised by seniority rules which give effective job-security to the 
median union voter.(6) On the other hand we should consider the growing 
evidence from the last few years of no-redundancy deals, agreements to 
restrain wage rises or accept wage cuts in the face of threats to Jobs, 
and - most notably - industrial action against the threat of job losses 
as exemplified by the year-long UK pit strike. These examples imply that 
workers are concerned not only about risks to their own employment but 
also about the job chances of family, community and fellow worker. Such 
concern may be more pronounced in times of high or rising 
unemployment.(7 ) I argue here that although workers are concerned about 
the level of employment it will often be in the employers* interest to 
restrict bargaining to cover only the wage.
My first proposition is that if a) the workers' utility function 
exhibits constant relative risk aversion and b) the bargaining outcome is 
characterised by the asymmetric Nash solution;(8 ) and c) relative 
bargaining strengths are fixed, then the employers' share of the surplus 
(of revenue net of opportunity costs) is higher if they restrict the 
scope of bargaining to cover wages only than if they bargain over 
employment as well.
This proposition is easily demonstrated by comparing the results 
given in equations 3.5 and 3.7.1 for the division of surplus on the 
contract curve and on the labour demand curve respectively. As we have 
seen, the share of profits is proportional to the degree of
workers' risk aversion in both cases but is also positively related to 
the elasticity of the labour demand curve when bargaining covers only the 
wage. So the employers' share of surplus is always less on the contract 
curve than their share of surplus on the labour demand curvet
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D(b) = 1 + e(w) < 1dlbT TT^ r)
3.10
this ratio must be less than unity because the elasticity of the labour 
demand curve (e) is negative, and the elasticity of the incremental 
utility function (1-r) is positive.(9)
We can explain this result through examination of the necessary 
condition for the bargaining solution (3.1) which tells us that the 
division of incremental utility is determined not only by the ratio of 
bargaining strengths, but also by the marginal rate of transformation of 
utility along the bargaining frontier. A down-sloping labour demand 
curve threatens workers with loss of Jobs if they win a higher wage, so 
putting workers at a disadvantage relative to the employer who chooses 
employment optimally. We can see from 3.10 that the greater is the 
threat of Job losses along the labour demand curve (the greater the 
absolute value of the labour demand elasticity e) the more pronounced is 
the shift in the division of surplus in the employers' favour if 
bargaining is switched from the contract curve to the labour demand 
curve. This shift in favour of the employer is also the more pronounced 
the greater the emphasis that workers put on Jobs (ie. the greater the 
risk- or inequality-aversion parameter r), for the more that workers 
value Jobs, the more effective is the deterrent threat of job losses.
Now, in order to argue that employers earn higher profits by 
bargaining over the wage alone, it is not enough to demonstrate that the 
employer can thus win a larger share of surplus; for the size of the 
surplus varies with the level of output and employment.
Surplus is S(L) = P(w,L) + L.(w-w) = R(L) - w.L - F
A convenient benchmark case for analysis is when the workers' are
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risk- or inequality-neutral. In this case the utility function is linear 
in the wage, so we can write u(w) = w and the union's maximand is the 
wage-surplus L.(w-w). Since both union and employer want to maximise 
their portion of surplus, it is evident that any efficient bargain must 
maximise the total surplus. Surplus is divided between employer and 
workers in direct proportion to their bargaining strengths. In this case 
we can show the following proposition to be true:
if a) the union is risk-neutral;
b) the bargaining outcome meets the asymmetric Nash 
condition;
c) the labour demand curve is linear or concave;
then the employer wins a higher level of profit by bargaining 
over the wage alone rather than over wages and jobs.
PROOF
It is convenient to normalise the level of employment L so that 
the efficient level of employment Le =1. So bargaining over both 
jobs and wages will yield:
Surplus Se = S(1) = R(1) - w - F 
Profit Pe = (1-b).Se 
Wage we = w b.Se
Consider the point B on the labour demand curve where the employer 
would earn the same profit Pe as the efficient bargain (see diagram 3.4). 
Let employment at this point be t, so the wage is w = R'(t). Using 
equation 3.6 we can compute the marginal rate of transformation of 
utility along the labour demand curve at point B as:
M(t) i -Q'(t) = t.R"(t)
U' it) t. H" (t) + (w-vJ)‘
and the division of surplus at this point is:
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D(t) Q(t)
uTtT
(1-b). Se 
t. (w-vT)
DIAGRAM 3.A
Comparison of a bargain on the (vertical) contract curve with the 
iso-profit point on the labour demand curve.
LDC = labour demand curve 
C'C = contract curve
We can now compute the elasticity of transformation of surplus between 
wages and profits along the labour demand curve. This ratio would be 
equal to the ratio of bargaining strengths if this were the solution 
point to bargaining over the wage (see the bargaining condition 3.1).
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D(t) . b = b.Se . t.R"(t) + (w-w) 
MTtT 1-b (w-w)t t.R"(t)
or
D ( t )  . _ b _  = (we -  w) . [1 -  t (  t - 1 ) R" ( t )  -  ( R ' ( t )  -  R ', (1 ) )  ] 
THTT 1-b  (w - w) t 2 . R " ( t )
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We know that we < w, so the value of the first term in 3.11 must be less 
than unity. Note that R"(t) is the slope of the labour demand curve at 
point B. If the labour demand curve is linear or concave (if R"'(L) 0,
t$L^1 ) ) then we know that:
R"(t). (t-1) $ R'(t) - R '(1)
3.12.1
and, since t < 1 ,
t.(t-1 ).R"(t) < R*{t) - R *(1)
3.12.2
So the value of the second term in 3.11 must also be less than unity.
-Q(t) . U'(t) < (1 —b)/b 
Q *(t) U(t)
3.13
This result tells us that the ratio of the elasticity of 
transformation of surplus at point B is less than the ratio of bargaining 
strengths. In terms of Svenjar's (1984) exposition of the bargaining 
process, if the deal represented by point B is proposed by the union 
which is bargaining over the wage only, then the employers would find 
that their bargaining power relative to their fear of disagreement 
(measured by the ratio Q(t) / Q'(t) ) is greater than the union's 
bargaining power relative to its fear of disagreement; so the employer 
would be able to win a better deal further down the labour demand curve, 
where they would make more profit than they can make through bargaining 
on the contract curve.
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M U T 1 - b  (w -w )t t . R " ( t )
or
D(t) . b = (we - w) . [1 - t(t-1)R"(t) - (R * (t) - R ', (1 )) ]
MTtT 1 -b (w - w) t2 .R"(t)
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We know that we < w, so the value of the first term in 3.11 must be less 
than unity. Note that R"(t) is the slope of the labour demand curve at 
point B. If the labour demand curve is linear or concave (if R"'(L) ^ 0, 
t$L$1 ) ) then we know that:
R"(t). (t-1) $ R'(t) - R*(1)
and, since t < 1 ,
t.(t-1).R"(t) < R'(t) - R'(1)
3.12.1
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So the value of the second term in 3.11 must also be less than unity.
-Q(t) . U'(t) < (1-b)/b 
Q'(t) U(t)
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This result tells us that the ratio of the elasticity of 
transformation of surplus at point B is less than the ratio of bargaining 
strengths. In terms of Svenjar's (1984) exposition of the bargaining 
process, if the deal represented by point B is proposed by the union 
which is bargaining over the wage only, then the employers would find 
that their bargaining power relative to their fear of disagreement 
(measured by the ratio Q(t) / Q'(t) ) is greater than the union's 
bargaining power relative to its fear of disagreement; so the employer 
would be able to win a better deal further down the labour demand curve, 
where they would make more profit than they can make through bargaining 
on the contract curve.
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This last argument can be shown more formally. We can ignore the 
trivial case where the iso-profit point B is on a section of the labour 
demand curve where union utility is an increasing function of employment 
(in which case a move down the labour demand curve is an improvement for 
both parties). So we are concerned only with cases where U'(t) is 
negative. Of course, Q'(t) is positive, so we know that the ratio Q(t) / 
U(t) is an increasing function of t. Employers' share of surplus is 
strictly increasing as we move down the labour demand curve. We can also 
show that the marginal rate of transformation of surplus, the ratio 
-U'(t)/O'(t), is an increasing function. Given the assumption that u"(w) 
= 0, we can write equation 3.6 ass
Q'(t) = -t.R"(t) > 0; and -U'(t) = -t.R"(t) - (R'(t) - w) > 0 
therefore
d (—U*(t)/Q*(t)) = d(1+R'(t)-w) = t.R".R"-(R'-w).(t.R"'+R") > 0 
dt dt t.R" Cu r '"') 2
This ratio must be positive given the assumptions that R"() and R"'() are 
not positive. So, since the term on the left of inequality 3.13 is the 
product of two functions of t which are both positive and increasing, 
this term must itself be an increasing function at point B and along all 
relevant sections of the labour demand curve. So the necessary 
bargaining condition can be satisfied only when employment is greater 
than t, ie. lower down the labour demand curve where profits are higher. 
QED.
Note that while this result must hold if the labour demand curve 
is linear or concave and if the union is risk-neutral, it may well hold 
more generally. For instance, even if R"'(L) > 0, so that inequality
3.12.1 is reversed, Inequality 3.12.2 may still be satisfied. Even if 
this Inequality is reversed, so that the second term in 3.11 is greater 
than unity, the first term may be small enough to maintain the result.
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Given the more general result that, with constant relative risk-aversion, 
employers' share of surplus is always higher on the labour demand curve, 
it seems reasonable to conclude in favour of a general presumption that 
bargaining on the labour demand curve will be more profitable for 
employers than bargaining on the contract curve.
The implication of this analysis is that there will usually be 
conflict between unions and employers over whether or not to include 
employment in the scope of bargaining.(10) The tradition that employers 
retain the power to set employment levels unilaterally is one which we 
may expect employers to guard jealously.(1 1 )
This analysis begs the question of who defines which variables 
will be the subject of bargaining. The Nash bargaining model simply 
treats the scope of bargaining as exogenous (as it treats the setting of 
each side's threat point). The bargaining parameter (b) captures only 
one dimension of power - the division of surplus within the exogenous 
constraints. The ability to set the scope of bargaining should be 
recognised as another dimension of bargaining power. So we may interpret 
evidence that employers bargain over wages alone as an indication of 
employers' power, and evidence of bargaining over jobs as some indication 
of workers' power.
An obvious implication of this argument is that we should look to 
cyclical evidence, expecting to observe a wider prevalence of bargaining 
over Jobs when workers are strong and able to win substantial concessions 
out of employers - and that employers should return to unilateral 
employment-setting when workers' bargaining strength is relatively weak. 
However, a counter-tendency is implied to the extent that workers' 
strength is negatively related to the level of unemployment, but their 
valuation of the importance of Jobs is positively related to 
unemployment. When unemployment is high we might expect workers to be
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relatively more concerned about Jobs, but lacking the power to win job 
deals; on the other hand, when unemployment is low and workers are able 
to win job guarantees, they may be relatively unconcerned about Job 
levels, expecting little trouble in finding employment elsewhere, with 
the result that the contract curve will be closer to the labour demand 
curve and it may be difficult to observe significant effects of job 
bargaining. This is not to argue that the thesis that employers prefer 
not to bargain over jobs is empirically untestable! Rather, the 
implication is that cyclical evidence may reflect the two opposing 
tendencies of incentive and ability to win Job deals; so we should 
perhaps look to other sources of variation in workers' bargaining 
strength - either in cross-sectional studies or in secular trends - in 
order to pick up the effect on the prevalence of bargaining over 
employment.
Finally, I note that many of the results of this section are 
anticipated by Cowling (1982, p.111-115) in his discussion of 
"all-or-none" contracts.
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3.6 Capital structure and the minimum profit constraint.
So far I have assumed that the opportunity cost of capital 
invested in the firm or industry is simply the market rate of return.
This cost is, in effect, deducted from gross revenue before the union and 
employer divide up the surplus. But if some parts of capital costs are 
sunk, their post-investment opportunity cost is zero and the 
post-investment surplus is increased correspondingly. If the 
pre-investment contract is not binding, efficient contracting is 
distorted according to the analysis of Grout (1984). The situation is 
similar to the horizon problem of "participatory" firms analysed by 
Ireland (1984), where the current owners face a dis-incentive to invest 
to the extent that part of the future surplus generated by the investment 
will be won by the future work-force.
It is recognised in the worker-control literature (eg. Ireland and 
Law 1982) that the distortionary effect of sunk investment may be 
nullified if the investment is financed externally or rented. The same 
argument applies to bargaining (or participatory) firms; with external 
finance the employer faces a financial constraint, enforced by the threat 
of bankruptcy, to cover the full cost of capital. External financing 
removes the return to capital from the bargaining arena even if capital 
costs are not recoverable. So owners have an incentive to seek external 
funds to cover their investment costs, particularly if capital is not 
fully and readily mobile.
The owners of a firm have an incentive to carry this financial 
strategy a stage further by finding external funds not only to cover the 
cost of capital but also to cover the expected stream of monopoly 
surplus. To give an extreme example, the owners of a firm which is in a 
position to earn monopoly profits could sell or rent their assets at a
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valuation which assumes that workers will in future be paid only the 
alternative wage. Even if capital costs are sunk and the firm faces a 
strong union, as long as the new employers are renting the assets or have 
borrowed in order to purchase them (and have limited liability), the firm 
then faces the union with a zero financial surplus. The threat of 
bankruptcy will ensure that workers do in fact settle for the alternative 
wage, as long as the lenders (or lessors) are seen to be determined to 
enforce bankruptcy in the case of default. It will be in the interests 
of the lenders to acquire a reputation for strictly enforcing bankruptcy.
Of course, in practice risk and moral hazard may limit the 
feasible financial gearing. But it is still clear that there is a strong 
incentive to capitalise expected surplus through external funding in 
order to pre-empt bargaining.(12) This is similar to the point made by 
Cowling (1982, p.11A) in the context of worker-controlled firms where he 
argues that capitalists may choose to withdraw from the fray of 
industrial conflict to the role of finance capital "supplying capital at 
arms' length to worker-controlled enterprises".
Cowling's point applies generally to employers facing strong 
unions as well as to worker-controlled firms (or 'co-determlned' firms); 
and the same motive is applicable to capitalists seeking to hire out, 
licence or franchise assets which are capable of earning monopoly profit. 
For if surplus has already been capitalised, employers have nothing to 
lose to workers' bargaining power (short of expropriation!).
3.A3
3 .7  THE INTERACTION OF MONOPOLY AND BARGAINING POWER
Having examined in thia chapter the model of Nash bargaining in 
the context of a single union-employer deal, we are now in a position 
to examine the implications of disaggregated bargaining in an 
oligopolistic economy. In particular we can examine more formally the 
proposition advanced in Chapter 2 that employers' monopoly power in 
product markets can nullify workers' attempts to alter aggregate income 
distribution, unless employers bargain over jobs as well as bargaining 
over wages. We can also examine how bargaining and monopoly power 
interact to determine relative prices and real wages, and investigate 
the necessary conditions for the price level to be stable.
I will consider a two-sector economy, though the principles of 
the analysis are generally applicable to any number of sectors. I will 
treat each sector as an oligopoly group, noting that appropriate 
behavioural assumptions allow us to model competitive behaviour (and we 
can regard one of the sectors as the foreign sector if we so wish).
In each sector an oligopolistic group of firms produces an 
homogenous product. Within a sector each firm (indexed by i - 1,..n) 
has labour as its only input, operates under constant returns to scale 
and faces a wage which is the result of bargaining between that firm 
and its workers. Wage bargaining satisfies the cooperative Nash
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bargaining solution described earlier and the bargaining is carried out 
anticipating (correctly) the product market outcome which will result, 
taking the wage bargains in rival firms as given. I start by 
considering a general model of conjectural variation oligopoly, which I 
then simplify to a symmetric duopoly in each industry of an economy 
where demand is generated by a Cobb-Douglas utility function. I 
consider two general cases : first where bargaining covers the wage 
alone; I will later consider the effects of bargaining over jobs as 
well as wages.
3-7.1 Product Market Behaviour
Within each sector / industry we can conveniently parameterise 
product market behaviour using the model of proportional conjectural 
variation described in Chapter 2 (see Clarke and Davies [1982]). Given 
the set of negotiated wages, each firm faces a profit-maximising 
problem :
where X is industry output, L employment, W is the wage, P is profit, 
and subscripts denote the relevant values for the firm. The 
conjectural variation parameter a captures the anticipated punishment 
strategy in retaliation against any deviation from equilibrium. I take 
the absolute value of a to be less than one. This parameterisation 
allows us to represent neatly the whole range of oligopoly behaviour 
from pure competition to outright monopoly. The lower limit of -1
max. w.r.t. L'i P - P(X).X±i
s.t
dX = 11 + a.tf-X^ - 1< a< 1
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captures the Bertrand assumption (in a symmetric duopoly) which leads 
to the competitive outcome; and the upper limit of 1 captures 
joint-profit maximising behaviour. X is industry output, which I 
normalise to be equal to employment L. The first order condition for 
profit maximisation is :
p ( 1  - s ± ( 1  -a) + a ] 
e
where s is market share ( L. / T \ , . ,i / L ) and e is the absolute value
of the elasticity of industry demand. Summing over all firms in the 
industry we can write the ratio of the industry price to the 
(unweighted) average cost (w) as :
£. = e / l e
w
where w = £ W^
n
We can see here the result, well-known in conjectural variation 
models, that the degree of monopoly, as measured by industry price 
relative to costs, is inversely related to demand elasticity and to 
industry numbers, and positively related to the collusion parameter a - 
but the margin (as defined here in relation to the average wage) is 
independent of the level of costs.
- (n- 1 )a + 1 )
n
3. 14
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Of course, the demand in each industry in an economy will not in 
general be independent of the wage and price outcome in other 
industries. But I am interested here in simplifying the analysis in 
order to concentrate on the interaction of bargaining power and 
monopoly power. So for the purposes of this model I shall assume that 
consumers have identical Cobb-Douglas utility functions which generate 
demand of unit elasticity for each good. I shall also simplify the 
analysis of interactions in product markets by assuming duopoly in each 
industry. These simplifying assumptions reduce the determination of 
firms' monopoly power in product markets to just the collusion 
parameter, a, allowing a more straightforward investigation of the 
interaction between product market and labour market power. I will 
first deal with monopoly and bargaining within an industry. We can 
write the industry price, each firm's output/employment level, and 
profit margins as functions of the bargained wages (W), monopoly power 
(a), and industry demand (R) :
industry price : p - W. + W„
Industry price is a positive mark-up on average costs if the 
collusion parameter a > -1• Each firm's market share, margin and total
relative to the costs of its rival. The firm with the lower wage has 
botn a larger share of the market and a higher margin (and therefore 
higher profits) than its rival. The aggregate industry price-cost
employment in firm i : 1^
1 -a
= R(l-a).___
( w 1+ w 2)'2
firm profit margin m i
P
industry profit margin : m - 1 - 2(l-a)W 1 W 2
R (w 1 + w 2)^
profits are inversely related to its own costs (the bargained wage)
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margin m is positively related both to the degree of collusion and to 
the dispersion of wages (because the more dispersed the costs, the 
greater the market share going to one firm and the greater the 
concentration in the market).
We can see from 3-_1_5 that a change in the bargained wage in a 
firm will affect not only its own performance, but also the performance 
of the rival firm and of the industry. These effects are summarised in 
Table 3.1.
From 3.13 we see that if both firms face proportional pay rises, 
their market shares and margins are protected ( and so too are their 
profits, because of the assumption of unitary elasticity of demand).
TABLE 3.1
The effects of increasing the wage in firm i, with exogenous W^
firm i firm j industry
employment L
market share s ♦
profits
concentration H
profit margin m
P
+ iff Vi> Wj 
+ iff Vi> Wj 
♦ iff Wi> Wj
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However, if the wage in the rival firm is presumed to be independent of 
a firm's own bargain, then bargaining will be expected to affect market 
shares and profits. Indeed the table shows that bargaining at the 
level of the firm does involve a direct conflict between wages and 
profits. (I assume that each firm and union are concerned in 
bargaining only with nominal values, ignoring for the moment any effect 
of their bargaining on the overall price level). Employers will want 
to keep wages in their firm down, while workers will want to push up 
the wage to their preferred point on the labour demand curve (the point 
where consequent job losses would outweigh the value of further wage 
rises).
3.7.2 Bargaining Over The Wage
I assume here : i) that bargaining occurs at the level of the 
firm; ii) that workers aim to maximise their utility above some 
alternative wage 9, with their preferences over wages and jobs captured 
by the 'risk-aversion' parameter r (see page 3.18); iii) that firms 
aim to maximise profits, anticipating the product market outcomes as 
described in the last section; iv) that bargaining covers only the 
wage and satisfies the Nash bargaining conditions, with the relative 
bargaining strength of the workers captured by the parameter b. Union 
utility and employers' profit in firm i (in an industry where total 
revenue is R) are given by ;
3-49
U
1 - L i (Wi - w ) 1_r » R ( 1 - a t ) . Wi  . (W± -  w ) 1 r
( w i + w j )2
r < 1
P i = R. W i (a1 W 1 + W i )
(W± + Wj)2
The Nash bargaining solution gives the result :
( 1 -b i>ai 
a . W +VJ
2 0
3. 16
which defines implicitly the bargained wage in firm i as a function of 
the following parameters or exogenous variables : the alternative 
wage; the wage in the other firm of the duopoly ; the risk-aversion 
and bargaining power of workers in firm i; and the level of employers' 
monopoly power in the industry.
In the case of a Cournot duopoly, where a - 0, the bargained wage
is :
where the bargained wage is an increasing function of the rival wage, 
of the alternative wage and of bargaining power. The assumption of 
unitary demand elasticity implies that the bargained wage will tend to 
infinity if workers are sufficiently risk-loving (if r is sufficiently 
negative) to ignore the consequent job losses.
2w + b l(l-rl)W1 b i ( 1 _ r i) < 2
3-5 0
In the general case where the collusion parameter a is not 
necessarily zero, I assume that workers are sufficiently risk-averse to 
sectle for a finite wage. Bargained wages are, of course, 
interdependent, but the industry outcome is easily established in the 
case where the duopolists face similar profit functions and where the 
risk-aversion and bargaining strength parameters of the workers in each 
of the firms of the industry are the same; for then we can impose a 
condition of symmetry on the bargained outcomes. I take the symmetric 
duopoly equilibrium in wage bargaining to be the wage W* which 
satisifies the bargaining solution in each firm, given that the same 
wage holds in the rival firm.
W - w ' (1+ab)
l-b&-r(l+a) ]
6 W *> 0 , 6 W * < 0 , 6 W * > 0  if a > - 1 , 0< b <1
6 a 6 r 6 b
* _a = -1 or b _ 0 W = w 3.17
We can see here that as the degree of monopoly power disappears 
(as the collusion parameter a approaches a lower limit of -1 ) workers 
are unable to raise the wage at all, for no surplus is generated over
which they can bargain. The greater the degree of monopoly power
exercised by employers, the greater the nominal wage which workers are 
able to win with a given level of bargaining power; and the greater 
their bargaining power, the higher their wage. We can also see that as 
workers' concern over job losses diminishes (as the parameter r 
decreases) the bargained wage increases, a phenomenen which mimics an 
increase in bargaining power (as discussed in section 3 -2 ).
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Since the purpose of this exercise is to examine the interaction 
of bargaining and monopoly power, I will simplify the analysis by 
considering the case where the risk aversion parameter r is zero, i.e. 
the case of the rent-maximising union. In this case the symmetric 
duopoly bargained wage and the industry price are:
r = 0 -*• W* = w ( 1 +ab) 
1 -b
P = 2w ( 1 + a b ) 
( 1 - a ) ( 1 -b)
*the product wage W 
P
= *s(l-a)
price-cost margin m “ *s(l+a)
The product wage and the distribution of income in the industry 
are determined solely by the employers’ monopoly power in product 
markets, since they pass on symmetric bargained wage rises in full. 
Nevertheless, workers' bargaining power in an industry enables them to 
increase their nominal wage. But the real wage depends on the price 
level in the whole economy. Here, we treat the rest of the economy as 
just one sector, characterised also as a bargaining duopoly. So prices 
in the economy are :
Ph “ 2w(l + ahbh)
1 " ahbh 
° <  bh C  1 
- 1  <  ah < 1
where the subscript h indexes the sectors (industries) of the economy.
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The assum ption  o f  id e n t ic a l  Cobb-Douglas u t i l i t y  fu n c t io n s  a llo w s
us to define the consumer price index :
P*
1 -x
where x is the Cobb-Douglas parameter for sector 1 (that sector's share 
in total expenditure). Deflating the bargained wage by this index 
gives us a measure of the real wage v (the indirect utility function of 
a typical worker ) in sector 1. The real wage can also be expressed as 
a function of relative wages and monopoly power :
We see that if monopoly power is fixed, real wage gains in one sector 
can be made only at the expense of real wages in the other sector. We 
can in turn express real wages as a function of both bargaining and 
monopoly power in the two sectors :
A first point to note is that real bargaining outcomes are 
independent of the nominal value of the alternative wage (I consider 
price stability later). We can explain real wages in the different 
sectors of the economy purely in terms of the structure of demand
sign 6 Vj sign b j ( 1 -x-a ^ ) x
< 0
> 0 if a x > -l
< 0 if a 2 > - 1
3.19
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(parameterised by x), bargaining power (parameterised by b), and 
monopoly power (parameteriaed by a). Although I present here results 
only for a two industry economy, the general principles apply to an 
economy with many sectors.
If monopoly and bargaining power are the same across sectors, we 
can see that the real wage is independent of bargaining power, being 
determined solely by employers' monopoly power. Bargaining power is 
effective at increasing real wages in one sector only if they can be 
lowered in another.
In the case where sector 1 is competitive (in the sense that the 
collusion parameter a is at the lower limit of -1 ) we have already 
shown that workers cannot push up their wage, whatever their bargaining 
power. In order to be able to bargain for an increased wage, workers 
have to be in an industry where employers have some degree of monopoly 
power. Any increase in monopoly and/or bargaining power in sector 1 
will push up the price of good 1 and thereby reduce the real wage in 
sector 2. It is interesting to note that as far as sector 2 workers 
are concerned, the effects of labour market bargaining power and 
product market monopoly power in sector 1 are the same - they both 
appear to push up the price of good 1 . However, workers in one sector 
are made worse off by the bargaining strength of workers in the other 
ssctor only to the extent that the other sector is not competitive. 
Employers' monopoly power creates potential divisions amongst workers 
by first generating surplus which makes wage rises possible and then
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passing on any such wage rises into higher prices. In this sense 
employers' monopoly power sets workers against workers.
However, although employers’ monopoly power is a prerequisite for 
worKers to bargain for real wage rises, it does not follow that 
increasing the monopoly power of employers will always benefit workers 
in that sector. As monopoly power rises, the bargained nominal wage 
will rise (3.17), but so too will the consumer price index. If the 
good that workers produce is an important constituent of their 
consumption, they may actually become worse off as their employers' 
monopoly power increases. The condition for workers to gain from an 
increase in their employers' monopoly power is :
6v^ > 0
6a,
iff bl » 1 -aj-x
i.e. workers' bargaining power should be high enough for them to win a 
pay rise large enough (in relation to the importance of the product in 
their consumption) to compensate for the rise in the price of the 
product.
The greater the number of sectors in the economy, and the greater 
is the level of workers' bargaining power, the more likely it is that x 
will be low enough for employees to be able to afford to ignore the 
price of their own product, in which case they will have a vested 
interest in the monopoly power of their own employers, since that 
monopoly power generates the pool of surplus over which they bargain.
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For example, we might take the typical value of the collusion parameter 
a in UK manufacturing industries to be of the order of one third (the 
mid-point of the range estimated by Clarke, Davies and Waterson 
[l984,p.466]). In this case the critical level of workers' bargaining 
strength in a particular industry, above which level they have a vested 
interest in their employers' monopoly power, is approximately equal to 
one and a half times the share of that industry product in consumption.
In this simple model, then, we see that workers' bargaining power 
over surplus can raise their real wage at the expense of the real wages 
of workers in the rest of the economy. But what is the impact on 
profits in either sector and what is the impact on aggregate income 
distribution? We have seen that income distribution in each sector is 
determined only by the degree of monopoly, since symmetric wage rises 
are passed on in full. So the aggregate distribution of income depends 
on the degree of monopoly in each sector and on the relative sizes of 
the sectors. With Cobb -Douglas demand, the relative sizes of the two 
sectors are fixed, so aggregate income distribution is given by :
M - *s { x.(l+a^) + (l-xKO+Sj) ) 
where M, the aggregate price-cost margin, equals the share of profits
in value added
Increased bargaining power in one industry pushes up the wage and 
price proportionally, so that income distribution in that industry is 
not altered. Of course, if demand is not of unit elasticity, changes 
in bargaining power will alter the relative sizes of the sectors and 
thereby affect aggregate income distribution to the extent that the 
degree of monopoly varies between sectors.
Although workers are unable to directly affect income 
distribution when bargained wage rises are passed into price rises, the 
real value of profits will of course be eroded by the price rises 
consequent on workers' bargaining, except to the extent that the level 
Of nominal aggregate demand in the economy rises in line with prices. 
For instance, an accomodating monetary policy would insulate aggregate 
real profits from workers' strength.
3.7.3 Bargaining, Monopoly Power And The Price Level
So far we have considered the impact of bargaining and monopoly 
power on real magnitudes : the product wage, the real wage, and income 
distribution. But we have formulated the bargaining and price-setting 
problems in nominal terms which imply certain expectations of the price 
level. What does this model imply for price stability ? The 
bargaining problem assumed a given nominal alternative wage w from 
which we derived the bargained wage and price for each industry :
Ph
where k.n
w . Ie­ri
2 -<1+ah V
a - a h) a - b h)
h - 1 , 2
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The r e a l va lu e  o f  th e  a l t e r n a t iv e  wage is  d e riv e d  u s in g  th e
consumer price index :
w = (kl)~X .(k2 ) x_1
P*
For simplicity we can assume that bargaining power is the same in 
each sector and that monopoly power in each sector is also the same, so 
the real value of the alternative wage is :
w = (1 -a) (1 -b) = f (a ,b)
p* 2 (l+ab)
f < 0  , f,. <  0 if 0 <  b <  1 , -1 <  a <  1 3.20a b
I assume that the expected real value of the alternative wage is 
fixed at some value z which captures the expected value of the 
alternatives to employment in a particular firm. The value of z will 
depend partly on historical expectations of wages, partly on the level 
of unemployment in the economy (which affects the probability of 
finding alternative employment). I assume that z is a non-increasing 
function of unemployment (u).
If the expected price level is p~, then the expected alternative 
wage is z.p~. But the expected price level will be realised, i.e. 
p*-p~, only if :
f(a,b) - z(u)
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which I take to be a condition for price stability. Should the 
bargaining and monopoly parameters generate a higher price level than 
expected, then the actual value of the alternative wage will be less 
than expected. If workers upgrade their expectations of the price 
level (or its rate of change) then prices will rise further, but the 
real outcome will be unchanged - leading, presumably, to accelerating 
prices and expectations.
This condition implies a fine balance between competing strengths 
of capital and labour if prices are to be kept stable. For instance, 
if z is fixed (i.e. if z'[u] - 0 ) there is a unique, negatively-sloped 
correspondence between values of the bargaining parameter b and the 
monopoly parameter a which allow price stability. Any tendency for 
either monopoly or bargaining power to rise must be counter-balanced by 
some reduction in such power if a price explosion is to be avoided.
If either workers' bargaining power or the expected real value of 
the alternative wage are declining functions of unemployment , then we 
can see that price stability requires that any tendency for monopoly or 
bargaining power to increase must be countered by a rise in 
unemployment:
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e.g. if z'(u) < 0 * b (u,B) < 0 and bR(u,B) > 0u
du
da
> 0 and dm > 0
3.21
where u in the level of unemployment, and the parameter B represents 
other exogenous determinants of workers' strength.
In this case, unemployment acts as a regulator which dampens 
workers' bargaining position and strength to a level where aspirations 
can be satisfied by a given degree of monopoly power. The 
"non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment" is an increasing 
function both of workers' bargaining power and of employers' monopoly 
power. This "natural” rate of unemployment is the product of conflict 
over income distribution.
3*7.4 Bargaining Over Jobs
If bargaining covers employment as well as the wage, the previous 
results are substantially altered because workers' bargaining power can 
now impinge on profit margins in an industry.
In the simplest case of efficient bargaining between a 
rent-maximising union and a profit-maximising employer we know that the 
price is set as if the employer faced just the alternative wage; 
surplus is divided in proportion to bargaining power. So in each
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sector the price is a mark-up on the alternative wage rather than on 
the actual wage, and wage rises are deducted directly from profit 
margins (see 3 *5 ).
More generally, if workers' collective utility function exhibits 
constant relative risk aversion with respect to the wage, we have seen 
(3*5) that we can write the division of surplus (D) and the efficient 
bargained wage (W) for a particular firm as follows :
where r is the 'risk-aversion' parameter and where R() is the 
(conjectured) revenue function facing the duopolist at the conjectural 
variation equilibrium.
But the price-cost margin can be expressed :
Taking the case which we analysed previously of a symmetric 
duopoly with bargaining covering only the wage, we know that if each 
firm were to face an exogenous wage of R'(L) they would choose to set 
employment at L and an industry price p such that each firm's profit
and Wj-R'd^) - W±-v
P - R ’a ±) W - R*(L±)
P P P
m‘i P - R'O^) b1-b ■iP
3-61
m arg in  would be equa l to  ( l+ a ) / 2  (see 3«18) .  p i s  o f  course th e  same
industry price which emerges when job-bargaining duopolists each settle 
on an employment level of L. So the value of the expression 
[p-R'(L)]/p in the above equation must equal (l+a)/2. Accordingly we 
can solve the symmetric duopoly efficient bargaining problem as follows
m* * Si (1 + a).(l - b)
v w . 1 - a + b ( l + a )  l - a + r b ( l + a )
p’ 2w . 1l - a + r b ( l + a )
-1 < a <1 , 0< b< 1 , r< 1 3.22
These results in the case of efficient bargaining can be compared 
with the results for wage-only bargaining (3-18) noting that the latter 
results assume the risk-aversion parameter r to be zero- When 
bargaining covers only the wage, we have seen that workers' strength 
does not affect profit margins within an industry, since employers use 
their monopoly power to pass on any wage rises in full; workers' 
strength affects inflation rather than income distribution. However, 
if bargaining is efficient, these results are reversed. When 
bargaining covers jobs as well as wages, employers bargain (by 
implication) over the level of output; so the price of the product, 
and therefore margins and income distribution, are affected directly by 
bargaining. If unions are rent maximisers (r-0), then bargaining 
strength has no effect on prices. Indeed, bargaining strength only 
causes price rises to the extent that monopoly power generates surplus 
(a>-l) and to the extent that unions are prepared to trade tents f0r
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h ig h e r  wages ( r < 0 ) .
We can also see from 3.22 that the more risk-loving the union 
(the lower the parameter r) the greater the resultant wage - for, as I 
have argued earlier, with this specific union utility function, greater 
risk-loving mirrors the effects of greater bargaining power. However, 
the risk aversion parameter does not affect profit margins, since the 
effect of job bargaining on margins is exactly offset by the effect of 
risk-aversion on the division of surplus.
3.7.5 Summary
This simple model of bargaining in an oligopolistic economy has 
illustrated and clarified a number of arguments presented earlier.
If bargaining covers the wage alone :
1. Workers' strength can erode profit margins within a firm by driving 
up the wage; but other firms in the industry, whose relative costs 
are thereby lowered, will increase their margins and their share of 
the market. The aggregate industry margin is eroded by an increase 
in the bargaining power of workers in one firm only to the extent 
that the dispersion of wage costs is reduced (3.15). If the 
oligopoly is symmetric, workers' bargaining power has no effect on 
margins at all, only on employment and price - and even then only
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i f  em ployers do ge n e ra te  some s u rp lu s  in  the  f i r s t  p la ce  ( 3 -1 8 ) .
Industry margins and income distribution are largely determined by 
employers' monopoly power; workers' bargaining gains are passed on 
via higher prices.
2. However, although workers do have a collective interest in reducing 
employers' monopoly power, such monopoly power can also divide 
workers if they bargain in separate sectors of the economy. For 
workers in one industry can increase their real wage through 
bargaining, but only to the extent that their employers wield 
monopoly power which generates some surplus over which to bargain, 
and only to the extent that such gains are made at the expense of 
workers in the other (domestic or foreign) sectors of the economy 
(3.19).
3. In aggregate, workers' strength affects price inflation, but only 
alters income distribution to the extent that bargained wage rises 
alter the balance of sectors in the economy.
4. Real wages in an industry will be an increasing function of the
monopoly power of the employers if bargaining power enables workers 
to win a large enough share of the surplus and if the industry 
product is not too important in their consumption (3-19). So the 
more bargaining is disaggregated into separate industries, the more 
likely it is that workers will have a vested interest in the degree
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of monopoly in their own industry, at the expense of workers in 
other industries.
5. Price stability requires that bargaining power and monopoly power 
must change in opposite directions. Unemployment may preserve 
price stability through its dampening effect on workers' bargaining 
power (3 .2 1 ).
However, if bargaining covers jobs as well as wages, our 
conclusions are substantially different :
1. Workers' strength does erode profit margins not only in the firm 
where the bargaining occurs, but also in the industry as a whole.
So bargaining does directly affect real wages and income 
distribution (3 -2 2 ).
2. If bargaining over jobs is efficient, the impact of workers' 
strength on prices depends on workers' 'risk-aversion'. If unions 
aim to maximise wage rents, then workers' strength does not affect 
relative prices : gains in real wages in one sector do not impinge 
at all on real wages in other sectors (3 -2 2).
3-65
These c o n c lu s io n s  have been d e riv e d  from  a model w ith  a number o f
restrictive assumptions. Nevertheless, we can expect the results to be 
relevant more generally. Introducing non-homogenous industry products 
and larger oligopoly groups will merely add the degree of product 
differentiation and industry numbers to those factors which determine 
monopoly power (simplified to a single parameter in the analysis 
above). Introducing asymmetries into oligopolies will complicate the 
analysis without radically altering the results'(see for instance the 
analysis of shifting asymmetric conjectural variation equilibria in 
Seade [1985])- Allowing for variation in demand elasticities and in 
returns to scale implies that margins over average costs will vary 
according to the level of output - in which case wage-only bargaining 
will have an impact on industry-level income distribution. But unless 
demand elasticities and productivity vary both substantially and 
systematically with scale, these effects are unlikely to nullify the 
general thrust of the results which have been derived from the 
simplified model.
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3.8 Summary
There is substantial evidence that workers bargain over the 
economic surplus which their employers’ market power enables them to win. 
The most promising and tractable model of bargaining appears to be the 
asymmetric Nash cooperative solution which allows us to analyse 
bargaining in terms of opportunity costs, preferences, the scope of 
bargaining, and the distribution of bargaining power.
If bargaining covers employment as well as wages, a point which is 
disputed in the literature, we can draw out a number of implications. 
There is no general expectation that wages should exhibit relatively more 
or less cyclical variability than employment, but we can expect workers' 
bargaining power to erode profit margins to some extent. On the other 
hand, if bargaining covers only the wage, there is no particular expect­
ation that workers' bargaining power should affect aggregate margins.
A vital question is what determines the balance of bargaining 
strength between workers and employers. Rather than making arbitrary 
assumptions, we need to look at the relative competitive positions of 
each side, their alternative supplies of labour or Jobs in the short 
term, their history, relative resources and organisation, and the legal 
and Institutional framework within which bargaining occurs.
Although it is usually more efficient for unions and employers to 
bargain over employment as well as over wages, we can expect to find that 
employers would generally prefer not to bargain over jobs, preferring to 
pose the threat of Job losses as a deterrent to workers pushing up wages. 
Moreover, owners have an incentive to capitalise potential surplus 
through capital re-structuring or leasing/franchising arrangements in 
order to impose on the direct employers financial constraints which have 
the effect of removing economic surplus from the bargaining arena.
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A model is developed highlighting interactions between firm-level 
union-employer bargaining and industry-level oligopolistic 
price-setting, combining models of conjectural variation oligopoly and 
asymmetric Nash bargaining. Income distribution is found to be largely 
determined by employers' ability to set price-cost margins, and price 
stability requires a trade-off between oligopoly power and union 
bargaining strength, except to the extent that the level of employment 
is important in bargaining. These results provide a more formal 
extension to the analysis of oligopoly and income distribution which 
was presented in Chapter 2.
3 -6 8
CHAPTER A
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF WORKER-EMPLOYER BARGAINING AND PRICE-COST 
MARGINS IN UK MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
4.1. The theoretical model and the empirical specification
I have argued earlier (see section 2 .2 ) that workers influence the 
aggregate distribution of income if they can alter employers' price-cost 
margins; I have shown that one way in which this might happen is if 
workers succeed in bargaining over jobs as well as over wages, noting 
that in general it may well be in employers' interests to bargain only 
over wages. In Diagram 4.1 I illustrate a number of possible wage-job 
deals for the 'typical' employer of an industry, making the simplifying 
assumption that outcomes at this level will be directly reflected at 
Industry level. The various possible bargains - B°, B', B" and B"' - are 
illustrated lying respectively on the labour demand curve, a vertical 
contract curve, a negatively-sloped contract curve and a 
positively-sloped contract curve. For illustrative purposes I assume 
that the bargained wage is the same, W, in each case.
If bargaining covers only the wage, so that the deal is at B° on 
the labour demand curve, I assume that employment and output have been 
chosen by the employer to maximise (conjectured) profit given the 
bargained wage and the employer's cost and (conjectured) demand 
functions. From the earlier discussions (section 2.1) of the model of 
collusive oligopoly developed by Clarke, Davies and Waterson (1984) from 
the Cowling-Waterson (1976) model, we can predict that for the typical
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DIAGRAM A . 1
The effect of employment-bargaining on price-cost margins
LDC = labour demand curve 
CC = various possible contract curves
firm and for the industry as a whole, price-cost margins will be 
positively related to industrial concentration and the degree of product 
differentiation, and negatively correlated with the elasticity of 
industry demand. So the price-cost margin at B° can be written as:
m(B°) = m (X)
A . 1
where X is a vector representing industry concentration, etc. We could 
make the further simplifying assumption that X is independent of the 
bargained wage, ie. that Industry concentration and demand elasticity 
will be the same at whatever point on the industry demand curve they 
operate. This assumption is not unreasonable for short-run variations in 
wage costs, for at the 3-digit level of disaggregation in UK 
manufacturing - the level I am studying in the empirical work reported 
here - wage and salary costs comprise on average only one quarter of
total costs. So even a 10% change in real labour costs will change total 
costs directly by (at most) only 2 .5%, inducing only a small movement 
along the industry demand curve.(1 )
Now, consider the result of the bargain on a vertical contract 
curve, represented in the diagram by point B'. If the bargain were at 
point C we know that the price-cost margin would be m(X), since C is on 
the labour demand curve. But, when the contract curve is vertical, 
employment, output and price are independent of the bargained wage. So 
we know that at B' the profit has been reduced (in comparison with the 
profit at point C) by the area of the rectangle AB'CD, the surplus of 
total wages over the alternative wage w. The price-cost margin is 
definitionally equal to the sum of profits and overhead costs divided by 
revenue, so the margin which results from a bargain at B' is: 
m(B') = m(X) - (wage surplus/revenue)
A.2
Another possible bargain is illustrated by point B", which might 
be the outcome either of efficient bargaining on a down-sloping contract 
curve or of inefficient bargaining resulting in an outcome between the 
labour demand curve and a vertical contract curve. If the bargain was at 
the point E on the labour demand curve vertically below B", the margin 
would again be m(X). We can see that the bargained wage rise will reduce 
profit (in comparison with its value at E) by the area of ABnEF which is 
less than the full amount of surplus of wages over the alternative wage. 
The margin at B" is:
m(B") = m(X) - d". (wage surplus/revenue); 0 < d" < 1
where d" = W - R'U")
W - vJ
ill(Comparing this result with equation 3.5 on page 3.20, we see that in 
fact d" = 1 /(1 -r), ie. d" is a direct measure of workers' risk aversion 
if bargaining is efficient).
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Similarly, if the bargain is at B"', the price-cost margin will be:
m(B"') = m(X)~ d"'. (wage surplus/revenue) ; d"’> 1
So, if we use a linear estimating equation:
4. 4
nu = a.X^ + d. (wage surplus/revenue)
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where m^ is the price-cost margin in industry i, then the estimated value 
of the coefficient d indicates that bargaining is on a vertical contract 
curve if it equals -1 , or that bargains lie on the labour demand curve if 
it equals zero, etc. The estimated value of d is a direct measure of the 
extent to which bargained changes in wage costs affect profit margins, 
and it gives an indication of the importance of employment in 
bargaining.(2 )
Equation 4.5 forms the basis of my empirical investigation. 
Detailed data on industry costs, wages and profits at the 3 digit level 
is given in the annual Census of Production which has formed the basis of 
many empirical studies of the market-structure-performance relationship 
in the UK. I have used generally accepted specifications of the first 
part of equation 4.5, following the surveys of the literature in Hay and 
Morris (1979), Hart and Morgan (1977) and Clarke, Davies and Waterson 
(1984). The novel part of this empirical investigation is the attempt to 
model and test for the interaction between labour and product markets, 
represented by the last term in this equation.
Some studies in Industrial economics have looked at the effect of 
labour markets on product market performance. Cowling and Molho (1982) 
look at the effect of unionisation on wage share in value-added in 1968 
and 1973, finding that unionisation tends to increase wage-share and, by
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Implication, depress price-cost margins.(3) Henley (1984) has extended 
this approach to cover 1973-78 and to distinguish between local and 
national collective agreements, also finding that unionisation tends to 
increase wage-share. Freeman (1983) finds that unionisation lowers 
margins and rates of return in US manufacturing 1958-76 amongst the more 
concentrated industries. Karier (1985) analyses US manufacturing 
price-cost margins in 1972 by State and by 2-digit industry. He finds 
that "unions significantly lower the potential excess profits of highly 
concentrated industries, but have little effect on profits in competitive 
markets". (He also shows that omitting unionisation biases downwards the 
estimated coefficient on the concentration term.) But all these studies 
lack a specific model of how union pressure affects profits, and they 
lack detailed analysis of what, apart from the level of unionisation, 
determines workers' bargaining strength.
The literature of labour economics is replete with analyses of the 
factors which affect wage differentials, but studies tend not to make 
clear the crucial distinction (as implied by explicit models of 
bargaining) between those factors which affect the alternative wage - the 
baseline position from which workers bargain - and those factors which 
influence bargained wage premia (ie. wage rises above the alternative 
wage). We can expect that skill levels, working conditions and the 
influence of local labour market conditions will affect the alternative 
wage; whilst unionisation and profitability will be amongst the 
determining influences on wage premia. So, for instance, Weiss (1966), 
Wabe and Leech (1978), Stewart (1983), Brown et al. (1984) and 
Blanchflower (1983 and 1984) use as explanatory variables one or more of 
unionisation (coverage or membership), industrial concentration and 
profitability in order to explain wage differentials. The implication of 
bargaining models is that strong unionisation will not make higher wages 
possible unless the employer has a (potential) surplus, and that high
profits or potential surplus will not lead to high wages if workers' 
bargaining strength is low. Geroski, Hamlin and Knight (1982) do use a 
two equation model which tries to capture this interaction, but they do 
not test any specific model of bargaining.
Clark (1984) does employ specific bargaining models in his study 
of 900 US "product line businesses" between 1970 and 1980. He compares 
two models: a) efficient bargaining on a vertical contract curve where 
the stock of capital, the level of employment, output and price are shown 
to be unaffected by bargaining; in this case rates of return and absolute 
profits are reduced by workers' strength; and b) a model of 
wage-bargaining where absolute profit is reduced by workers' bargaining 
up wages (as long as demand is elastic), but where capital stock is also 
reduced in response to higher wages (unless the elasticity of 
substitution between labour and capital in the constant returns CES 
production function is greater than the elasticity of demand), with the 
result that the response of the rate of return on capital to wage rises 
depends solely on the elasticity of substitution. Clark concludes from 
his study that while unionisation reduces firms' profitability, it has 
little effect on growth and on capital-labour substitution, supporting 
the model of bargaining on a vertical contract curve.
One of the déficiences of Clark's study is that it treats workers' 
bargaining strength as a function of unionisation alone. Svejnar (1984) 
Investigates the asymmetric Nash-bargalning model applied to data on 12 
major US unionised companies. He concludes that bargaining power is 
influenced significantly by both inflation and unemployment.
However, the study of the determination of bargaining power is 
generally underdeveloped, both theoretically and empirically - Svejnar 
cites the absence of any literature as necessitating an ad hoc 
specification of the functional form. So I choose here to estimate
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bargained wage premia directly from investigation of inter-industry wage 
differentials, correcting for those factors which affect the alternative 
wage. I then treat the estimated wage premia as data - much as other 
researchers use, for instance, seasonally adjusted data - to estimate 
equation 4.5.(4) I also use these estimates of industry wage premia to 
conduct a preliminary investigation into the determinants of bargaining 
power. Then I check for the possibility that the omission of bargaining 
variables may have biased estimation of wage premia. I also check for 
the effects of possible heteroscedasticity on the reported tests of 
statistical significance. My estimating equations for the wage and for 
the determination of bargaining power are derived as follows.
I take the observed wage, kT, in industry 1 to be the sum of the 
alternative wage, which faces workers in that industry and a 
bargained wage premium, WP^:
Wi * WP, 4.6
The alternative wage is approximated by a linear function of workforce 
skill and other characteristics, and of regional labour market 
characteristics, Y^, with a normally distributed random error term:
■Xi " ei 4.7
and the wage premium is assumed to be distributed normally and 
Independently of e ^  with an average premium ViP. So the estimating
equation is:
w
1
- WP + e^)
A.8
where the average premiura(5) is incorporated in the constant term of c, 
and the composite random term satisfies the assumptions required for 
ordinary least squares regression (some of which assumptions will be 
tested). In this case we can derive the estimated wage premia as:
The earlier analysis of bargaining allows us to derive a simple 
expression for the share of wage surplus in total surplus in the case 
where workers are 'risk-neutral(6 ) From equation 3.5, putting r = 0:
where b is the normalised index of workers' bargaining strength, L is the 
level of employment, 77 represents excess profits and the product L.WP is 
wage surplus. I represent the vector of variables which determine 
workers' relative bargaining strength by Z (covering unionisation, 
unemployment, etc.) and use a linear estimating equation:
It would be desirable to estimate equations 4.8 and 4.10 
simultaneously, but the unobservability of WP introduces severe 
non-linearities, compounded by the paucity of guidance for the correct 
specification of 4.10. A more tractable form of the bargaining equation 
is found if it is the bargaining ratio b/(1-b) rather than the bargaining 
parameter b which is a linear function of the bargaining variables, for 
then the bargaining equation is:
A
WP + - c.YiWPi 4.9
L.WP / (17+ L.WP) = b
A A
(L.WP / ( 77+ L.WP) )i 4.10
4.8
e' 1(l .w p / n ) ± = g . z ± - A.10a.
which we can combine with A . 8 to derive the following estimating 
equation:
wi = c".rt + g.(Z.n/L)i + ei + (e".n/L).
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This embodies the principle that wages are determined partly by skill and 
other characteristics (Y) and partly by the determinants of workers' 
collective bargaining strength (Z) weighted by profits per worker, 
following the reasoning that if employers cannot win (super-normal) 
profits, workers cannot push wages above the alternative wage (in the 
long run). X estimate A.11 using the weighted least squares and maximum 
likelihood techniques suggested by the hypothesised error structure. 
However, I note here the reservation that equation A.10a. from which A.11 
is derived is inherently less plausible a representation of the 
determinants of bargaining power than A.10 because the former implies 
that profits can never be driven to zero.(7)
Moreover, I have noted that there is little guidance as to which 
factors should be expected to determine bargaining power. So I prefer to 
estimate wage premia from equation A.9 and to use A.11 both as a 
preliminary investigation of the bargaining power hypothesis and as a 
check on whether the omission of bargaining variables from A.9 is a 
source of serious bias. I then use the estimated wage premia as data 
with which to estimate the effect on price-cost margins (equation A.5) 
and to further investigate what must necessarily be ad hoc specifications 
of the bargaining equation A.10.
4.2 The Data
One of the problems in assembling data is the need to match the 
data units for labour and product markets. The oligopoly model underlying 
the estimating equation 4.5 relates price-cost margins to concentration 
etc. at industry level. Industry data on revenue, profits etc. for UK 
manufacturing are available from the annual Census of Production, although 
I note that the 3-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC 1968, 
revised SIC 1980) does not necessarily correspond to actual product 
markets in all cases. Data on earnings and on some characteristics of 
jobs and of workforces are published in the Employment Gazette, broken 
down by the SIC (but not covering all industries). The most detailed 
breakdown of earnings is given by the annual 'October Survey' which covers 
only manual workers. Since manual workers comprise around 70% of the 
manufacturing workforce, and since I advance arguments that employment of 
non-manual workers is treated by employers as an overhead rather than as a 
short-run variable cost, I estimate wage premia only for manual workers. 
Moreover, I estimate wage premia only for male workers, who outnumber 
women in manufacturing by three to one, and I make the simplifying 
assumption that female manual workers win the same proportionate premium 
as their male colleagues.
The 1982 Census of Production breaks down industries by SIC 1980, 
but 1982 earnings data is classified by SIC 1968. Accordingly, I use 1983 
earnings data (available by SIC 1980) and make the assumption that the 
ratio of wage premia to earnings in 1982 was the same as that in 1983.
The most elusive information is that on skill and training levels, 
hypothesised to be important Influences on the alternative wage. I have 
used industry breakdowns of skill and training levels from the National 
Training Survey which is available only for 1975 (but I assume it to be
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valid for 1979 as well). Unfortunately there is no direct industry-level 
data on capital stock, so I am forced to construct rough Indices from 
series on annual net investment in order to control for employers' minimum 
profit constraints in bargaining. Lack of data makes it impossible to 
test the hypothesis advanced in section 3.6 that capital gearing has a 
significant effect on bargaining through its effect on minimum profit 
constraints.
I have chosen to conduct cross-sectional analyses on each of three 
years: 1975, 1979 and 1 9 8 2. 1 start with 1975 because of the availability
of detailed data on skill levels. This year was a cyclical trough when 
the rate of profit in manufacturing was at a record low. 1979 is chosen 
to test the bargaining relationships at a cyclical peak (when, however, 
unemployment was higher than in 1975). Finally, 1982 is the latest year 
for which Census of Production information is available, a year which 
comes at the end of the trough of the very deep recession of the early 
1980s amidst record unemployment levels.
The full sample of industries which I use comprises the 3-digit 
industries for which both the Employment Gazette and the Census of 
Production give data, excluding the residual and miscellaneous categories, 
giving a sample of 106 3-digit industries by the 1968 SIC and 91 by the 
1980 SIC. For the estimation of the price-cost margin and bargaining 
relationships I have followed the example of Hart and Morgan (1977) in 
excluding mineral oil refining on the grounds that net output is largely 
determined by valuation methods, and the steel and ship-building 
Industries on the grounds that, as largely nationalised industries, they 
are not subject to the same profit objectives and constraints as our 
theory of pricing and bargaining supposes.
The variables I have used are defined in Table 4.1, and their means 
and standard deviations are given in table 4.2.
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TABLE 4.1
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES
All variables refer to industry averages at the 3-digit industry level on the Standard 
Industrial Classification.
A. Wages and characteristics of workforce and jobs
WAGE; gross hourly earnings (pence) of full-time adult male manual workers in October 
1975, 1979 and 1983. (EG 1976, 1980 and 1985.)
HOURSi weekly hours worked (as above).
REGIONS; proportion of industry workforce eaiployed in each region at June 1975, June 1978 
and September 1981 respectively. (Labour Statistics Year Book 1975, EG March 1981, and 
December 1983 (Occasional Supplement no.2).)
0-5 YEARS! proportion of full-time manual male workforce with less than 5 years of 
service, 1979 and 1983. (NES 1979 and 1983.)
AGE! average age (years) of male manual workers in 1975, expressed as deviation from the 
overall mean of 38.9 years. (NTS)
FURTHER EDUCATION! proportion of workforce in 1975 with further education or adult 
education experience since starting work, (as above)
TRAINED! proportion of workforce who needed some form of special training to obtain 
current Job. (as above)
JOB TRAINING: proportion of workforce given training for the current type of work since 
starting, (as above)
OVERTIME! average industry overtime hours for male manual workers (taking normal hours as 
40 in 1979 and 1975, and 39 in 1983) sxprasaed as a proportion of total hours worked, 
multiplied by the hourly wage.
SHIFTWORK! the percentage of male manual gross earnings made up by shift premium 
payments. (NES 1975, 1979 and 1983.)
PBRi the percentage of male manual earnings made up by payment-by-result payments, (aa 
above)
Notes
1. The data from the National Training Survey and the New Earnings Survey is not given - 
or is not reliable - for the smallest industries; in which case the average figure for the 
appropriate industry group or order is used.
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B. Barga in ing  v a r ia b le s
CAPITAL INTENSITY = ( rj net investment) / value added T 
for 1975, t = 1971, T = 1975
for 1979, t = 1971, T = 1979
for 1982, t = 1979, T = 1982.
(COP 1975 - 1982.)
UNION COVERAGE: proportion of workforce covered by national and/or local collective 
agreements in 1973 (for 1975 regressions) and in 1978 (for 1979). (NES.)
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: number of registered unemployed (in June 1975 or June 1979) / number 
of employed operatives (1975 or 1979); number of registered unemployed in May 1982 (end of 
series broken down by industry) / total employment March 1982. (1982 figures adapted from
SIC 1968 to SIC 1980). (EG and COP.)
GROWTH RATEi proportional growth in total employment over previous year, for 1975 and 
1979; growth over previous four years for 1982. (COP.)
CONCENTRATION: industry 5 firm concentration ratio by gross output of enterprises ranked 
by employment. (COP.)
FEMALE RATIO: female employment as proportion of total employment. (EG.)
STAFF RATIO: employment of clerical, technical, administrative and managerial staff / 
employment of operatives. (COP.)
PLANT SIZE: natural logarithm of the average number of operatives (for 1975 and 1979) or 
employees (for 1982) employed per plant by the five largest enterprises in the industry. 
(COP.)
C. P r ic e - c o s t  margin v a r ia b le s
NET OUTPUTi is calculated by deducting from gross output the cost of purchases (net of 
any change in stocks), the cost of industrial services - including aaounta payable to 
other firms for out-work, repairs and maintenance, and sublet contracts - and, when 
applicable, duties etc. (COP)
WAGESi gross amount paid during year to operatives (broadly speaking, all manual wage 
earners) including the value of redundancy payments, net of government reimbursements. 
(COP)
SALARIES: gross amount paid during year to administrative, technical and clerical 
employees, employed directors, managers, superintendents, foremen, research and design 
employees, draughtsmen, etc and all office employees. (COP)
NATIONAL INSURANCE: employers' national insurance contributions. (COP)
CONCENTRATION RATIO: see above.
PRODUCT CR5: weighted average of product concentration ratios in 1975. (Business Monitor 
PO 1006.)
ADVERTISING INTENSITY: ratio of other non-industrial coats (advertising, royalties, etc.) 
to value added. (COP)
GROWTH: see above.
WAGE PREMIUM: excess of actual wage over estimated alternative wage (see text).
WAGE SURPLUS: (wage premium/wage) x wages.
WAGE RISE: proportional rise in hourly earnings over previous year, less the average wage 
rise (25.33 in 1975, 17.43 in 1979). (EG.)
WAGE BILL RISE: = wage rise x wages.
PCH1-4: alternative definitions of price-coat margins - see text.
PROFITS: value added - wages - salaries - national insurance. (COP)
MANUAL SHARE OF SURPLUS: wage surplus / (profits + wage surplus).
SOURCES
EG x Employment Gazette, published monthly by the Department of Employment.
COP x Census of Production, Summary Tables, published by the Department of Industry.
NTS x National Training Survey 1975, aee "People and their work", published by the
Manpower Services Commission (1978). Data taps kindly provided by Mark Stewart.
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TABLE 4.2
MEAN (AND STANDARD DEVIATION) OF VARIABLES
broken down by 106 3-digit industries on the SIC 1968 for 1975 end 1979, end by 91 3-digit 
industries on the SIC 1980 for 1982/3.
VARIABLE 1975 1979 1982/3
WAGE (pence per hour) 133.9 (16.3) 218.8 (25.8) 331.7 (44.3)
HOURS (per week) 43.13 (2.1) 43.54 (2.4) 43.0 (2.5)
EAST MIDLANDS 0.085 (0.11) 0.094 (0.11) 0.092 (0.10)
NORTH WEST 0.158 (0.12) 0.156 (0.13) 0.141 (0.11)
SOUTH EAST - - 0.252 (0.14)
0-5 YEARS - 0.377 (0.071) -
AGE (yesrs) 0 (2.5) - -
FURTHER EDUCATION 0.312 (0.11) - -
TRAINED 0.289 (0.12) - -
JOB TRAINING 0.342 ((0.09) - -
SHIFTWORK (X) 3.5 (2.0) 3.6 (2.2) 4.0 (2.4)
PBR (X) 9.3 (5.0) 9.1 (5.4) 9.0 (4.7)
WAGE PREMIUM (pence per hour) 14.5 (10.5) 22.9 (16.8) 37.6 (33.9)
WAGE PREMIUM / WAGE 0.103 (0.069) 0.100 (0.067) 0.103 (0.085)
MANUAL SHARE OF SURPLUS 0.117 (0.12) 0.096 (0.092) 0.128 (0.13)
WAGE SURPLUS / PROFIT 0.184 (0.48) 0.117 (0.115) 0.180 (0.232)
CAPITAL INTENSITY 0.388 (0.225) 0.458 (0.275) 0.392 (0.207)
UNION COVERAGE 0.782 (0.133) 0.762 (0.128) -
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 0.049 (0.02) 0.069 (0.03) 0.158 (0.06)
GROWTH 0.954 (0.047) 0.966 (0.059) 0.770 (0.12)
FEMALE RATIO 0.339 (0.197) 0.333 (0.194) 0.293 (0.162)
STAFF RATIO 0.389 (0.223) 0.420 (0.241) 0.471 (0.258)
PLANT SIZE (In) 6.33 (0.85) 6.26 (0.89) 6.38 (1.02)
CONCENTRATION (X) 51.2 (23.9) 49.2 (23.8) 45.0 (23.9)
ADVERTISING INTENSITY 0.098 (0.060) 0.129 (0.065) 0.168 (0.082)
WAGE RISE 0 (0.050) 0 (0.050) -
WAGE BILL RISE / NET OUTPUT 0 (0.018) 0 (0.014) -
WAGE SURPLUS / NET OUTPUT 0.034 (0.026) 0.031 (0.022) 0.034 (0.032)
PROFIT PER OPERATIVE (£'000) 3.15 (6.12) 6.70 (17.7) 6.66 (7.3)
PCM1 0.262 (0.078) 0.268 (0.085) 0.283 (0.100)
PCM2 0.181 (0.062) 0.189 (0.069) 0.190 (0.082)
PCM3 0.613 (0.117) 0.628 (0.119) 0.635 (0.119)
pern 0.432 (0.133) 0.448 (0.147) 0.430 (0.142)
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A.3.1 ESTIMATING INDUSTRY WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
Estimating equation A . 8 involves correcting observed inter-industry 
wage differentials for differences in workforce composition. The 
variables I use are described in Table A.1. In selecting regional 
variables I have tried preliminary specifications involving all of the 
standard regions (other than the South East, which I have taken as the 
base region in 1975 and 1979), progressively removing those with the 
lowest t-ratios.
From preliminary specifications I have eliminated other variables 
which are not statistically significant at the 20% level. These include 
measures of the proportion of the male manual workforce with the following 
characteristics: a) having responsibility for the work of others in the 
firm; b) having undertaken a trade apprenticeship; c) having undertaken 
training for the current type of work since starting.(8 )
For 1983, data was not available on skills and training, nor on 
length of service or age, so the equation for this year has less 
explanatory power than for the other years. Perhaps because of the 
omission of these variables, the estimated coefficient on the overtime 
variable was not statistically significant in 1983; so I have imposed a 
value of 0.5 (9 ) and calculated the hourly wage adjusted for overtime for 
use as the dependent variable in 1983.
The regressions (reported in Table A.3) seek to explain that part 
of inter-industry wage differentials which are the result of differences 
in the alternative wage facing workers in different industries, explained 
by regional distribution of employment, age or length of service (as a 
proxy for Job-acquired skills), and training and education. I take 
account also of differences in overtime worked, and the prevalence of 
shiftwork and of payment-by-results schemes.
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TABLE 4.3
CORRECTION OF INTER-INDUSTRY WAGE DIFFERENTIALS FOR SKILLS. REGIONS. OVERTIME. ETC.
Reporting coefficient« of OLS regressions 
are in brackets. For 1975a and 1983 the 
heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistic
on male, manual hourly earnings« t-statisti< 
second figure in brackets is the 
• The estimating equation is 4.8.
YEAR 1975 1979 1983
a« b.'1’ a. b.<2> a (3)Be
Mean wage 
(s.d)
133.9
16.3
132.9 218.8 
25.9
206.0
24.7
317.7
44.2
EAST MIDLAND -22
(1.79,2.13)
-22
(1.86)
-36
(2.14)
-36
(2.15)
NORTH WEST -22
(2.23,2.91)
-23
(2.35)
-34
(2.30)
-34
(2.31)
SOUTH EAST 114
(4.01,3.38)
AGE 0.87
(1.73,1.73)
0.77
(1.54)
0-5 YEARS -131
(4.76)
-130
(4.78)
FURTHER EDUCN. 29
(1.93,2.24)
29
(1.99)
51
(2.45)
51
(2.48)
TRAINING 41
(3.08,2.87)
40
(3.00)
39
(1.89)
39
(1.93)
OVERTIME 0.47
(2.19,2.38)
0.52
(2.45)
0.66
(3.60)
SHIFTWORK 3.59
(5.36,6.12)
3.56
(5.35)
3.29
(3.71)
3.20
(3.80)
8.44
(4.90,5.03)
PBR 0.43
(1.56,1.62)
0.46
(1.70)
0.72
(1.96)
0.73
(2.06)
N 106 106 106 106 91
R2 0.454 0.451 0.519 0.470 0.276
R2 0.409 0.406 0.479 0.432 0.259
NOTES
1. The dependent verieble ie the logarithm of «egei ell coefficiente heve been 
multiplied by the geometric meen of «age for comparieon «ith 1975a.
2. The dependent variable ia «age adjuated for an overtime rate of 0.8.
3. The dependent variable haa been adjuated for overtime at a rate of 0.5.
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The regression results are fairly clear, with coefficients of the
2expected sign. The overall explanatory power, as measured by R , is 45% 
for 1975a, 52% for 1979a, and 27% for 1983 - the three preferred 
equations.
When the South East is excluded, the East Midlands and the North 
West are the only standard regions attracting a statistically significant 
coefficient (even at the 10% level) for 1975 and 1979. It is probable 
that these regional variables are picking up high concentrations of the 
low-paying clothing and textile industries. For although the East 
Midlands (at September 1981) had only 8 .8% of total manufacturing 
employment, this region was the location of 29% of textile industry 
employment, and 14% and 16% of leather and clothing industry employment 
respectively. The North West had 13.2% of total manufacturing 
employment, but 19%, 15% and 18% of employment for these three 
industries, (and 24% of textile industry employment in 1979). We would 
expect that the alternative wage should be lower in those regions with a 
high concentration of low-paying industries.
For 1975 I have been able to use estimates of the average age of 
the male manual workforce. The result that industries with an older 
workforce tend to pay higher wages reflects, perhaps, a correlation with 
job-acquired skills. For 1979 I use a variable representing the 
proportion of the workforce with less than 5 years service with their 
current employer - perhaps a more direct proxy for Job-specific skills - 
and find a significant negative effect.
Further education and training do, as expected, raise wages. The 
omitted variables representing apprenticeships and on-job training may 
have been statistically insignificant because of collinearity. Shiftwork 
and payment-by-results schemes also attract positive coefficients (with 
the exception of 1983 for the latter variable).
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I have corrected for differences in overtime hours worked by 
including a variable which is calculated as the ratio of overtime to 
total weekly hours, multiplied by the hourly wage rate. For if the 
overtime premium is some fraction P of the normal hourly wage W*, if 
normal hours are AO, and actual hours are H, then the observed hourly 
wage W is given by:
W = W* + P.W*.(H - AO) / H
or, since W* is unobserved, we can write the approximation:
W = W* + P.W.(H - AO) / H 5
So the coefficient on the overtime variable I have defined is an 
approximation (a slight under estimate) to the estimated actual overtime 
premium. The estimates for 1975 and 1979 are 0.A7 and 0.66 which fit 
well within the range which X would expect from hearsay evidence that 
overtime premia in manufacturing tend to vary between one third and one, 
depending on the day on which overtime is worked.
I have checked the use of this approximation by rerunning the 
regression for 1979 whilst imposing various values of the overtime 
premium to adjust the dependent variable according to the formula:
W» = W.H / (H + P.(H - AO) ).
The sum of the squared residuals is minimised with a value of P between 
0 . 7 and 0.8 , showing that the 1979 estimate of 0.66 is indeed a slight 
under estimate. In Table A.3 I report the regression based on the 
imposed premium of 0 . 8 and note that the other estimated coefficients are 
altered only minutely in comparison with the regression (1979a) which 
uses the approximation. So I conclude that use of the approximation is 
Justified.
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The overtime variable Is statistically insignificant in the 1983 
preliminary specifications. I presume that this is the result of the 
omission of the skill variables (due to lack of data), so I impose an 
overtime premium rate of 0.5. I note that this is higher than the rate 
of 0.3 which Layard and Nickell (1985, Appendix, p.83) impose in their 
study of aggregate earnings, but the evidence for 19 75 and 1979 suggests 
that that figure is too low for manufacturing industry.
It is common for researchers to use the log of the wage as the 
dependent variable in wage equations, and sometimes to use logarithms of 
the independent variables as well. I report in regression 1975b the 
results when the dependent variable is expressed in logarithms (as used, 
for example, by Stewart, 1983). The coefficients measure the 
proportional rather than the absolute effect of the independent 
variables, so I multiply each of the estimated coefficients by the 
geometric mean of the wage to give estimates of the effect of each 
variable which are comparable with the non-log specification (1975a).
None of the coefficients are altered by more than a small fraction of 
their standard deviation. The explanatory power of the two regressions 
is almost identical. So I conclude that the non-log specification, which 
implies that factors have an additive rather than a multiplicative 
influence, is in no way inferior to the log specification.
I also check for the effect of possible heteroscedasticity on the 
validity of statistical inferences which can be drawn from the OLS 
estimates. (See discussion in Section 4.7.3.) In Table 4.3 I report in 
addition to the OLS t-statistics, the heteroscedasticity-consistent 
t-statistics for 1975 and 1982. In all cases they are close to the OLS 
statistics, usually slightly higher. So there is little evidence that 
heteroscedasticity is a serious problem, and I note that OLS estimates 
are still unbiased even in the event of heteroscedasticity.
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4.3.2 THE INFLUENCE OF BARGAINING POWER ON WAGES
I repeat here the two versions of the wage equation used for 
estimation:
Equation 4.11 provides a means of preliminary investigation of the 
determination of workers' bargaining strength, and at the same time 
provides a check on whether there is any serious omitted variable bias in 
estimations of equation 4.8. I report estimations of equation 4.11 in 
Table 4.4. For each year I report regressions: a) without any bargaining 
variables (ie. comparable to those in Table 4.4, but on slightly 
different samples); b) including the bargaining variables Z, representing 
a 'standard' specification of the wage equation(1 0 ); and c) including the 
bargaining variables weighted by profits per worker (ie. as in equation 
4.11). The bargaining model I have investigated suggests that c) should 
be a superior specification to b).
I omit from the samples the steel and shipbuilding and oil 
refining industries (for reasons outlined in section 4.6) and also the 
photo industry in 1979 and the articificial fibre and clock industries in 
1982 when they reported negative profits.
Since equation 4.11 predicts that the error term is 
heteroscedastlc in a known form, we can construct appropriate weights for 
weighted least squares estimation:
Wi
(l^  = WP.^ - WP + et)
4.8
W.i cV.ï1 + g.U.ÍÍ/L^ ♦ ei + (e".n/L)i 4.11
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4.3.2 THE INFLUENCE OF BARGAINING POWER ON WAGES
I repeat here the two versions of the wage equation used for 
estimation:
Equation 4.11 provides a means of preliminary investigation of the 
determination of workers' bargaining strength, and at the same time 
provides a check on whether there is any serious omitted variable bias in 
estimations of equation 4.8. I report estimations of equation 4.11 in 
Table 4.4. For each year I report regressions: a) without any bargaining 
variables (ie. comparable to those in Table 4.4, but on slightly 
different samples); b) Including the bargaining variables Z, representing 
a 'standard' specification of the wage equation!1 0 ); and c) including the 
bargaining variables weighted by profits per worker (ie. as in equation 
4.11). The bargaining model I have investigated suggests that c) should 
be a superior specification to b).
I omit from the samples the steel and shipbuilding and oil 
refining industries (for reasons outlined in section 4.6) and also the 
photo industry in 1979 and the articificial fibre and clock industries in 
1982 when they reported negative profits.
Since equation 4.11 predicts that the error term is 
heteroscedastic in a known form, we can construct appropriate weights for 
weighted least squares estimation:
Wi
^  = WPt - WP + e ^
4.8
W.i c".Yi + g. (Z. n / L ) i + e. + (e".n/L)i 4.11
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= k' + k.P^
where is profits per worker in industry i. But we need to choose k' 
and k.
Stewart and Wallis (1981, p.257) give the likelihood function for 
equation A . 11 (on the assumption that the error term is heteroscedastic 
but normally distributed) which can be written as:
-21ogL = nlog2* + ZQ.2 + Z(R/Q).2 5 nlog Zn + V(k',k )
1 1 4 . 12
where R^ is the residual: Wi - c".Y.^ - g.(Z.P .
The maximum likelihood estimate is given by finding those values 
of k* and k which minimise V(.)t the sum of the squared weights added to 
the sum of the squared weighted (least squares) residuals.
I suggest here a method of reducing the dimensions of the search 
from two parameters to one, noting that the weighted least squares 
estimates of c" and g depend only on the ratio k'/k (=k"), for it is the 
ratio of the weights, not their absolute values, which affect the 
coefficient estimates. So I define the folllowing:
Qi = k.(k" + Pt)
A(k") = X(k" «• Pt
B(k") = r(Ri/(k" + P
where A and B are simply the sum of the squared weights and sum of the 
squared residuals (obtained from least squares regression with 0  ^ as 
weights), with k set equal to unity.
In general, the sum of the squared weights is:
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and the sum of the squared weighted residuals is:
2(Ri / Q i )2 = B / k2 .
The sum of these two expressions ( = V(k,k") ) is minimised with respect 
to k when: k2 = (B/A ) 1 ^2 , in which case
V(k") = V(k»,k") = 2(AB) 1 / 2  .
The maximum likelihood estimate is found by searching for that value of 
k" which minimises the product AB from equation 4.13.
I have applied this technique to equation 4.11 for each of the 
three years studied. For 1975, I found V(k") to be monotonically 
declining, indicating that the data did not meet the assumptions of 
equation 4.11. This is perhaps not surprising given that industry 
profitability was at a record, and perhaps unanticipated, low to which 
bargainers on both sides may not have yet adjusted. However, for each of 
1979 and 1983 V(k") does decrease monotonically before reaching a minimum 
and then rising monotonically. The maximum likelihood estimate of k" is 
55 in 1979 and 140 in 1983 (where, in each case, is measured in units 
of thousands of pounds per worker per year). The weighted least squares 
estimates which I report are therefore the maximum likelihood estimates 
for 1979 and 1983. For 1975 X report weighted least squares estimates 
based on a somewhat arbitrary choice of the weighting parameter, k" = 30.
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NOTES TO TABLE 4 .4
1. FED = FURTHER EDUCATION; EN = EAST MIDLANDS; NW : NORTH WEST; SE = SOUTH EAST;
TRW) = TRAINED; OVERP = OVERTIME; CAP = CAPITAL INTENSITY; FEM = FEMALE RATIO;
STAFF = STAFF RATIO; UR s UNEMPLOYMENT RATE(X) ; CR5 = CONCENTRATION X IO-2
2. For each year, equation c. is estimated by Weighted Least Squares, giving maximum 
likelihood estimates for 1979 and 1983. The weights are of the form = (k t Pj), 
where Pj is profit per head in industry i (£'000 per year) and the parameter k takes the 
value 30 for 1975, 55 for 1979, and 140 for 1983. The bargaining variables (from 'CAP' 
to 'UNION') have each been pre-multiplied by Pj .
3. Coefficients are followed by t-values in brackets.
4. For the weighted least squares regressions, the statistics are based on the weighted 
residuals.
5. For 1983, the dependent variable wage has been adjusted for overtime at a rate of 0.5 .
The bargaining variables I use are attempts to capture the 
determinants of workers' ability to wrest some part of industry surplus 
from the employers. Since I use measured gross profits, I need to 
correct for the employers' minimum profit constraint which I assume to be 
a positive, linear function of capital invested in the industry. Lacking 
data on capital stock, I have constructed proxies by summing net capital 
investment over the previous few years. Since investment is measured in 
current prices, I have, in effect, used the inflation rate as the 
depreciation factor on past investment. Capital intensity is measured as 
the ratio of this proxy to value added. Unfortunately, no data is 
available broken down by SIC for industry capital gearing, which I have 
argued in section 3.6 to be an important influence on the minimum profit 
constraint. Nevertheless, the bargaining theory predicts that the 
coefficient on the capital intensity term should be negative, since the 
higher the minimum profit constraint, the smaller is the pool of surplus 
which workers can bargain over.
The estimates shown in Table A.4 do indeed show a negative 
coefficient on capital intensity in each of the three years when 
specification A.11 - the 'bargaining' specification - is used. The 
coefficient is significant at the 1 % level in 1979 and at the 20% level 
in 1975 and 1983. It is interesting to note that when the bargaining 
variables are not weighted by Industry profitability - the 'standard' 
specification - the coefficient is positive in 1975, and statistically 
inslgnflcant in 1983. If the underlying theory of bargaining is correct, 
we can see that erroneous Inferences about the influence of bargaining 
variables could easily be drawn as a result of mis-specifying the 
estimating equation.
The significance of non-manual employees for the bargaining 
outcome is perhaps analogous to the role of the minimum profit constraint
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and capital intensity. For I would hypothesise that non-manual workers 
also have the capacity to pre-empt some part of industry surplus, so 
reducing the size of the cake which manual workers can try to win. If, 
for instance, employers' bargaining strength gives them a certain share 
of industry surplus, and if the share of industry surplus which is paid 
to non-manual workers (through higher salaries and through perks) is an 
increasing function of their number, then manual workers' share of 
surplus must be a decreasing function of the ratio of non-manual to 
manual employees.
In the bargaining specifications, the coefficient on the staff 
ratio is indeed negative in each year, significant at the 5% level in 
both 1979 and 1983. The comparison with the standard specification is 
dramatic - for the sign of the coefficient is reversed in each year, but 
is not statistically significant at even the 10% level.
The proportion of the workforce which is female is found to have a 
significantly negative effect in both specifications in all years. We 
might expect this to be so if women workers are less strongly organised 
than men, and/or if less men choose to take jobs in low-paying 
industries.
The unemployment rate has, as expected, a negative coefficient for 
all years in both specifications. It is noteworthy that the effect is 
statistically significant at the 5% level only for 1983, a year when 
unemployment reached record post-war levels. The rate of growth of 
employment is generally found to attract a positive coefficient, but it 
is statistically insignificant. I have hypothesised that this variable 
should have a positive effect on workers' bargaining strength, hence on 
wages. It will tend, however, to be colllnear with the unemployment 
rate.(11) Moreover, there may be some slmultaneous equation bias if 
higher wages tend to reduce Industry growth, though if bargaining does
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occur on a vertical contract curve, this will not be the case.
The concentration ratio would be expected to have a positive 
coefficient in the standard specification, as a proxy for industry 
surplus. Indeed it does have a positive coefficient in 1975, but is 
statistically insignificant at the 10% level for all years (not reported 
for 1983). When industry profitability is introduced directly in the 
bargaining specification there is no obvious expectation for the sign of 
the coefficient on concentration. If a concentrated industry facilitates 
collusion and organisation between employers, the effect will be positive 
- unless it is outweighed by easier co-ordination for unions.(12) In 
fact, the coefficient is only significant at the 10% level in 1979, when 
it is negative.
I would expect union coverage to have a positive influence on 
workers' bargaining power - indeed many researchers treat it as the only 
such influence. The coefficient is however statistically insignificant 
in both specifications in the two years for which data was available (I 
report the results only for 1975), indicating perhaps that the other 
variables reported are more important determinants of bargaining 
strength, given that the union coverage variable is picking up relatively 
small variations in the highly unionised manufacturing sector.(13)
For both 1979 and 1983, the bargaining specification gives higher
t-values on most variables than does the 'standard' specification. (The 
2R values are not strictly comparable because the bargaining 
specification has been estimated by weighted least squares.) The 
bargaining specification performs less well for 1975, when the 
hypothesised likelihood function does not have the predicted shape. I 
suggest that this may be the result of the exceptionally low profit 
levels of 1975 and the high rate of inflation in that year which may well 
have been incorrectly anticipated by the bargaining parties. So I take
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the results for 1979 and 1983 as tentative support for the bargaining 
model. However, I note ray previous qualifications about the 
specification of the bargaining relationship underlying the estimating 
equation 4.11, which imply that the bargaining relationship needs further 
investigation.
If we compare the coefficients on the 'skill' variables in Table
4.4 (ie. from FED to PBR) when bargaining variables are omitted 
altogether (equation a.) and when the bargaining specification is used 
(equation c.) we find that in all cases the inclusion of bargaining 
variables alters the estimated coefficients by less than one standard 
error, with the exception of the overtime variable in the unsatisfactory 
1975 bargaining regression. In the 1979 and 1983 regressions, the 
inclusion of bargaining variables alters the coefficients generally by 
substantially less than one standard error. So I conclude that any 
omitted variable bias in the comparable wage equations reported in Table
4.3 is not likely to be substantial.(14)
4.« ESTIMATING INDUSTRY WAGE PREMIA
The residuals from estimation of equation A . 8 give estimates of 
the deviation of the industry wage premia around their mean - but we 
still need some method of estimating that mean. This problem amounts to 
deciding which of the industries at the lower end of the distribution of 
the residuals are paying at or under the alternative wage. The method 
used by Svejnar (1984) is to assume a) that the alternative wage is the 
average wage for a particular class of workers across a sample of 
unionised and non-unionised firms, and b) that in unionised firms all the 
workers have the same proportionate premium as that particular class of 
workers. The method used here avoids assumption b) by taking into 
account the differing composition of the workforce in different 
industries. Assumption a) would require that we divide our sample into a 
unionised and non-unionised sector, assuming that the non-union sector is 
paying the alternative wage. But I have already noted that UK 
manufacturing is almost entirely highly unionised, with less than 50% 
coverage found only in the clothing industry. Moreover, I have argued 
that even if workers are highly unionised they may be unable to win wage 
premia if other factors have reduced their bargaining power or if there 
is no surplus in the Industry; and even poorly unionised workers may have 
some bargaining power.
Another approach would be to take the lowest observed wage 
(adjusted for skill etc.) as the alternative wage. But there are two 
problems with this: a) it is likely that some industries will be paying 
below the reservation wage at any one moment if workers' bargaining 
strength is low and if bargainers in that industry have underestimated 
the rate of inflation and growth in the nominal value of the alternative 
wage, with the result that they have settled temporarily for a wage which 
in the long-run would be insufficient to keep workers in that industry;
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and b) some low paying industries will have particular circumstances, 
conditions of work and workforce characteristics, which have not been 
picked up by the explanatory variables in my wage equation - unidentified 
circumstances which lower the alternative wage for that industry below 
that which is predictable with the available data. For these two 
reasons, we might expect to find a number of industries paying a wage 
which is temporarily, or apparently, below the alternative wage. Taking 
the lowest observed wage as the alternative wage might lead to 
substantial overestimation of the actual wage premium in other 
industries.
Indeed, if the lowest (adjusted) pay level was the alternative 
wage, it is likely that there would be some clustering of observations 
around this wage, on the assumption that there will be a number of 
industries where workers' bargaining strength is around zero and/or where 
industry surplus is negligible. This suggests that we examine the lower 
end of the distribution of residuals from the preferred wage equations of 
Table A.3. These residuals are listed in Table A.5. There is no 
concentration of industries at the very bottom of the scales, but for 
each year there is a distinct clustering of industries paying roughly 
between 8% and 10% below the average. The clusters for each year are 
delineated by the dashed lines in the table. Within each cluster, the 
density of industries (per percentage point on the wage scale) is greater 
than, and usually at least twice as great as the density of the five 
industries above and below the cluster. For each year, approximately 10% 
of the sample of industries are paying wages (adjusted for skills, etc.) 
below the level of the clustering, and in each year approximately half of 
these lowest paying industries are textile or leather industries (which 
are very reasonable candidates for paying the minimum wage as a result of 
their long-term decline).
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So I take the lowest-paying industry in the identified clusters 
for each year to be paying the alternative wage. For higher-paying 
industries I measure the wage premium relative to this line. I assume 
that the even lower-paying industries are paying a zero wage premium, 
allowing for the problems of mistaken expectations and inadequate data.
I define the wage surplus for each industry to be the equivalent 
proportion of the industry's annual manual workers' wage bill, assuming 
that women workers receive the same proportionate wage premium over their 
alternative wage as the men. I will use these measures of industry wage 
surplus in the following sections to investigate the effect on price-cost 
margins and to investigate further the determinants of workers'
bargaining power
TABLE 4.5
THE LOWEST PAYING INDUSTRIES. AFTER ADJUSTMENT FOR SKILLS. ETC.
Wage differentials, after corrections for differentials in skills etc., expressed as 
percentage deviation from mean Mage. These figures are derived from the residuals of the 
mage equation estimations shown in Table 4.3.
1975 1979 1983
INDUSTRY (SIC 1968) INOUSTRY (SIC 1968) INDUSTRY (SIC 1980)
MLH ORDER WAGE
S
MLH ORDER WAGE
%
MLH WAGE
S
273 5 -22.0 432 14 -17.5 494 -23.2
432 14 -20.8 273 5 -17.5 434 -21.0
414 13 -18.4 416 13 -15.2 419 -18.7
493 19 -17.9 261 4 -15.0 428 -16.6
422 13 -17.3 422 13 -14.1 442 -15.9
494 19 -16.2 421 13 -12.8 456 -15.9
421 13 -15.3 415 13 -12.4 431 -14.4
495 19 -13.1 495 19 -11.3 415 -13.9
415 13 -12.8 263 4 -11.1 432 -13.1
322 6 -12.1 493 19 -10.2 413 -12.6
391 12 -11.6 322 6 -10.1 255 -11.9
423 13 -10.9 365 9 -9.7 453 -10.7
363 9 -10.1 444 15 -9.5 346 -10.5
416 13 -9.4 414 13 -9.4 412 -10.2
261 4 -9.1 494 19 -9.1 466 -9.7
212 3 -8.9 278 5 -8.8 455 -9.4
445 15 -8.6 239 3 -8.7 231 -8.8
444 15 -8.5 221 3 -8.1 483 -8.7
354 8 -8.2 462 16 -7.9 462 -8.6
446 15 -7.6 363 9 -7.5 441 -8.4
338 7 -7.6 445 15 -7.3 464 -8.0
412 13 -6.8 370 10 -6.7 411 -7.7
214 3 -6.7 435 -5.5
256 -5.2
344 -4.9
SIC 1968« 3 a food, drink, etc.; 4 = coal and petroleum products; 5 = chemicals, ate.;
6 a metal manufacture; 7 = mechanical engineering; 8 a instrument engineering;
9 a electrical engineering; 10 a shipbuilding; 11 a vehicles! 12 a metal goods;
13 a textiles; 14 a leather, etc.; 15 a clothing and footwear;
16 a bricks, etc.; 17 z timber, furniture, etc.; 18 a paper, print, etc.;
19 z other manufecturing.
SIC 1980I 23 Z  extraction of atone, clay, etc.; 25 z chemicals; 34 z electrical and 
electronic engineering; 41/42 = food and drink; 43 z textiles;
44 z leather, etc.; 45 z footwear and clothing; 46 z timber and wooden furniture;
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A.5 THE EFFECT OF BARGAINED WAGE PREMIA ON PRICE-COST MARGINS
A.5.1 Specifying the variables
Before estimating equation A.5 we have to define the price-cost 
margin and the variables used to explain margins. The denominator of the 
margin is revenue (see equation 2.1), but Hart and Morgan (1977, p.188) 
prefer to measure revenue by net output rather than gross output. They 
argue that the use of gross output or sales brings in the influence of 
"prices of raw materials, duties, subsidies and changes in the amount of 
work given to other establishments. An alternative measure which avoids 
these problems is the ratio of profits to value added (net output)".
On the other hand, the conjectural variation equilibrium model of 
oligopoly does predict that sales (or gross output, the two measures are 
usually very close) is the correct measure of revenue. However, the 
model ignores the existence of vertical links between industries and the 
consequent possibility of bilateral bargaining. If vertical integration 
is prevalent, there will be a substantial intra-firm component to 
inter-industry trade and it may well be that firms operate and interact 
in terms of net rather than gross output. Cowling (1983) makes a similar 
point with regard to intra-industry inter-establishment transactions.
This issue is potentially quite serious, for there are wide 
variations in the ratio of net output to gross output, so variations in 
margins will be heavily dependent on the measure used. For instance, in 
1982, on the sample of 91 3 digit manufacturing industries, the mean 
ratio of net to gross output is 0.AA5 with a standard deviation of 0.118. 
The lowest ratio of net to gross output is in grain milling.
We can see
A.3A
from Table A . 6 that when revenue is defined on gross output, grain 
milling has a margin far below the average; but when net output
is used as a measure of revenue, the grain industry has a higher margin. 
This reversal of rankings occurs also at the level of industry groups; 
comparing, for example, the food, drink and tobacco group with 
non-metallic mineral products. Clearly, any analysis of variations in 
margins will be heavily influenced by the choice of measure.
TABLE 4.6
THE INFLUENCE OF NET AND GROSS MEASURES OF REVENUE ON THE RANKING OF MARGINS 
1982
INDUSTRY (SIC 1980)
Food, Drink and Tobacco (41/42) 
Non-metallic mineral products (24)
Grain milling (416)
NET / GROSS 
OUTPUT PCM2 PCM4
0.304 0.184 0.607
0.527 0.284 0.539
0.184 0.121 0.660
Average of 91 industries
in sample 0.449 0.190 0.430
Source: Cenaus of Production
PCM2 : price-cost / gross output 
PCM4 : price-cost / net output 
(see text for definitions)
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Net output has the distinct advantage that it is a measure which 
is independent of the level of vertical integration of the industry. For 
the reasons advanced above, it is the measure I prefer. But since this 
issue has not been resolved either theoretically or empirically, I will 
follow the example of Cowling (1983) and Clarke, Davies and Waterson 
(1984) in reporting alternative definitions of price-cost margins based 
on both gross and net output measures.
Unfortunately, the problems in defining price-cost margins do not 
end here. The model of profit-maximising oligopoly indicates that 
mark-ups are determined relative to marginal costs. Most empirical 
studies measure margins relative to average variable costs, tantamount to 
an assumption of constant returns to the variable inputs. For instance, 
Cowling (1983) makes this assumption explicitly for UK manufacturing in 
the 1970s, arguing its validity for a period when capacity utilisation 
was falling from 93% in 1970 to 83% in 1979. This argument is supported 
by Sawyer's (1983) study of pricing in UK manufacturing over the period 
1963-75, where, in the majority of industries studied, the preferred 
pricing model omits the level of output as a significant influence on 
prices; and in those cases where output is found to be significant, the 
effect is sometimes positive, sometimes negative. Clarke, Davies and 
Waterson (1984) examine the conjectural variation pricing model in terms 
of intra-industry margins in UK manufacturing from 1971-77 and posit the 
possibility of u-shaped (quadratic) marginal cost curves. But in 
two-thirds of the industries studied, their findings (p.445) are 
consistent with ar. assumption of constant marginal costs. On the basis 
of this evidence, I conclude that the assumption of constant marginal 
costs is indeed valid for the period under investigation.
A further issue is whether non-manual employees' salaries should 
be Included in the definition of variable costs. Cowling (1983) follows
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Kalecki in treating salaries as overhead costs. This assumption seems 
reasonable with regard to the indivisibilities of senior managerial, 
research and design functions, but it seems less plausible in the case of 
more menial office and clerical functions where tasks are more readily 
divisible and employment contracts allow for lay-off and dismissal. 
Unfortunately, the data does not allow us to make such distinctions, 
requiring that we treat staff salaries as a whole.
One approach to this problem is to compare the actual variability 
of manual and non-manual employment. Table A.7 reports a simple 
comparison of the relative variations of annual levels of employment and 
average hours of work. Examining aggregate manufacturing employment over 
the period 1971-82, the coefficient of variation for manual workers is 
more than twice that for non-manuals. Breaking variations in employment 
down by 106 3-digit industries over the period 1974-79, the average of 
the ratio between the two coefficients of variation is nearly one and a 
half. However, the greater relative variability of manual employment is 
due, at least in part, to the relatively greater secular decline in 
manual employment in manufacturing; manual workers comprised 73.4% of the 
manufacturing workforce in 1971, but 68.4% in 1982. So the apparently 
much greater variability in employment for manual workers is not 
conclusive.
On the other hand, if we examine weekly hours of work the evidence 
is much clearer. Over the period 1972-79, examining annual averages of 
weekly hours worked in all manufacturing industry, the coefficient of 
variation for manual hours is twice that of non-manual hours; over the 
period 1977-83 it is three times as high (though this last figure is 
Influenced by a decline in the normal manual working week in the early 
1980s from 40 to 39 hours).
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TABLE 4.7
1. THE VARIABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT OF MANUAL AND NON-HANUAL EMPLOYEES 
IN UK MANUFACTURING
employment of operatives 
mean
atandard deviation 
coefficient of variation
employment of others 
mean
standard deviation 
c.o.v.
ratio of c.o.v.a
a) annual measures 
of manufacturing 
employment 1971-82
---- T5TO5-------
5021.3
637.4
0.126
1,951
104.7
0.053
2.36
b) annual measures of 
industry employment, 
averaged over 106 
industries, 1974-79
41,237
8,500
0.162
15,904
2,460
0.137
1.44
2. THE VARIABILITY IN HOURS Of WORK OF MANUAL ANO NON-HANUAL EMPLOYEES
annual averages of weekly hours for manufacturing industry, for full time adult men 
excluding those whose pay was affected by absence
1972-79 1977-83
weekly hours worked by 
manual employées
mean 45.71 44.78
standard deviation 0.462 0.988
coefficient of variation 0.010 0.022
weekly hours worked by 
non-manual employees
mean 39.21 39.20
standard deviation 0.196 0.267
coefficient of variation 0.005 0.007
Sourcesi Census of Production and Employment Gazette
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It seems clear from this evidence that manual workers' employment 
is indeed more variable than that of non-manual workers, especially when 
hours of work are taken into account. This gives some credence to the 
hypothesis that employers treat manual wages as variable costs while 
treating non-manual salaries as overheads. But the case is far from 
proven, so I will report measures of price-cost margins which treat 
salaries alternately as overhead and as variable costs.
Employers' national insurance contributions should naturally be 
treated as overhead or variable costs according to whether they are 
levied with respect to overhead or variable incomes. But the Census of 
Production gives only aggregate employers' contributions, so I have to 
estimate the proportion of each industry's payments which are 
attributable to manual and non-manual workers. Since national insurance 
is a mildly progressive tax over much of its range, the average rate 
levied on manual workers' wages is likely to be less than the rate on the 
relatively higher salaries of non-manual staff. In Table 4.8 I show the 
results of regression of total national insurance payments on industry 
wage and salary bills. The estimated rate of national insurance levy on 
manual wages rises from 10.9% in 1975 to 17.3% in 1979, falling to 16.1% 
in 1982. The estimates for salaries are several percentage points 
higher. I use these estimated rates to derive estimates of industry wage 
costs including national insurance.
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TABLE 4.8
ESTIMATION OF THE AVERAGE RATE OF EMPLOYERS' CONTRIBUTIONS ON MANUAL WORKERS’ WAGES
OLS regression results; the dependent verieble is employers' national insurance 
contributions: t-values are in brackets.
WAGES
SALARIES
1975 1979
0.109 (14.8) 0.173
0.157 (11.0) 0.195
1982
(28.1) 0.161 (16.9)
(18.2) 0.191 (15.7)
R
N
2 0.958 0.987 0.976
106 106 91
Source ; Census of Production
I define four alternative measures of industry price-cost margins, 
measuring the ratio of overhead costs plus profits to revenue, using the 
alternative definitions of both overheads and revenue which have been 
discussed above:
PCM1 = (net output - wages - N.I.) / gross output
PCM2 = (net output - wages - salaries - N.I.) / gross output
PCM3 = (net output - wages - N.I.) / net output
PCM4 = (net output - wages - salaries - N.I.) / net output
I use various proxies for the independent variables in estimating 
equation 4.5. Rather than the theoretically preferable Herfindahl index 
of concentration, I use the more readily available five-firm 
concentration ratio. Lacking direct measurement of the elasticity of
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industry demand, I report the effects of the commonly used proxies, 
advertising intensity and industry growth (noting that the Census of 
Production category from which advertising expenses are taken does also 
cover expenditure on royalties, etc.). I am unable to find any measures 
of product differentiation, except for 19 75 when I report the use of 
concentration ratios which are aggregated up from sub-industry product 
level concentration ratios. All concentration measures refer to domestic 
production rather than to domestic markets. The lack of data on exports 
and on imports (which can be intra-firm imports, or competitive imports) 
could be a serious omission. Lyons (1981) reports on UK manufacturing in 
1968 and finds that both import and export intensitites affect price-cost 
margins. But he ignores both the concentration of importers and the 
degree of intra-firm trade. Coutts, Godley and Nordhaus (1978, 
p.129-132) conclude that neither import prices nor import penetration 
affect UK domestic price-cost ratios. Murfin and Cowling (1981) study 
the effects of import penetration on UK manufacturing wholesale prices 
between 1954 and 1978, and they also find that import penetration appears 
not to affect pricing. On balance, it may well be that the omission of 
import and export data from this study is not problematic.(15)
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TABLE 4 .9 .5  THE DETERMINATION OF PRICE-COST MARGINS (v a riou s  samples)
YEAR 197 5g 1975h 19791 1982J 1982k
DEPENDENT VARIABLE PCMJ PCM3 PCH3 PCM3 POO
CONCENTRATION 1.45 (3.31) 1.38 (3.2) 0.76 (1.70) 0.86 (2.00) 0.83 (1.62)
ADVERTISINGS 2.0 (3.7) 1.96 (3.7) 1.4 (3.0) 0.42 (3.3) 0.44 (3.1)
GROWTH 0.47 (5.4) 0.46 (5.11)
GR0WTH2 0.42 (2.2) 0.37 (2.1)
PLANT 0.03 (0.27)
CAPITAL -0.2 (0.30)
SURPLUS/N. OUTPUT -0.85 (2.4) -0.83 (2.4)
SURPLUS2/G. OUTPUT -0.73 (4.5)
SAL ARIES/N. OUTPUT 0.13 (0.73)
N 106 106 104 88 88
R2 0.303 0.375 0.377
R2 0.184 0.200 0.275 0.353 0.339
PCM 0.613 0.613 0.633 0.642 0.642
NotB8
1. For 1975 and 1979, advertising intensity is measured relative to gross output rather 
than value added.
TABLE 4.9.6 DEFINITION OF VARIABLES FOR TABLE 4.9
All variables are aa defined in Table 4.1, with the Following additions and/or ahorthandi
CONCI
CONC
AD
PREM
TOT
GR0WTH2
SURPLUS2/G. OUTPUT
PLANT
CAPITAL
= PRODUCT CR5 /1000 
■ CONCENTRATION RATIO /1000 
s ADVERTISING INTENSITY 
= estimated wage premium / wage
s mean value of the dependent variable used in the regression 
s growth rate (over previous year) in employment of operatives 
= wage premium X employment of operatives / gross output X 100 
= plant size / 10 
= capital intensity / 10
NOTE I For spécification e, 1975 and 1982, the second t-etatistic reported is the 
heteroscedasticity consistent measure.
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4.5.2 Price-cost margin regression results
= a.Xj' + d. (wage surplus/revenue)
4.5
I report regression results for OLS estimation of equation 4.5
using various specifications of the independent variables,and using the
four definitions of the price-cost margin variables, in Tables 4.9.1-5.
If we examine for each year the specification labelled e which contains
the ratio of wage surplus to net output as an explanatory variable, we
see that the regressions have far less explanatory power (as measured by 
_2R ) when the denominator of the price-cost margin is measured as gross 
rather than as net output. Using the gross output definition, ie. PCM1 
or PCM2, the explanatory power is less than 10% for every year except 
1982 when it reaches 18% for PCM2. On the other hand, when revenue is 
defined as net output, the regressions explain between 23% and 49% of the 
variation in margins. The same comparison holds true for sill the other 
specifications of the estimating equation. I take this as support for 
the argument put forward in the previous section that net output is a 
better measure for comparing revenues across industries, since it is not 
affected to the same extent as the gross output measure by differences in 
vertical integration.
Concentration
The coefficient on the concentration term comes out uniformly 
negative, but generally statistically insignificant at the 5% level, when 
margins are measured relative to gross output; but when margins are 
defined on net output, the effect of concentration is positive, as 
predicted, and significantly so in a number of specifications. This 
result echoes the findings of Clarke, Davies and Waterson (1984) in their
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study of intra-industry margins, where they find that both the leading 
firms and the smaller firms have significantly higher margins in more 
concentrated industries, but only if margins are defined on net output. 
This dependence of the results on the definition of the measure of 
revenue is perhaps explicable at least in part by the food, drink and 
tobacco group of industries which buys in far more 'raw materials' than 
most industries (see Table 4.6), resulting in a lower than average margin 
on gross revenue, but a much higher than average margin on net revenue; 
at the same time, this group of industries has a particularly high 
average concentration ratio, 60% compared with the sample average of 45%; 
hence the dependence of the sign of the concentration coefficient on the 
definition of margins.
When I am able to use a measure of concentration which takes some 
account of product differentiation, available for 19 75 only, I would 
expect it to increase the explanatory power of the regression. Comparing 
specifications 1975a and 1975b in Tables 4.9.1-A we can see that in fact 
the apparent explanatory power only rises with the PCM3 definition of 
margins, based on net output. X take this to lend further support for 
preferring the net definitions of revenue.
Advertising
X would expect the effect of advertising Intensity to be positive, 
as reported, for example, by Hart and Morgan (1977) or Comanor and Wilson 
(1967) both because the Dorfman-Steiner result on optimal advertising 
expenditure predicts a positive correlation between advertising and 
margins, and because advertising may have the effect of increasing 
product differentiation, hence lowering demand elasticities (although I 
note that only in the second of these two cases should advertising be 
treated as an independent variable). The results do indeed show a
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positive relationship in almost all cases, generally significant at the 
5% or 10% level. I note Hart and Morgan's (1977) concern that there may 
be some spurious correlation because the numerator of PCM contains 
advertising and market research expenditures as part of overhead costs. 
This might be a particular problem if advertising intensity is measured 
relative to the same measure of revenue as is used in the denominator of 
PCM. I have tried to minimise this problem by measuring advertising 
expenditures relative to value added.
Growth
I treat growth of demand as another proxy for price elasticity, on 
the assumption that demand will be relatively less elastic if demand 
grows faster (or, in the context of this study, if it falls more slowly). 
Hay and Morris (1979, p.213) claim that: "there is no theoretical 
agreement on this variable, apart from general agreement that it is 
likely to be of some importance". Comanor and Wilson (1967) find that 
the correlation is typically positive, as do Hart and Morgan (1977) in 
their survey of work in this field and in their own study. It is of 
course possible that the observed correlation results from the effects of 
profitability on growth, in which case our regressions might suffer from 
simultaneous equation bias. But the omission of growth from the 
regression, as reported in specifications 1975g and 1975h in Table 4.9.5, 
has a negligible effect on the estimated coefficients and t-values of the 
other variables; so I discount this as a serious problem in interpreting 
results on other variables.
Some researchers measure demand growth by growth in the value of 
sales. But this measure may be picking up changes in pricing, which are 
clearly not independent of the price-cost margin. Lacking industry level 
price indices, I prefer instead to proxy real industry output with the
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level of employment, assuming that inter-industry differences in the 
growth of labour productivity can be ignored.
The results in Tables 4.9.1-4 show that growth does have the 
expected positive impact on margins. The effect is significant at the 1% 
level in 19 82 when demand changes are measured over the severe 19 7 9 -8 2  
slump; in other years, when demand changes are measured over the previous 
year, it is significant at the 10% level only on the PCM3 measure of 
margins.
Barriers to entry
Hay and Morris (1979, p.209) comment that: "a criticism of all 
studies of concentration and profitability is that other important 
variables are omitted, notably barriers-to-entry variables". They seek to 
reconcile collusive and competitive theories of oligopolistic pricing by 
arguing: "concentration (is) a help to co-operation between firms, so 
that prices (can be) raised... But in long-run equilibrium a limit is 
given by the entry-limit price". Cowling's (1981) argument is that 
excess capacity, and the credible threat of price-war, can deter entry, 
so rendering conventional entry barriers irrelevant. Results in Tables 
4.9.1-5 show that the inclusion of capital intensity and plant size 
variables (the most commonly used entry-barrier variables) has very 
little effect on the estimated coefficients of the other variables 
(compare specifications e and f for 1975 and 1979, and J and k for 1982). 
In all cases the estimates are within the range of one standard error, 
and are usually much closer. Moreover, the estimated effect of these 
barrier to entry variables is usually either statistically insignificant 
at the 10% level and/or negative, whereas the expectation is that the 
effect, if it exists, should be positive. Since there is so little 
evidence to support the claim that entry-barrier variables should be
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included, I suggest that the Cowling hypothesis is supported and that it 
is valid to exclude these variables from the analysis. At the same time 
I note that this exclusion does not substantially alter the estimates of 
the other coefficients.
Wage Surplus
The main purpose of this study is of course to examine the impact 
of wage surplus on margins. Regressions of equation A.5 are reported as 
specifications d and e in Tables 4.9.1-4» defining revenue as gross and 
net output respectively. Specification c uses the proportional wage 
premium directly as an explanatory variable (not weighting it by the 
share of wages in revenue) for purposes of comparison. The results of 
these regressions are summarised in Table 4.10.
The theory of bargaining which I have described does not imply 
that there need be any correlation between unweighted wage premia and 
price-cost margins. For even if workers' bargaining does erode margins, 
the extent of the erosion will depend not on the wage premium itself, but 
on the share of wage surplus (ie. the sum of all the wage premia in that 
industry) in revenue. So, for instance, workers in one industry may win 
a high wage premium; but if wages form only a small part of revenue we 
would expect the impact on margins to be correspondingly small.
Indeed, when the wage premium is expressed Just as a fraction of 
the wage, this variable has a negligible and statistically insignificant 
partial correlation with price-cost margins.
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TABLE ft.10
COEFFICIENTS ON THE WAGE PREMIUM AND ON WAGE SURPLUS IN PCM REGRESSIONS (equation 4.5)
derived From specifications ct d and e in Tables 4.9.1-4, where the other independent 
variables are concentration, advertising and growth.
Alternative definitions of price-coat margins
PCM1 PCH2 PCM3 PCM4
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (mean) YEAR
Waqe premium / waqe (0.103) 1975 -0.09 -0.05 0.10 0.11
(0.100) 1979 -0.04 -0.04 0.12 0.04
(0.103) 1982 0.14 -0.05 0.02 -0.30 (5S)
WAGE SURPLUS/GROSS OUTPUT (0.014) 1975 0.52 0.06 -2.18 (IS) -2.48 (IS)
(0.012) 1979 0.47 -0.11 -2.93 (IS) -3.45 (IS)
(0.012) 1982 0.97 -0.28 -1.71 (5S) -3.43 (IS)
WAGE SURPLUS/NET OUTPUT (0.034) 1975 -0.50(20S) -0.43 (5%) -0.99 (IS) -0.98 (IS)
(0.031) 1979 -0.76 (5%) -0.74 (5%) -1.39 (IS) -1.67 (IS)
(0.031) 1982 -0.01 -0.51 (5S) -0.92 (IS) -1.84 (IS)
IS and 5S refer to level or statistical significance on t-teat, using the 
heteroscedasticity consistent measures for (wage surplus / net output) in 1975 and 1982.
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But when wage surplus is expressed as a proportion of industry revenue, 
the impact on price-cost margins is much larger and is statistically 
significant at the 5% level in 16 of the 24 specifications. Moreover, if 
we consider only those definitions of price-cost margins based on net 
output - and I have argued that there are both theoretical and empirical 
grounds for preferring this definition - the estimates are statistically 
significant at the 1% level in 11 out of the 12 specifications. In each 
case where the coefficient is statistically significant, the sign is 
negative, indicating that bargained wage premia do erode profit margins.
When the price-cost margin is defined in terms of net output (ie. 
PCM3 and PCM4) the appropriate measure of revenue in equation 4.5 is also 
net output, in which case we see that the estimated values of the 
coefficient d lie between -0.92 and -1.84. If we were to correct for the 
average rate of employers' national insurance contributions, which is an 
additional cost to employers of wage increases, the values of d would lie 
between -0.8 and -1.59. The implication is that bargained wage premia 
are deducted directly from profit margins and are not passed on into 
price rises.(16) In terms of the analysis concerning possible bargaining 
over jobs, the evidence supports the hypothesis of bargaining on a 
vertical contract curve.
When the ratio of wage surplus to gross output is regressed on 
PCM3 and PCM4, the coefficients are still statistically significant and 
approximately twice the magnitude of the coefficients on the ratio of 
wage surplus to net output. This is as we might expect, given that the 
average ratio of gross to net output is around 2. However, this 
comparison does not hold when we consider the regressions which have 
price-cost margins relative to gross output as the dependent variable 
(le. PCM1 and PCM2). For in these cases, the effect of wage surplus on 
margins is statistically significant only when expressed as a fraction of
4 .53
net output. But even with these less preferred definitions of margins, 
the weight of evidence does still indicate that bargained wage premia do 
erode margins, even if the extent of such erosion is not so clear as in 
the case of net margins.
4.5.3 Comments on possible econometric problems
Heteroscedastlcity consistent tests of significance
The OLS assumptions of homoscedastic error terms may be suspect in 
cross-section analysis, especially if industry size varies considerably 
with the result that the reliability of data derived from industry 
samples is variable. Moreover, other variables may be correlated with 
the variance of the error term in equation 4.5; we might speculate that 
the variance of margins is higher in Industries with high growth rates, 
for instance.
OLS estimates are still unbiased even if heteroscedasticity 
exists, but the estimates are not necessarily efficient and the OLS 
t-statistics are not necessarily valid. Messer and White (1984) show 
that even when the exact form of heteroscedasticity is unknown, it is 
possible to derive a consistent estimator of the variance-covariance 
matrix of the OLS coefficients, by transforming the variables of the OLS 
regression (dividing them by the OLS residuals) and using instrumental 
variable estimation (with the independent variables multiplied by the 
errors as instruments). In Tables 4.9-1-4 I report these 
heteroscedasticity consistent t-values after the OLS t-values for 
specification e for 1975 and for 1982. Most of the t-statlstics are
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barely altered in the revised estimates, with the exception of the 
advertising measure, for which the t-statistic is reduced substantially 
in most cases. The important variable for this study is the wage surplus 
variable, and we find that the t-statistics are affected only slightly 
and in most cases are revised upwards. So I conclude that the inferences 
based on other OLS t-statistics are not likely to be substantially 
affected by heteroscedasticity. (I assume that the 1979 results behave 
similarly to the 1975 results, since both samples are based on SIC 1968.)
Simultaneous equation bias
It is possible that the estimated coefficient on the wage surplus 
variable, measuring its effect on margins, is biased by a simultaneous 
influence of the price-cost margin on wages. However, I have argued that 
wages are bargained in relation to surplus or profit levels rather than 
margins. (In order to estimate the relationships simultaneously, we 
would have to make assumptions about industry cost and revenue functions 
which would allow us to relate profit levels to margins; since, for 
example, profit margins might be high in an industry, but if fixed costs 
are high relative to the level of output, profits might be low.) Indeed, 
we see from specification c in Tables 4.9.1-4 (summarised in Table 4.10) 
that the partial correlations between margins and wage premia are of 
variable sign and statistically insignificant. So I conclude that any 
simultaneous equation bias is not likely to be substantial.
Hart and Morgan (1977) refer to the related problem of spurious 
correlation when explanatory variables are defined as ratios which are 
related through identities to the independent variable. This could be a 
problem in the regressions of PCM3, for when salaries are treated as 
fixed costs the price-cost margin is equal to unity minus the ratio of 
wages plus national insurance to revenue. When wage surplus is related 
to the same measure of revenue, there is a possibility that it is related
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to the dependent variable through an identity. To give an extreme 
example, if the wage premium was the same in every industry - so that 
wage surplus was fixed at the average level of 10% of wages - and if the 
national insurance rate is, say, 15%, then we would be estimating the 
following equation:
net output - (1.15 X Wages/Revenue) = a.X + d.(0.1 x Wages/Revenue) 
revenue
in which case we would expect to find an almost perfect correlation with 
an estimated coefficient d = -1 1 .5 , especially when revenue is defined as 
net output.
In fact, of course, the wage premium varies considerably across 
industries, so the correlation between wage surplus and wages is weak. 
Indeed, the actual estimates of the coefficient d are around -1 rather 
than -11. If we use the gross definition of revenue in relation to wage 
surplus when the margin is measured relative to net revenue, and vice 
versa, we find that the estimated t-values are usually as high or even 
higher as when the same definitions are used on each side of the equation 
- whilst if we were picking up bias due to an identity we would expect 
the reverse to hold. In Table A.9.5 I report a further check on the 1979 
data by calculating the industry wage surplus without any direct 
reference to the industry wage bill, and express it as a fraction of 
gross output whilst the price-cost margin is relative to net output. But 
the estimated coefficient is again negative and highly significant. So I 
find little evidence of spurious correlation.
A.56
4.5.4 Alternative explanations of the erosion of price-cost margins
I have argued that the evidence that wage surplus erodes 
price-cost margins supports the hypothesis that workers bargain over jobs 
as well as wages. But another explanation of the empirical results could 
be simply that prices adjust slowly to wage rises, so that at any one 
time margins will tend to be lower in those industries where workers have 
recently won relatively large wage rises. Indeed, this argument is 
supported by Sawyer's (1983, p.72) evidence that UK manufacturing prices 
respond to cost changes with a lag which is usually 2 to 4 quarters. It 
is, however, difficult to explain Sawyer's accompanying evidence that 
rises in labour costs (rather than fuel, materials, components, etc) are, 
on average, not passed on into prices at all. A suggested hypothesis is 
that pricing anticipates wage rises in advance, rather than responding 
after the event, with employers' responding to the state of bargaining in 
progress. If this were so, we might expect wage growth to be positively 
rather than negatively correlated with price-cost margins. In any case, 
any effect of wage growth on margins, positive or negative, does not 
directly explain the observed effect on margins of wage surplus, which is 
a measure of wage levels rather than wage growth.
Nevertheless, I do test for the effect of wage growth on margins 
to see if it provides an alternative explanation for the erosion of 
profit margins. The underlying hypothesis is that employers set prices 
on the assumption that they will have to concede the average nominal pay 
rise for that year - in which case any wage rise above the average will 
erode margins. I define a variable which is unanticipated wage growth 
weighted by the share of wages in revenue, giving a measure of the 
proportion of revenue which has to meet the unanticipated rise in total 
Industry wage costs - a concept which corresponds to my definition of the 
share of wage surplus in revenue. If this measure of the unanticipated
4 .57
wage bill is not passed on into price rises, we would expect a 
coefficient of - 1  in the regression.
Results of OLS regressions, incorporating either wage growth or 
unanticipated wages as a proportion of revenue, are shown in Table A.11. 
Wage growth is positively correlated with the various measures of 
price-cost margins, but when weighted by the share of wages in net 
output, the t-statistics all drop, so that only two are significant at 
the 10% level, and in all cases but one the coefficients are positive.
The observed positive correlations between margins and both measures of 
wage growth might be the result either of some reverse causation (if high 
profit margins encourage workers to press for higher wage rises) or else 
if employers raise prices in anticipation of future wage rises. In any 
case, there is no evidence here that wage growth erodes profit margins. 
(Nor is there any evidence that the use of the ratio of wages to net 
output as weights leads to any spurious correlation, c.f. the discussion 
in the previous section).
I conclude therefore that it is the bargaining of high wage levels 
rather than high wage growth which has the potential to erode profit 
margins. I have put forward the hypothesis that this is the result of 
bargaining over Jobs, but my expectation has not been confirmed that this 
effect would have diminished or evaporated altogether by 1982 when 
workers were suffering record Job losses and unprecedented (post-war) 
attacks on union organisation and morale (for I have argued that the 
ability to bargain over Jobs is likely to be a sign of workers' 
strength).
The other hypothesis which might explain the vulnerability of 
margins to high wage premia is the threat of foreign competition (as 
discussed in section 2.3). However, in this case we should expect 
margins to be eroded as much by the level of the alternative wage as by
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the level of the wage premium and we should expect other domestic cost 
rises (of materials, components, etc.) to erode margins as well. To the 
extent that foreign competition does inhibit domestic pricing, the impact 
of high wages should be the same as the impact of high levels of other 
costs. Unfortunately, I have not had available the detailed price data 
on domestic costs and foreign prices which would enable a direct test of 
this hypothesis. However, I have previously noted the time-series 
evidence that UK manufacturing non-labour cost changes are generally 
marked-up in full, evidence which discounts the foreign competition 
thesis.
TABLE 4.11
THE EFFECTS Of (UNANTICIPATED) WAGE RISES ON PRICE-COST MARGINS
Reporting the estiuted coefficients (t-etatietice in brackets) of OLS regression of «age 
growth variables on price-cost Margins) the other explanatory variables (not reported here) 
are concentration, advertising intensity and growth of demand. The aaaples are 10? 
industries.
DEFINITION Of DEPENDENT VARIABLE
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE (YEAR) PCM1 PCH2 PCH3 PCH4
Wage Riee 1975 -0.12 (0.72) 0.27 (1.36)
Wage Rise 1979 0.38 (2.30) 0.39 (2.97) 0.60 (3.11) 0.71 (3.00)
Wages rise/revenue 1975 -0.25 (0.52) 0.64 (1.11)
Wages rise/revenue 1979 0.67 (1.09) 0.77 (1.58) 1.39 (1.94) 1.78 (2.02)
Wage rise a 1975 hourly earnings / 1974 hourly earnings - 1.253 
a 1979 hourly earnings / 1978 hourly earnings - 1.174
Wages rise/revsnus a (wage rise) X (wages / net output)
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4 .6  The D e te rm in a n ts  o f  B a rg a in in g  Power
In section 4.4 I investigated the explanatory power of a number of 
bargaining variables in wage equations, finding that the results were 
mostly statistically significant and theoretically plausible for 1979 and 
1983, but not satisfactory for 1975. These estimations were based on 
equation 4.11 which requires special assumptions about bargaining, in 
particular that it does not allow industry profits to be driven to zero. 
In this section I use the measures of wage surplus derived in section 
4.4, express them as a ratio of total industry surplus, and use this 
index of workers' bargaining strength to investigate directly the 
bargaining estimating equation 4.10. The specification is necessarily 
fairly ad hoc, though I have discussed in section 4.3.2 the likely 
effects of the bargaining variables.(17)
Results of OLS regressions are reported in Table 4.12. In each 
year there are a few industries with exceptionally low or negative 
profits which result in a few very wide outliers for the dependent 
variable. (This is one reason why estimating the effect of bargaining 
through the wage equation may in fact be preferable, despite its other 
limitations.) Since industries cannot survive in the long run if they 
earn very low or negative gross profits (before payment of interest etc.) 
I assume that such industries are subject to short-term disturbances 
which have not been taken into account in wage-bargaining. So I exclude 
these industries from most of the samples, as well as excluding the oil 
industry in 1975 (when it had just been subject to extreme price changes) 
and excluding the nationalised steel and shipbuilding industries which 
are not subject to the same profit constraints.
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TABLE 4.12
THE DETERMINANTS OF WORKERS' BARGAINING POWER
Reporting coefficients from OLS regression on workers' shsre of surplus ( = wage surplus / 
profits + wage surplus)• t-statistics in brackets (second set of t-statistics are the 
heteroscedasticity consistent values).
1975a 1975b 1975c 1979a 1979b 1982a
CAPITAL INTENSITY -0.08
(0.40)
(0.48)
-0.079
(1.85)
-0.16
(2.90)
UNION COVERAGE 0.12
(1.64)
(1.51)
0.15
(2.60)
0.15
(2.55)
0.001
(0)
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE -0.40
(0.99)
(1.21)
-0.60
(1.66)
-0.36
(1.26)
-0.47
(1.73)
-0.27
(1.23)
CONCENTRATION (/1000) -0.93
(2.45)
(2.71)
-0.97
(2.72)
-0.92
(2.56)
-1.03
(2.42)
FEMALE RATIO -0.04
(0.75)
(0.74)
-0.16
(3.10)
-0.14
(3.30)
-0.37
(5.88)
STAFF RATIO -0.065
(1.85)
(1.78)
-0.063
(1.90)
-0.042
(1.28)
-0.14
(4.03)
-0.13
((4.17)
-0.09
(2.15)
PLANT SIZE 0.025
(2.27)
(2.41)
0.025
(2.38)
0.024
(2.23)
0.025
(2.45)
0.012
(1.46)
0.035
(3.41)
INVESTMENT RATIO -0.25
(3.16)
GROWTH 0.21
(1.21)
(1.24)
0.33
(2.17)
-0.11
(0.85)
-0.28
(2.98)
N 100 100 100 103 104 86
R2 0.196 0.184 0.167 0.263 0.230 0.436
R2 0.125 0.141 0.123 0.200 0.190 0.394
Notes
1. INVESTMENT RATIO = net investment (197S ♦ 1979) / value added (1979)
2. 1979 sample excludes the oil, steel, shipbuilding, photo, vehicles, cans industries. 
1979 smsple excludes steel and photo industries (and shipbuilding in 1979a).
19B1 sample excludes steel, fibres, clocks, shipbuilding, cycles industries.
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Capital intensity has the expected negative coefficient in each 
year (though it is statistically insignificant in 1975) representing the 
minimum profit constraint. Union coverage has a positive coefficient in 
1975, but is zero in 1979 (data is not available for 1982). The 
unemployment rate attracts the expected negative coefficient in each year, 
though it is barely significant at the 10% level in 19 75 and 1979, and 
only when industry growth is dropped (an indication of collinearity). 
Industry growth is positively correlated with workers' bargaining strength 
in 1975, but negatively correlated in 1979 and 1982. I would expect 
growth in industry demand and employment to boost workers' bargaining 
strength, but at the same time there may be some reverse causation if 
workers' strength tends to reduce industry growth rates. Of course the 
1982 figures cover a period when manufacturing as a whole had been plunged 
into deep recession, so 'high growth' usually means only less rapid 
decline.
The coefficients on industry concentration and on the proportion of 
women employees attract negative coefficients consistently, as does the 
ratio of non-manual to manual staff. I have argued previously that 
non-manual staff will tend to pre-empt some share of industry surplus, and 
that women workers may tend to be less strongly organised, so explaining 
these negative coefficients, while industry concentration might increase 
the bargaining power of both employers and workers. Plant size has a 
consistently positive coefficient, supporting the hypothesis that workers 
gain strength from economies of scale in organisation and solidarity.
This analysis of the bargaining equation is generally consistent 
with the results of the wage equation reported in section 4.3.2 (see Table 
4.4) which Included bargaining variables weighted by profits per worker.
Taking these results together, I conclude that workers' bargaining 
strength relative to employers' is a positive function of plant size, and
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a negative function of the unemployment rate, the proportion of women 
workers in the workforce, and the ratio of non-manual to manual workers. 
The effects of union coverage, demand growth and concentration appear to 
be less conclusive or even ambiguous. The employers' minimum profit 
constraint does appear to be positively related to capital intensity.
Of particular interest is the evidence that the unemployment rate 
in an industry does erode workers' bargaining strength. The size of the 
coefficients in the bargaining equations (Table 4.12) indicates that a one 
percentage point rise in the unemployment rate will reduce workers' share 
of surplus in that industry by between a quarter and 0.6 percentage 
points. Since industry surplus, for manufacturing as a whole, is roughly 
equal to the total wage bill in any year we can see that the effect on 
wages will be of the same order of magnitude for the average industry. If 
we look to the wage equations in Table 4.4 we can compare the estimated 
effect of a 1% point rise in unemployment on wages, deriving our estimates 
from both the 'standard' wage equation (specification b) and from the 
bargaining wage equation (specification c),.in the latter case multiplying 
the coefficients by average profits per worker. These estimates of the 
effect of unemployment are presented in Table 4.13. It is interesting to 
compare these estimates with those derived by Layard and Nickell (1985) in 
the very different context of their time series analysis of aggregate 
employment and wages in the UK over the period 1954-83. Their 3-equation 
model contains a real wage equation where they estimate the elasticity of 
the real wage of male manual workers with respect to the unemployment rate 
to be -0.07. So, taking the average unemployment rate in manufacturing 
for each year, we can estimate the effect that Layard and Nickell predict 
for a 1% point rise in unemployment. Their specification imposes a 
constant elasticity, so the effect that they predict necessarily declines 
as unemployment rises.
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TABLE A.13
THE EFFECT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ON MAGES
Estimates of the percentage change in the wage resulting from a rise in the unemployment
rate of one 
YEAR
percentsge point.
•STANDARD'
WAGE EQUATION 1
BARGAINING , 
WAGE EQUATION 2
BARGAINING . 
MODEL }
LAYARD AND 
NICKELL “
1975 - 0.8 S - 0.4 % - 0.5 S - 1.4 S
1979 - 0.1 S - 0.4 ¡5 - 0.4 % - 1.0 S
1982 - 0.5 » - 0.3 S - 0.3 S - 0.4 S
Notes
1. From Table 4.4, specification b.
2. From Table 4.4, specification c.
3. From Table 4.12, taking the average of the coefficients for each year.
4. From Layard and Nickell (1985) p.75, Table 4, model no. 1, non-linear 3SLS estimate of 
the elasticity of the real wage with respect to the unemployment rate; using the 
average unemployment rate of the sample of industries as the baseline for each year.
My cross-sectional estimates of the impact of unemployment are very 
similar to Layard and Nickell's estimate for 1982, (and are lower for the 
earlier years). Taking the average of the 1982 estimates we can see that 
the rise in the average rate of unemployment in manufacturing Industries 
from 7% in 1979 to 15% in 1982 will have reduced the bargained wage by 
some 3.2%.
Of course, real wages will be reduced in aggregate only if the 
changes in the bargained wage premia are not reflected in price movements. 
But that is precisely the implication of the results of section 4.5's
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analysis of the impact of wage premia on price-cost margins; a rise or 
fall in the premium reduces or increases margins and, by implication, does 
not change price. Indeed, we have seen (Table 1.3) that between 1979 and 
1982 the wages of male manual workers in manufacturing fell behind the 
growth of wages for all adults (including non-manuals) by 4.7%. It does 
appear that the rise of mass unemployment has played a considerable role 
in holding down manual workers' real wages and redistributing income in 
favour of employers.
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4 .7  Summary
The bargaining model described in chapter three predicts that 
oligopoly price-cost margins will be eroded by high wages only inasmuch 
as wages exceed the alternative wage that workers could earn elsewhere 
and to the extent that jobs are important in bargaining. For if 
bargaining covers only the wage, employers are free to mark-up wage costs 
in the same way as any other costs. This chapter reports an econometric 
cross-section study of the determination of UK manufacturing price-cost 
margins at the 3-digit industry level in 1975, 1979 and 1982, testing 
specifically for the effect of wage premia on margins.
The study follows generally accepted specifications of the 
performance-structure relationship, reporting alternative specifications 
where there is disagreement or uncertainty in the literature. In 
particular, I highlight the disagreement over whether to classify 
non-manual salaries as fixed overhead costs or as variable costs and 
whether to measure margins in relation to gross or net revenues. I 
investigate these questions and suggest preferred specifications, while 
noting that the issues are not fully resolved. When a measure of 
bargained wage premia is included in the price-cost margin regression it 
improves significantly the explanatory power of the preferred 
specifications. The point estimates indicate that wage premia are not 
marked up into price, rather that they have the effect of reducing 
margins. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis of efficient 
bargaining over jobs and wages between profit-maximising employers and 
rent-maximising unions. However, the prediction that bargaining over 
Jobs would be less prevalent in 1982, when workers' bargaining position 
is predicted to be very weak, is not confirmed. The evidence does reject 
the hypothesis of slow adjustment of pricing in response to unexpectedly 
high wage increases, but is not able to distinguish the Job-bargaining
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hypothesis from the hypothesis that margins are restrained by foreign 
competition.
Prior estimation of the magnitude of industry wage premia is 
required in order to assess the impact of the premia on margins. The 
method of estimation used here is to correct observed inter-industry wage 
differentials for those factors - skill, location, etc. - which are 
hypothesised to affect the alternative wage, then to identify a group of 
industries paying no more than the alternative wage and to attribute the 
residual inter-industry wage differentials to bargaining.
Having estimated wage premia it is then possible to construct 
measures of the division of surplus between wages and profits in each 
industry and to investigate what are necessarily adhoc and exploratory 
specifications of the determination of bargaining power. A reduced form 
equation which estimates the determination of bargaining power without 
using the prior estimates of wage premia confirms the general results of 
the bargaining equation and suggests that the estimation of wage premia 
was not biased substantially. The pertinent result from the various 
bargaining regressions is that unemployment has a consistently negative 
effect on workers' bargaining strength - though the statistical 
significance is usually weak. The estimates suggest that unemployment 
has played a considerable part in causing the redistribution of income 
described in Chapter 1. Bargaining power is also found to be related to 
plant size and workforce composition.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPORT COMPETITION AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY MARGINS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The primary hypothesis to be examined here is that the pressure 
of foreign imports on domestic industry will be competitive, forcing 
domestic producers to lower their margins below the level which their 
domestic oligopoly position would otherwise allow. This is the view 
of, for instance, Geroski (1982), Utton and Morgan (1983), Turner 
(1980), Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972) and Khalizadeh-Shirazi (1974), 
although these authors tend to assume that imports will be competitive 
rather than argue the case why importers should not be collusive 
partners in domestic oligopolies.
Some authors have presented the import competition hypothesis 
formally. For instance, Jacquemin (1982) argues that an infinitely 
elastic supply of foreign goods will limit the price which a domestic 
monopolist would wish to set (unless domestic costs are much lower than 
world prices). A different example which also argues for the import 
competition hypothesis is presented by Lyons (1981) who deals with the 
foreign sector in a model of conjectural variation equilibrium. He 
concludes that domestic margins will be reduced by the degree of 
substitutability between domestically and foreign produced goods and 
will also be reduced in line with the conjectured elasticity of imports 
with respect to home output. However, he assumes that foreign supply 
will react competitively rather than collusively (i.e. he assumes that
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the foreign supply conjectural variation parameter is non-positive). 
He does not consider the case where importers join in the rivalrous 
collusion of the domestic oligopolists.
Should foreign supply react collusively to changes in domestic 
output, it is no longer obvious that imports should depress oligopoly 
margins. Bather, we should extend our definition of the oligopoly 
group to include both domestic and foreign, or transnational, 
producers. Most models of conjectural variation equilibrium do, 
however, imply that the firm with lowest costs will gain the highest 
market share and have the highest profit margins - see for instance 
result 3.15 or Table 3.1 summarising the effects of changes in costs in 
a simple duopoly model. In this model, if one firm is regarded as the 
domestic producer, its profit margin will be seen to be inversely 
related to the market share of the rival (importer), reflecting 
relative cost competitiveness. So, even in international oligopoly we 
should expect to observe that an increase in import penetration is 
correlated with lowered domestic margins, even though foreign 
producers' margins rise and the aggregate profit margin of the 
international oligopoly group may be constant. In such a case, I 
describe the imports as rivalrous rather than competitive. However, it 
may be difficult to distinguish empirically between competitive and 
rivalrous imports if we cannot observe how the margins of importers 
behave - for in either case we expect to observe a negative correlation 
between domestic margins and import penetration.
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On the other hand, Jones et al (1973) and Cowling (1982) argue in 
the context of the Canadian and UK economies respectively that imports 
may actually increase domestic margins if the imports are controlled by 
domestic producers. Imports may comprise component parts for assembly 
or finished products, and in either case may be imported and then 
resold by a member of the domestic oligopoly. We can again expect that 
import shares will be positively related to the cost advantage of 
foreign producers, but in this case the consequent profits may be 
realised by domestic rather than foreign firms if the imports are 
priced at cost rather than at domestic market prices. In particular, a 
transnational producer will be able to choose where to realise profits 
through control of internal transfer pricing. For instance, Cowling 
(1982) notes that Ford is the leading importer into the UK car market 
and is also the dominant domestic firm. If Ford chooses to import at 
continental cost (which is presumably lower than UK cost) then Ford's 
UK profit margins will be positively related to the level of imports.
As the leading UK producer, a rise in Foard’s market share will tend to 
increase concentration in the industry and therefore to increase the 
aggregate industry profit margin as well as Ford's own profit margin. 
(This argument is made by Sugden,1983a.)
On theoretical grounds alone, then, our expectation of the impact 
of imports on domestic margins is ambiguous. We need to distinguish 
between the three categories of imports discussed above : first, those 
which are truly competitive, where the foreign supply is a function of 
market price alone (the case which is often assumed to apply); second, 
the case where importers act in rivalrous collusion with domestic
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producers, each expecting the other's supply to be dependent on their 
own supply; and third, the case where imports are controlled by 
leading domestic producers. In the case of competitive imports, we can 
expect the industry profit margins to be lowered by import competition. 
In the case of rivalrous oligopoly imports we can expect that aggregate 
oligopoly margins may be independent of import shares, but that 
domestic margins will tend to be negatively correlated with imports.
In the third case, where imports are controlled by leading producers, 
domestic margins might be either positively or negatively correlated 
with import penetration in the industry. (The potential importance of 
this last category of imports is highlighted by the finding of 
Helleiner and Lavergne (1979) that some 4Q% of imports into the US in 
1977 were either intra-firm transactions or transactions between 
related parties.) In order to distinguish between these three 
categories of imports, we would need data on the ownership and control 
of imports in each industry and data on foreign supply decisions. 
Lacking such data, we have to remain agnostic with regard to the 
relationship which we should expect to observe between imports and 
domestic profit margins. The inability of most researchers to 
distinguish between competitive and other imports may account to some 
extent for the very mixed bag of results reported in the literature, 
where imports are found to be sometimes positively and sometimes 
negatively correlated with domestic margins, and where the 
relationships are often found to be statistically insignificant.
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A preliminary question which has to be clarified for empirical 
investigation is how best to measure import pressure. Marvel (1980), 
Jones et al. (1973,1977), Lyons (1981) and Murfin and Cowling (1981) 
use various measures of the share of imports in home sales, or the 
ratio of imports to home production. Coutts et al. (1978) use both a 
measure of import penetration and an index of the relative price of 
competing imports (inclusive of border taxes). A different measure 
again is used by Turner (1980) who argues that it is the elasticity of 
import supply (with respect to domestic prices), rather than import 
levels, which constrains home pricing. He constructs a proxy measure 
for import supply elasticity by assuming that the import supply curve 
is moving down at a uniform rate over time and that domestic producers 
have a well-defined supply curve (he does not consider oligopoly 
behaviour). He deduces that the change in import shares over time will 
be superior as a proxy for the elasticity of import supply to the more 
usual measure of the level of imports. (However, even given his 
restrictive assumptions, the rate of change of import shares may be 
measuring domestic supply elasticities as much as it measures the 
elasticity of foreign supply.)
5.2 PREVIOUS RESULTS
Both Marvel (1980) and Jones et al. (1973,1977) find that import 
levels have a negative impact on US price-cost margins in their 
cross-section studies which use data from the mid-sixties. However, 
Jones et al. (1973,1977) report a contrary result for Canada where 
they find that import levels are statistically significant in 
explaining margins only in producer goods industries, where the effect
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i s  p o s i t iv e .
UK studies also show varying results. Both Coutts et al. (1978) 
and Murfin and Cowling (1981) analyse time series of industrial pricing 
from the 1950s to early 1970s and find no significant impact of import 
penetration; nor do Coutts et al. (1978) find any significant effect 
of relative import prices except in the clothing industry where the 
impact of foreign price competition is found to raise rather than to 
lower domestic prices. Khalizadeh-Shirazi (1974) finds the effect of 
import penetration on margins to be negative, but the statistical 
significance of this finding is dubious. On the other hand, both 
Geroski's (1982) and Lyons'(1981) studies of UK manufacturing in 1968 
find import levels to be a significant factor in lowering margins.
Turner (1980) analyses the performance of 52 UK manufacturing industries 
between 1974 and 1976, finding that import competition has a 
statistically significant depressant effect on margins only if 
competition is measured by changes in import shares (rather than by 
import shares themselves), and then only in concentrated industries.
The various contradictory results from these studies appear to 
reflect the uncertainty of the theoretical predictions concerning the 
relationship between imports and margins. However, a serious 
methodological flaw in most of these studies may account in part for 
the lack of consistency in the results. If we consider the various 
models which seek to explain the impact of imports on margins it is 
apparent that we can expect domestic pricing to have a simultaneous
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effect on the measure of foreign competition. For instance, if imports 
are supplied competitively along an upward sloping supply curve, we can 
expect that higher domestic prices will tend to attract higher import 
levels and/or prices as importers are attracted by the higher profits 
to be made. If the relationship between margins and imports is indeed 
simultaneous, than any estimates which treat the relationship as 
uni-directional are likely to be both biased and inconsistent.
The problem of simultaneous equation bias has been dealt with to 
some extent in Marvel's (1980) study of US profitability and trade 
flows. Using instrumental variable estimation techniques on 
cross-section data for US manufacturing in 1967, he finds that at the 
same time as import shares are increased by higher concentration and by 
higher profits, the effect of import shares is to depress the rate of 
return in concentrated industries. Marvel explains variations in the 
level of import penetration across industries by variations in domestic 
margins and by a number of variables attempting to capture the sources 
of comparative advantage in trade. These variables include the 
capital-output ratio and the ratio of research and development 
employment to total employment. He also uses the concentration ratio 
to capture long-term influences on the stimulus to import. Geroski 
(1982) also uses simultaneous techniques in his study of UK data for 
1968 (his study differs from that presented here in that he uses levels 
for his dependent variables rather than their rate of change, which 
latter measure I argue to be preferable).
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The p r in c ip a l  c o n c lu s io n s  I  draw from  th e  fo re g o in g  d is c u s s io n  o f
existing theoretical and empirical studies are as follows :
1. There is no very strong a priori presumption that import pressure 
must reduce domestic margins. Imports may indeed have the opposite 
effect.
2. Using import levels as a proxy measure for competitive pressure is 
potentially misleading because it does not distinguish between 
competitive imports, rivalrous imports and domestically controlled 
imports. Lacking data on international oligopoly structure and 
intra-firm trade flows, estimation is liable to omitted variable 
bias and to misinterpretation. One way out of this problem is to 
estimate the relationship between margins and imports in terms of 
rates of change over time rather than levels (n.b. this is 
different from the procedure used by Turner (1980) who regresses 
the level of margins on the rate of change of import shares). This 
approach is tantamount to making an assumption that the omitted 
variables (international oligopoly structure and the level of 
intra-firm trade) remain constant within each industry over the 
period in question. This is a reasonable assumption if the time 
period is fairly short, more plausible than the alternative 
assumption which has to be made if import levels are used to 
explain the level of margins, namely the assumption that these 
omitted variables are constant across industries.
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3. Several investigators report that the impact of foreign competition 
is significant only in the more concentrated industries, a finding 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that imports are 
competitive but have an effect only on industries where domestic 
competitive pressures are not strong enough to prevent prices being 
raised above competitive levels. So it is important to test for 
differences between industries with high and low levels of 
concentration.
4. The relationship between margins and imports should be modelled as 
a two-way, simultaneous interaction.
5. The independent variables in the import penetration equation should 
capture the sources of comparative advantage (disadvantage) in 
trade as well as measures of profitability and domestic monopoly 
power.
Accordingly I 
Stage Least Squares
estimate the following model by Iterative Three
APCM± a0 + *1.AIMPORTS1 + a2.X1 + u±
AIMPORTS^ - bQ + b1.APCM1 + b2 .Y1 + u'j
where X and Y are vectors of exogenous variables explaining changes in
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margins and imports. The error terms are taken to be normally 
distributed etc. but are not necessarily independent. The sample used 
is of 88 manufacturing industries at the three digit level, excluding 
those 'miscellaneous' industries which are not clearly defined, 
excluding the nationalised industries of steel and shipbuilding, and 
excluding textile finishing (which exhibited negative profits). Most 
of the variables used, including the dependent variables, are expressed 
as the ratio or difference between levels in 1982 and 1979 (or 1980 
when 1979 data is not available, as in the case of the concentration 
and plant size variables). This period is chosen with a view to 
investigating whether or not import competition has played a role in 
the determination of UK manufacturing margins over the recession of the 
early 1980s. The use of differences rather than levels is indicated by 
the operator D. . The variables are described in the following 
tables.
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TABLE 5.1
VARIABLES USED TO TEST THE IMPORT COMPETITION HYPOTHESIS
PCM price-cost margins - using the four alternative 
definitions as used in Chapter U. PCM1 = (P+F+S)/(Gross 
output); PCM2=(P+F)/(Gross Output); PCM3=(P+F+S)/(Net 
output); PCM4=(P+F)/(Net Output). P is gross profits,
F is overheads and S is salaries.
IMPORTS the ratio of the value of Imports to the value of 
domestic gross output plus imports.
IMPORT GROWTH the change in the value of imports from the previous 
year, expressed as a proportion of current Imports plus 
gross output.
IMPORTS(CONC) IMPORTS X concentration dummy (=1 iff CR5 > 50% in 
1980).
CR5 the five-firm concentration ratio by gross output.(S)
DEMAND [industry employment]/[1 - IMPORTS] (normalised 1979=1).
WAGES(IMP) [wages per operative (normalised,1979=1)] X import dummy 
(=1 iff IMPORTS 1979 > 20%).
SKILLS non-operative salaries as a proportion of total wages 
and salaries.
SKILL DUMMY =1 iff SKILLS 1979 > 33%.
INVESTMENT aggregate net investmment 1979-82 expressed as a 
proportion of value added in 1982.
PLANTSIZE average employment per establishment amongst the leading 
5 enterprises (normalised 1980=1).
Sources : Census of Production ; Overseas Trade Analysed in Terms of 
Industries
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TABLE 5.2
MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF VARIABLES
VARIABLE MEAN S.D.
D.PCM1 +0.00944 0.03856
D.PCM2 -0.00201 0.03935
D.PCM3 ♦0.00581 0.04548
D.PCM4 -0.01698 0.06842
D.IMPORTS +0.02018 0.03751
D.IMPORT GROWTH -0.01397 0.05947
D.IMPORTS(CONC) +0.00859 0.02370
D.CR5 -1.1364 4.4313
D.DEMAND -0.20552 0.1165
D.WAGES(IMP) +0.17837 0.22827
D.SKILLS ♦0.02911 0.02736
SKILL DUMMY ♦0.39773 0.49223
INVESTMENT +0.38471 0.19872
D.PLANTSIZE -0.07880 0.20810
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TABLE 5.3
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR MARGINS AND IMPORTS
PCM1 PCM2 PCM3 PCM4
1979 LEVELS
PCM2
PCM3
PCM4
IMPORTS
0.8970
0.4311
0.2304
-0.1867
0.5430
0.5425
-0.2542
0.8620
-0.0994 -0.1757
1982 LEVELS
PCM2
PCM3
PCM4
IMPORTS
0.8969
0.5339 0.6451 
0.3*130 0.6412 0.8753
-0.2273 -0.3047 -0.1979 -0.2751
1979-82 DIFFERENCES
PCM2
PCM3
PCM4
IMPORTS
0.9510
0.7897 0.8112
0.8069 0.91**3 0.9080
-0.0461 -0.13*»3 -0.1375 -0.2031
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5.3 EXPLAINING CHANGES IN MARGINS
I use the four alternative versions of the price-cost margin 
variable as defined in Chapter 4 (p.4.40). These measures differ 
according to their treatment of fixed costs and their treatment of 
variations in the level of vertical integration across industries. As 
we are dealing here with changes in margins we might expect that the 
four alternative measures should be much closer to each other than when 
we deal with levels (if the industry ratios of salaries to wages and of 
material costs to net output do not change substantially over the three 
year period). A simple comparison can be obtained by examining the 
simple correlation coefficients for the four measures of margins 
expressed alternatively in levels and in differences - see Table 5-3.
It is indeed apparent that the four measures are more closely
correlated in differences than in levels : the lowest correlation 
coefficient in differences is 79Î, whereas in levels the lowest are 23JÉ
for 1979 and 34Ï for 1982. So we can expect that the four measures of 
changes in margins will give less widely differing results than the use 
of levels.
I use several measures of import pressure. The first, the most 
commonly used in the literature, is the ratio of imports to the sum of 
imports and domestic production, a direct measure of import 
penetration. This measure iB negatively correlated with price-cost 
margins (see Table 5.3). Secondly I construct a variable to examine 
whether the impact of penetration in concentrated industries is 
different from its impact in less concentrated industries. The
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competitive import hypothesis predicts that import penetration would 
have a greater depressant effect on domestic margins in industries 
where domestic competitive forces are weaker. So the import pressure 
variable is multiplied by a dummy variable equal to one in industries 
where the 1980 concentration ratio is greater then 50% (38 out of 88 
industries). Thirdly, I construct a measure of the change in import 
penetration from the previous year, following the suggestion of Turner 
(1980) that this may be a better measure of competitive pressure than 
levels of penetration.
Changes in the five-firm concentration ratio are expected to have 
a positive influence on the change in margins, proxying changes in 
potential domestic monopoly power. However, the three year period 
under investigation may be too short to pick up structural changes in 
oligopoly groups and the changes in concentration which did occur over 
this period may be too small to have had a significant effect on 
oligopoly behaviour. Indeed, the changes in the concentration ratio 
are distributed around a mean fall of 1 percentage point with a 
standard deviation of only 4 percentage points; the deviation from the 
mean exceeds 6 percentage points only in 4 industries. These changes 
in concentration are very small compared with the dispersion of levels 
of concentration (a standard deviation of 24 percentage points around a 
mean of 44/t). If there is a threshold below which small fluctuations 
in concentration do not affect margins, we may find that our analysis 
of changes in margins and changes in concentration over this period may 
not pick up any systematic relationship.
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The growth of demand is included as an explanatory variable to 
account for differences across industries in the severity of the 
recession of the early 1980s. I have argued that demand growth is 
better proxied by changes in total employment (assuming a constant rate 
of productivity growth across industries) than the more usual measure 
of changes in the value of sales, since this latter measure 
incorporates the changes in relative prices which we are seeking to 
explain. Here I correct also for import penetration to get a measure 
of changes in total demand met from both foreign and domestic sources.
I assume that the changes in real sales which are proxied by this 
measure are dominated by demand conditions rather than by supply 
conditions, a reasonable assumption in the context of this very deep 
recession which saw demand (as measured) drop by an average of 20? in 
three years.(While domestic employment fell some 23? on average, import 
penetration rose from an average of 19? to 21?.) Only in four 
industries (specialised chemicals, metal doors and windows, fish 
processing, and jewellry) did demand actually rise over the recession.
Finally, I examine the impact of wage growth on margins in those 
industries which were facing a high level of import penetration. The 
import competition hypothesis predicts that in such industries 
employers will be unable to pass on high wage rises, which will 
therefore be seen to erode profit margins. This hypothesis is an 
alternative to the hypothesis advanced in Chapter 4 that it is 
job-bargaining which restrains employers from passing on high wages 
into higher prices.
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5 .4  EXPLAINING CHANGES IN  IMPORT PENETRATION
The effect we are most interested in is the interrelationship of 
margins and import penetration. We would expect rising domestic prices 
(occasioned by rising domestic margins) to attract greater import 
penetration if imports are competitive. On the other hand if domestic 
margins rise in response to an increase in domestic cost 
competitiveness, we might expect import penetration to decline. The 
observed negative values of the simple correlation
coefficients between margins and imports (Table 5-3) are of course a 
compound of the simultaneous relationships which the following 
estimation procedures will attempt to disentangle.
Following Marvel (1980) I have controlled for changes in the 
sources of comparative advantage (or disadvantage) in trade by 
including as explanatory variables: the level of investment over the 
period (capturing relative capital intensity); both the growth of 
technical and administrative skills and the level of such skills; and 
the growth of plant size of the leading domestic producers (capturing 
either changes in capacity utilisation or potential scale economies / 
diseconomies). To the extent that capital investment and such skills 
and plant size are sources of comparative advantage (disadvantage) for 
UK producers, we would expect these variables to have a negative 
(positive) impact on import penetration.
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Finally, I have also followed Marvel’s example by including as an 
explanatory variable the change in domestic concentration. Marvel 
argues that while current domestic profits provide a short-term 
incentive for importers, concentration (as a proxy for domestic 
monopoly power) will provide a longer-term incentive to import.
However, it might also be the case that a rise in concentration would 
better enable domestic producers to effectively collude to repel 
foreign competition. For instance, Utton and Morgan (1983,p.91) report 
a tendency for high concentration industries in the UK over the period - 
1963-75 to experience lower import growth if they are 
capital-intensive, but to experience relatively high import growth if 
they are labour intensive. So we must conclude that the expected 
impact of the concentration change on the the change in import 
penetration is indeterminate, and also note the preceeding argument 
that the changes in concentration which did occur over this period may 
be too small to have had a systematic impact.
5.5 ESTIMATION RESULTS
I first estimate the determination of changes in margins and 
changes in import penetration by single equation OLS - a procedure used 
by many of the studies reported earlier. The results are summarised in 
Table 5.4. Specification a. tests for the impact of imports on 
margins in concentrated industries as well as for all industries. The 
first t-statistic reported on the IMPORTS(CONC) variable tests the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient for concentrated industries is the same 
as the coefficient for other industries; the second t-statistic 
reported tests the- null hypothesis that the impact of imports on
margins in concentrated industries is zero. Specification b. omits 
the concentration dummy variable, making no distinction between the 
effects of imports in concentrated and in less concentrated industries. 
Each specification is repeated using the four different definitions of 
the price-cost margin.
These single equation results are of course likely to be biased 
since they ignore the simultaneous determination of margins and import" 
penetration. But they are of interest in clarifying the results 
obtained by other researchers. In particular I note that these single 
equation results appear to support the import competition hypothesis. 
The coefficient on import penetration in the price-cost margin 
regression is significantly negative at the 10$ level in five out of 
the eight specifications, although the overall effect in concentrated 
industries is of uncertain sign and statistically insignificant. 
Moreover, wage growth does appear to reduce margins in the more 
concentrated industries; the coefficient is negative in all 8 
specifications. However, this effect is statistically significant at 
the 10$ level in only 2 cases, and these are the specifications (PCM3 a 
and b) which perform least well overall, where the hypothesis that all 
slope coefficients are zero is not rejected at the 10$ level.
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TABLE 5-4
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FROM SINGLE-EQUATION (OLS) ESTIMATION OF THE 
DETERMINATION OF CHANGES IN PRICE-COST MARGINS AND IMPORT SHARES.
(t-statistics in brackets)
(Dependent) 
independent 
variable [l]
PCM1
a. b.
PCM2
a. b.
PCM3
a. b.
PCM4
a. b.
(D.PCH)
D.IMPORTS -1.48 -0.98 -2.83 -2.06 -3.33 -2.16 -6.38 -4.77
( 10.1) (-1.19) (-0.88) (-2.24) i(-1.83) (-2.21) (-1.60) (-2.85) (-2.39)
D.IMPORTS(CONC) 1 .71 2.64 4.02 5-50
( X 0.1) (0.87,0 .13) (1.32,-0.11) (1.69,0 • 32) (1.56,-•0.27)
D.CR5 -1.12 -1.26 -1.26 -1.47 -1.38 -1.71 -2.21 -2.66
( X 0.001) (-1.18) (-1-34) (-1.30) I(-1.54) (-1.20) (-1.50) (-1.29) (-1.57)
D.DEMAND 1.06 1.06 1.11 1.10 0.32 0.32 1.26 1.26
( X 0.1) (3.13) (3.12) (3.22) (3.20) (0.78) (0.76) (2.09) (2.06)
D.WAGES(IMP) -2.50 -2.31 -1.39 -1.11 -4.03 -3.60 -2.70 -2.10
( X 0.01) (-1.43) (-1.33) (-0.78) I(-0.63) (-1-91) (-1.70) (-0.86) (-0.67)
R 2
r [3]
0.1569
3.05*
0.1491
3-64**
0.1703
3-37**
0.1524
3-73**
0.1196
2.23
0.0888
2.02
i 0.1446 0.1185 
2.76* 2.79*
(see over for notes) /...
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TABLE 5 -4  (CONTINUED)
(Dependent) 
independent 
variable [l]
PCM1
&• b*
PCM2
q • b •
PCM3
a. b.
PCM4
& • be
(D.IMPORTS)
D.PCM -0.96 -1.18 -2.10 -1.01
( X 0.1 ) (-0.98) (-1.26) (-2.52) (-1.89)
D.CR5 -1.91 -1.97 -2.02 -2.05
( X 0.001) (-2.20) (-2.26) (-2.39) (-2.37)
D.SKILLS 4.13 3.83 5.03 3.77
( X 0.1) (3.02) (2.83) (3.64) (2.81)
SKILLDUMMY -1.53 -1.51 -1.46 -1.48
( X 0.01) (-2.05) (-2.03) (-2.01) (-2.01)
INVESTMENT -O.9O -0.87 -1.02 -1.03
( X 0.01) (-0.47) (-0.47) (-0.57) (-0.56)
D.PLANTSIZE -3.23 -3.15 -2.71 -2.87
( X 0.01 ) (-1.76) (-1.72) (-1.51) (-1.58)
R 2 
F [3]
0.2541
4.60**
0.2597
4.73**
0.3000
5.78**
0.2772
5.17**
[1 ] The operator D. refers to differences in levels between 1982 and 1979 (or 
1980).
[2 ] The second t-statistic on D.IMPORTS(CONC) tests that this coefficient plus 
that on D.IMPORTS sum to zero.
[3 ] F-test significant at 1$ level ** 5 at 5% level *
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TABLE 5-5
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FROM SIMULTANEOUS ESTIMATION [l] OF THE 
DETERMINATION OF CHANGES IN PRICE-COST MARGINS AND IMPORT SHARES 
(t-statistics in brackets)
(Dependent) 
independent 
variable [2 ]
PCM1
c. d.
PCM2
c. d.
PCM3
c. d.
PCM4
c. d.
(D.PCM)
D.IMPORTS 2 .4 3 2.62 -2 . 1 2 -1.17 3-16 2.54 -5-83 -4.55
( X 0.1) (0.71) (1.04) (-0.65) (-0.48) (0.72) (0.82) (-1.03) (-1.06)
D.IMPORTS(CONC) 2.91 4.63 4.48 8.95
( X 0.1) (1.08,2 • 93) (1.73,1 • 39) (1.25,3 .26) (1.92,0.99)
D.CR5 0.07 -0.35 -0.78 -1.28 0.34 -O .3 7 -1.59 -2.65
( X 0.001) (0.06) (-0.30) (-0.74) (-1.15) (0.23) (-0.26) (-0.85) (-1.36)
D.DEMAND 1 .07 1.15 1.07 1.19 0.55 0 1.23 1.43
( X 0.1) (3.00) (3.29) (3.19) (3.49) (1.43) (0) (2.25) (2.39)
D.WAGES(IMP) -0.69 -0.76 0.07 0.10 -1.93 -4.89 0.52 -0.83
( X 0.01) (-0.45) (-0.47) (0.05) (0.06) (-0.85) (-2.17) (0.20) (-0.27)
(see over for notes) /...
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TABLE 5 .5  (CONTINUED)
(Dependent) 
independent 
variable [2 ]
PCM1
c. d.
PCM2
c.
»
d.
PCM3
C e d.
PCM4
c. d.
(D.IMPORTS)
D.PCM 3 . 1 0 2.11 5-56 3.13 1 .10 -4.89 5.26 1 .11
( X 0.1) (0 .96) (0.67) (1.47) (0.91) (2.17) (-0.90) (1.29) (0.35)
D.CR5 - 1 . 7 4 -1.72 -1.49 -1.59 -1.85 -2.25 -1.21 -1 .68
( X 0.001) (-1.86) (-1.90) (-1.32) (-1.60) (-1.89) (-2.32) (-0.77) (-1.55)
D.SKILLS 3-77 4.16 4.09 4.26 4.79 5-93 4.51 4.22
( X 0.1) (2.76) (3.01) (2.61) (2.93) (1.70) (1.94) (2.22) (2.80)
SKILLDUMMY -1.51 -1.56 -2.08 -1.89 -1.21 -1.44 -2.33 -1.77
( X 0.01) (-2.20) (-2.28) (-2.47) (-2.43) C-1.70) (-1.80) (-2.20) (-2.13)
INVESTMENT -1.21 -0.85 -0.75 -0.21 -1.26 -1.57 -1.25 -O .3 2
( X 0.01) (-0.63) (-0.44) (-0.33) (-0.10) (-0.65) (-0.70) (-0.41) (-0.13)
D.PLANTSIZE -2.17 -2.63 -2.97 -3.34 -1.27 -2.54 -3-16 -3.43
( X 0.01) (-1.42) (-1.63) (-1.51) (-1.78) (-0.61) (-1.09) (-1.10) (-1.51)
R 2
[3]
0.4935
* *
0.4476
* *
0.2843
* •
0.3166
» *
0.4260
• «
0.1841 0.0078 0.2419 **
[1] Estimated by iterative three-stage least squares with convergence in 3.4 or 
5 iterations in all cases (convergence tolerance - 0.1).
[2 ] The operator D. refers to differences in levels between 1982 and 1979 (or
1980) .
2
[3 ] This is the system R . Asterisks indicate that the chi-square test that 
all slope coefficients are equal to zero is rejected at the 1 % level.
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However, when we estimate the relationships between margins and 
imports as a simultaneous system, the results (Table 5.5) no longer 
support the import competition hypothesis.
There are striking differences between the single equation and 
system estimations of the coefficients measuring the interaction of 
margins and imports. These differences indicate the importance of 
estimating the interactions' simultaneously. Whereas single equation 
analysis suggests that import penetration reduces margins, the 
simultaneous estimation finds no consistent or statistically 
significant impact of imports on margins.
Under the simultaneous estimation, we find that the sign of the 
estimated coefficient on import penetration is either positive or 
negative according to whether the definition of the dependent variable 
(margins over variable costs) treats salaries as fixed costs (PCM143) 
or as variable costs (PCK2A4). (There is a similar pattern in the 
single equation estimates where the coefficients are all negative, but 
substantially lower when salaries are treated as variable costs).
These findings are compatible with the hypothesis that some part, but 
not all, of salaries are properly treated as. overhead costs. To 
illustrate this point, suppose that the fixed component of salaries is 
S* which is less than the full salary bill S. The PCM2 definition of 
margins treats all of salaries as variable costs. If we define the 
actual margin over variable costs to be m*, revenue to be R, and import 
penetration to be I, then we can write the observed margin and its
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d i f f e r e n t i a l  w ith  re s p e c t to  im p o rts  as fo l lo w s :
PCM2 - m* - S*/R
d(PCM2)/dI - dm*/dl + (S*/H).(1/R).(dR/dl)
We expect the value of (dR/dl) to be negative, as imports replace 
domestic revenue, so the PCM2 measure will estimate the coefficient on 
import penetration to be lower than its actual value (dm*/dl). The 
larger the fixed component of salaries, the larger the underestimation 
of the import coefficient. Equally, we might expect those measures of 
margins which treat salaries as fixed costs (PCM143) to overestimate 
the import coefficient to the extent that some part of salaries are 
actually variable costs. This hypothesis, in tandem with the 
hypothesis that the effect of imports on margins is actually zero, 
would explain the observed pattern of positive and negative 
coefficients. Since the coefficients are all statistically 
insignificant anyway, the import competition hypothesis is clearly not 
supported under simultaneous estimation.
Both methods of estimation find that import penetration has less 
of a depressant effect (or a stronger positive effect) on margins in 
the more concentrated industries; this differential effect is 
statistically significant at the 10$ level in two out of the four
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systems specifications. Indeed, the total impact of import penetration 
on margins In concentrated industries is estimated to be positive in 
all four of the systems specifications, and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in 2 of these cases. (In tests not 
reported here, these effects persist if alternative cut-off points are 
used for the concentration dummy, e.g. at 40% or 60% instead of 50%.) 
There is substantial evidence here that imports are generally not 
competitive and that in fact they tend to bolster margins in 
concentrated industries - evidence which supports the hypothesis that 
leading producers in concentrated industries bolster their market 
dominance and profits by means of overseas sourcing.
If we follow the suggestion of Turner (1980) in measuring import 
pressure by the annual rate of growth of imports, rather than by 
levels, we also find that the Import competition hypothesis is 
rejected. Table 5.6 summarises the estimated coefficients obtained by 
substituting the variable IMPORT GROWTH for the variable IMPORTS in 
both the single equation and system estimations.
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TABLE 5 .6
COEFFICIENTS ON THE IMPORT GROWTH VARIABLE
SPECIFICATION D.IMPORTGROWTH D.IMPORTGROWTH(CONC)
SINGLE EQUATION
PCM1 a. 0.051 (0.70) 0.111 (0.42,0.64)
2a. 0.123 (1.65) 0.034 (0.12,0.60)
3a. 0.294 (3.49) -0.082 (-0.26,0.72)
4a. 0.438 (3.45) -0.117 (-0.25,0.72)
SYSTEM
PCMIc. -0.133 (-0.39) 0.156 (0.34,0.09)
2c. -0.016 (-0.05) 0.046 (0.10,0.12)
3c. 0.382 (1.00) 0.184 (0.43,4.12)
4c. 0.486 (0.82) 0.516 (0.69,2.81 )
t-statiatics in brackets; the second statistic on the second 
variable tests the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on the 
two variables is zero. Specifications a. and c. are as in Tables 4.4 
and 4.5 .
Finally, we observe from Tables 5-4 and 5-5 that wage growth in 
high import industries appears to erode margins when the relationship 
is estimated by a single equation . The coefficient on the variable 
which measures wage growth in industries where import penetration is 
high is negative in all 8 specifications, and statistically significant 
at the 10? level in two specifications. But in the system estimation, 
the coefficient is generally much smaller, and it is positive in three 
specifications. It is statistically significant at the 10? level in 
only one specification (PCM3d) - and that is a specification which is 
unsatisfactory in that the hypothesis that all slope coefficients are 
zero is not rejected at the 5? level. (Note that choosing a different 
cut-off point for the import dummy variable, e.g. at 10? or 30? 
instead of the reported 20?, does not affect these results.) Again we 
are led to conclude that single equation estimation is liable to lead 
to a mistaken inference that imports are competitive. When the 
relationships between margins and imports are tested as a simultaneous 
interaction, there is no support for the import competition hypothesis.
While the import variables perform very differently according to 
whether we estimate by single equation or by systems methods, it is 
interesting to note that the exogenous variables perform very similarly 
whichever procedure is used.
The demand variable has a consistently positive impact on 
margins, significant at the 1? level in all specifications (except 
PCM3), with almost identical coefficients . It is apparent that
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industries hit hardest by the recession lowered their margins in 
relation to other industries. (This captures, of course, only the 
differential effect of the recession across different industries. 
Despite the severity of the recession, aggregate manufacturing margins 
actually rose between 1979 and 1982 - see Table 1.4).
The concentration variable has an unexpected negative sign in the 
price-cost margin regressions when estimated as a single equation, but 
it is statistically insignificant even at the 10% level. In the 
simultaneous estimation, the coefficient is smaller or positive and 
shows even less statistical significance. I infer support for the 
hypothesis that the changes in concentration which did occur over this 
period were too small to have had a systematic effect on margins.
Turning to the explanation of changes in import penetration, we 
again find that the endogenous variable (changes in margins) performs 
very differently when the estimation is simultaneous compared with 
single equation estimation, whereas the performance of the exogenous 
variables varies very little.
Under single equation estimation, a rise in price-cost margins 
appears to discourage imports - an unexpected result. However, when we 
estimate the interactions simultaneously, the coefficient on changes in 
margins is positive in seven out of eight specifications, although 
significant at the 3% level in only one case.
5-29
The concentration variable has a consistently negative 
coefficient in the import regression under both single and system 
estimation, with coefficients very similar in either case and usually 
significant at the 5% level in the single equation estimation and at 
the ^0% level in the system estimation. Rather than attracting 
imports, increases in domestic concentration appear to enable domestic 
oligopolies to deter imports more effectively.
In the import regressions, the coefficient on the variable 
measuring growth in technical and administrative skills is consistently 
positive and significant (at the \% level in most specifications) in 
both single equation and system estimations. This indicates that those 
domestic industries where skills are increasing at the fastest rate are 
at a comparative disadvantage in trade in relation to industries where 
skill levels are stable. In contrast, the skill level dummy attracts a 
negative coefficient (significant at the 5% level in most 
specifications), implying that those industries which already have a 
high skill level are at a comparative advantage. The implication is 
that comparative advantage for UK manufacturing lies in the accumulated 
stock of older skills rather than in the acquisition of new skills.
F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  l a r g e s t  grow th i n  th e  s k i l l  v a r i a b l e  i s  found i n  
i n d u s t r y  3 4 7 ,  m a n u f a c t u r e  o f  o f f i c e  m a c h in e ry  and d a t a  p r o c e s s i n g  
e q u ip m en t ,  where t h e  s k i l l  r a t i o  grew by 15 p e r c e n t g e  p o i n t s  betw een  
1979 and 1 9 8 2 ,  p r e s u m a b ly  a s  th e  i n d u s t r y  was f o r c e d  to  r e c r u i t  and 
t r a i n  s t a f f  w ith  s k i l l s  i n  th e  new t e c h n o l o g i e s  o f  co m m u n ica t io n s  and 
m i c r o - c o m p u t e r s .  On th e  o t h e r  hand, th e  v a r i o u s  c h e m ic a l  i n d u s t r i e s  
( 2 5 1 - 9 )  a l r e a d y  had  a h ig h  r a t i o  o f  n o n - o p e r a t i v e  s t a f f  in  1 9 7 9 ,
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presumably already trained in relatively older skills. The chemical 
industries increased their skill ratio by only 3 percentage points 
between 1979 and 1982. The implication of these regression results is 
that the chemical industry is likely to have a comparative advantage in 
trade, based on older skills, in relation to computer manufacturers who 
are likely to be fighting a losing battle with importers in the 
acquisition and development of new skills.
Investment attracts negative, but statistically insignificant, 
coefficients in both single equation and system estimations, giving 
only very weak evidence of systematic comparative advantage in capital 
intensive industries. Growth in plant size attracts a consistently 
negative coefficient, statistically significant at the \0% level in 3 
of the 12 specifications reported. The plant size variable measures 
changes in the average level of employment in the plants of an 
industry's leading five producers. During the recession this measure 
of plant size fell by an average of nearly 8^ while total employment 
fell by an average of 22%, indicating that capacity utilisation fell in 
those plants which were retained at the same time as many plants were 
closed down. The plant size variable may well be picking up a 
comparative advantage for those industries where the leading producers 
were better able to reorganise and close down plants during the 
recession in order to concentrate production in their most efficient 
plants.
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5 .6  CONCLUSIONS
When the interaction between changes in domestic price-cost 
margins and changes in import penetration over the period 1979-82 is 
examined as a simultaneous relationship, there is no evidence to 
support the import competition hypothesis. Rather, variations in the 
changes in margins across industries appear to be most strongly 
influenced by the relative severity of the impact of the recession. 
The study shows that the bias inherent in the single equation 
estimation procedure could lend misleading support to the import 
competition hypothesis.
It appears then that the importing of manufactured goods into the 
UK has not been systematically competitive with domestic production, at 
least not over the period covered by this study. We may surmise that 
imports are in large part coming from overseas producers who act 
collusively rather than competitively in relation to domestic
producers, behaving as trans-national oligopolies; or, alternatively, 
a substantial proportion of imports might be controlled by leading
domestic producers. Indeed, the evidence that imports tend to actually 
raise rather than depress margins in concentrated industries lends 
support to the latter hypothesis.
There are, however, other possible interpetrations of these 
results. It might be argued that the changes in import penetration 
which occurred over the period 1979-82 may have been too small to have
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had a measureable impact on margins, or that the period is too short 
for the effects to have worked through; if this were the case, the 
evidence here would neither prove nor disprove the import competition 
hypothesis. Moreover, it might be argued that the period was unusual 
in that the real exchange rate reached an unprecedented peak in 1980 
(see footnote 1.3 for movements in the real exchange rate vis-a-vis the 
US dollar).
The period 1979-82 is the longest for which industry production 
data is currently available on the 1930 Standard Industrial 
Classification, so this is the longest period over which we can study 
the impact of import competition on recent movements in margins and 
income distribution. This four-year period is not necessarily too 
short or unusual for significant results to emerge in cross-section 
analysis. Changes in the real exchange rate may have been one of the 
underlying factors influencing the overall upward drift in import ' 
penetration over the period, from a 1979 level (averaged across the 
sample) of 18.9% to a level of 20.9% in 1982. We would expect exchange 
rate movements to influence primarily the overall level of domestic 
margins, however, rather than the inter-industry differences which are 
studied here. Moreover, any industry-specific effects of exchange rate 
movements or of other factors (e.g. productivity movements relative to 
foreign producers) should be picked up by the measured changes in 
import penetration. There is indeed substantial variation in the 
amount by which import penetration increased (or in some cases 
decreased) across industries between 1979 and 1982; the sample 
standard deviation is some 3*75 percentage points, nearly one fifth of
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the 1979 average level of import penetration. This variation in the 
growth of import penetration does appear to be substantial enough to 
have had a (potentially) measureable impact on margins - hence the 
apparently significant effect of import penetration reported from 
single-equation estimation in Table 5.4 . So the four-year time period 
does not appear to be too short for us to test the import competition 
hypothesis. Indeed, use of a much longer period would strain severely 
the underlying assumption that no change occurred in the unobservable 
variables such as the degree of intra-firm or intra-oligopoly trade.
There are two sources of delay which might affect the timing of 
the impact of foreign competition on domestic pricing: the lag with 
which foreign producers react to changes in underlying conditions of 
comparative advantage, and the lag with which domestic producers 
respond to changes in actual or threatened behaviour by foreign 
producers. The former lags are subsumed when we use a direct measure 
of import penetration to explain domestic margins. With regard to the 
latter, there is little work to indicate the length of time we should 
expect for the adjustment of oligopoly pricing to changes in either 
internal or external competition. Indeed, if domestic producers react 
in the same way, and with the same delays, as do foreign producers to 
changes in the underlying sources of comparative advantage, then 
changes in import penetration and domestic pricing would occur 
simultaneously. The assumption implicit in this study, and in most of 
the other studies to which reference is made, is that most of the 
adjustment takes place within the one-year data period. Even if lags 
are longer than one year, we might nevertheless expect that the impact
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of import competition will atill be picked up in this study if the 
measured changes in import penetration reflect longer term trends in 
industries' comparative advantage.
An interesting implication of this study is that where previous 
research has found imports to have a significant competitive effect, 
the results may have been biased by the use of single equation 
estimation which ignores the simultaneous impact of margins on import 
behaviour. Of course, firm conclusions cannot be drawn without further 
study of the earlier periods which these studies cover. Further 
studies should also attempt to deal with the problem of inter-industry 
differences in international oligopoly structure and intra-firm (or 
intra-oligopoly) trade, either by examining changes rather than levels 
of import penetration (the technique used here) or by estimating these 
inter-industry differences directly.
The other general conclusion which we.can draw from this study is 
that, in the early 1980s, improvements in the comparative trade 
advantage of UK manufacturing appear to have occurred in the following 
areas : a) those industries with an established stock of skills, 
rather than those which are being forced to acquire new skills; b) the 
more concentrated industries; and c) those industries which were best 
able to rationalise plant utilisation over the period of the recession.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
The empirical study reported in chapter four suggests strongly 
that workers' strength, as measured by their ability to push wage levels 
above the alternative wage, does reduce price-cost margins in UK 
manufacturing, thus affecting the aggregate distribution of income.
There is also support for the hypothesis that unemployment plays an 
important role in influencing the relative bargaining strengths of 
workers and employers. Though the statistical significance of the 
unemployment effect is weak, the estimates correspond surprisingly 
closely to the estimates derived from other research using the very 
different techniques of aggregate time-series analysis. Taking the 
evidence of chapter four together with such time-series studies and with 
the evidence presented in chapter one on recent changes in UK income 
distribution, I find substantial support for the reserve army hypothesis. 
In chapter two I have emphasised that this involves two complementary 
hypotheses, first that unemployment undermines workers' bargaining power 
and secondly that the balance of bargaining strength is reflected in 
price-cost margins so that changes in labour strength affect, in 
aggregate, the division of income as well as the rate of cost and price 
inflation.
Unfortunately, the measure of the pressure of unemployment which I 
have used is not able to distinguish between the effects of the level of 
unemployment and its rate of change. The number of registered unemployed 
attributed to an industry measures the pressure of unemployment on that 
industry only to the extent that workers look for Jobs in the industry in 
which they were previously employed; otherwise this measure is more
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likely to be picking up the rate of loss of jobs in the industry. The 
important question of whether or not the reserve army effect is 
diminished when unemployment levels off is left unanswered. Moreover, 
many other factors will have affected workers' bargaining strength over 
the period studied (often factors which cannot be distinguished in 
cross-section studies) such as the political climate, industrial 
relations legislation and state intervention in industrial disputes. It 
could well be argued that these factors have been largely instrumental in 
the weakening of unions' bargaining position in the UK since the late 
1970s, though it may also be the case that such institutional attacks on 
unions as have occurred have only been feasible given the contemporaneous 
rise of mass unemployment. A more detailed study of the reserve army 
effect on bargaining power should look not only at the direct and 
immediate effects of the level and rate of change of unemployment but 
also at the lagged effects of past developments which may well affect 
current bargaining through their embodiment in institutional, legal and 
political forms.
If the evidence presented in chapter four is fairly clear that 
manufacturing industries' price-cost margins are eroded by workers' 
success in bargaining up wages, the reason why this should occur is not 
so clear. An obvious explanation, that firms are price-takers (taking 
for instance the prices set competitively in world markets) is discounted 
by the voluminous evidence from cross-sectional studies that prices are 
set above marginal costs and that such margins are affected 
systematically by industry structure and conduct variables, and the 
similar evidence from time-series studies which show, in addition, that 
cost changes tend to be marked up in full albeit with a time lag. The 
hypothesis that it is the slow adjustment of prices to cost changes which 
affects income distribution suggests that unanticipated wage growth 
should erode margins. But this hypothesis fails to explain changes in
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aggregate margins when inflation rates are steady, and the 
cross-sectional evidence presented here does not support the hypothesis 
when it is applied to inter-industry variations. The evidence here is 
that it is a high level of wages (above the alternative wage) rather than 
a high rate of growth of wages which erodes profit margins.
The evidence is compatible with the hypothesis that workers and 
employers bargain over employment as well as over wages, and X cannot 
reject the hypothesis of efficient bargaining between profit-maximising 
employers and rent-maximising unions. This last conclusion fits with the 
findings of recent research in the US which investigates the relationship 
over time between firms' profits, employment and wages. The study here 
reaches similar conclusions through cross-sectional analysis at the 
industry level. I find the hypothesis of job-bargaining plausible for 
the UK in 1975 and even in 1979, years when unions were both fairly 
strong and (presumably) concerned about the effects of unemployment both 
on their members and on the unions as organisations in their own right. 
However, the analysis (chapter three) of bargaining models suggests that 
when employers are particularly strong they should be able to, and find 
it in their interests to, refuse to bargain over employment. My 
expectation that this situation would have prevailed in 19 8 2, when unions 
were feeling the impact of mass unemployment and attacks on their 
organisation, is not borne out by the evidence that wage premia continued 
to erode manufacturing margins. Of course, employers too were only just 
recovering from the depths of recession by 1982 and it is possible that 
any effects on the scope of bargaining would not come through until later 
years.
An alternative hypothesis is that margins over marginal costs are 
stable but that margins over average costs are affected by scale 
economies. However, I have cited evidence that most of UK manufacturing
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industry exhibits constant returns to scale when operating under 
conditions of excess capacity; moreover, the Industry growth variable 
which proxies variations in demand conditions in estimating the 
determination of margins would also pick up any systematic scale effects.
The alternative hypothesis which is not discounted by the evidence 
in chapter four is that it might be the threat of foreign competition 
which restrains employers from passing on high wages into high prices; 
although I have noted that several studies of UK industrial pricing do 
specifically reject the hypothesis that import penetration and/or price 
competition depress domestic margins. Nevertheless, even if one rejects 
the hypothesis of a competitive world price, we should recognize the 
growing internationalisation of production and marketing and the openness 
of national economies to exports and imports. These developments suggest 
that industrial oligopolies should be analysed as international 
phenomena. Simple equilibrium models of rivalrous collusion do suggest 
that (transnational) oligopolies would adjust industry output in the face 
of relative cost changes to give larger shares to the relatively lower 
cost producers, so that domestic producers facing high rises in costs 
(relative to inflation rates and currency movements) could expect to lose 
some share of the transnational market. The expected effect on margins 
of a loss of international competitiveness is not so obvious, depending 
partly on the degree of product differentiation.
Further study is clearly required to investigate industrial 
structure and performance in an international context. Unfortunately, 
the rate of progress of labour and Industrial economics is slow in 
addressing the necessary theoretical and data requirements for 
transnational studies; such work is beyond the scope of this study. 
Nevertheless, although the finding, described in chapter four, that high 
wage premia are not passed on into prices might be explicable through
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examination of Internationa] oligopoly adjustments, such an explanation 
would be difficult to reconcile with the cited evidence that, in general,
UK manufacturing cost rises in the 1970s were marked up in full and that 
there has been little discernable effect of import competition on 
industry margins. Moreover, to the extent that international competition 
does restrain domestic pricing, we would expect manufacturing margins to 
be affected by movements in the real exchange rate; but in chapter one I 
have described the evidence that there has been a secular rise in 
manufacturing margins which has not been accompanied by a corresponding 
relaxation in foreign price competition as measured by the real exchange 
rate. Moreover, the study reported in Chapter 5 presents evidence supporting 
the conclusion that any apparent competitive effect of imports on 
margins which emerges in cross-section single-equation analysis is a 
biased result which disappears when the relationship between imports and 
margins is estimated simultaneously.
I conclude that the balance of evidence tends not to support the 
hypothesis that it is foreign competition which has prevented domestic 
producers from marking up high wages. On the other hand, the hypothesis 
of job-bargaining does provide a generally plausible explanation both for 
the evidence that wage-premia are not marked up in the same way as other 
costs and for the observed secular rise in UK manufacturing profit 
margins at the expense of manual workers' earnings.
A theoretical position running through this study has been to 
emphasize the importance of analysing conflict over the creation and 
distribution of economic surplus. Recognising the evidence from both 
labour and industrial economics that surplus is not competed away implies 
that we need to investigate bargaining over surplus as the interface 
between labour and product markets. It is not sufficient for labour 
economists to simply insert a few variables representing concentration or 
profitability into wage equations, nor for industrial economists to add 
measures of unionisation into structure-performance equations. We need 
to model bargaining as a process with simultaneous repercussions on both 
labour and product markets.
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I have argued that the asymmetric Nash bargaining model allows us 
to distinguish and investigate important aspects of bargaining: each 
side's opportunity costs, their preferences, the scope of bargaining, and 
bargaining power. I have used the model to analyse whether or not 
workers and employers might choose to bargain over employment as well as 
wages; I have examined the implications of job-bargaining for price-cost 
margins; and I have discussed briefly the possibility that employers 
might manipulate the minimum profit constraint in order to withdraw 
surplus from the bargaining arena. Several further developments of the 
bargaining model suggest themselves: to investigate bargaining over other 
decision variables besides wages and jobs, including levels of 
work-effort and supervision, and the question of whether these are 
decided cooperatively or otherwise; to analyse the development of 
multi-divisional and transnational corporations in terms of strategies to 
bypass workers' bargaining power by capitalising surplus through transfer 
pricing and artificially high profit constraints, or strategies to 
directly reduce workers' bargaining strength by setting up alternate 
sources of supply from both within and without the corporation; to extend 
the bargaining problem to include managers and other non-manual staff as 
well as employers and production workers.
The particular empirical study which I have reported here suggests 
a number of lines of development. We need a fuller analysis of the 
determinants of bargaining power, Including institutional features, and 
we need to investigate appropriate specifications for empirical 
estimation. The fall-back positions, or minimum wage and profit 
constraints, need clearer definition particularly with regard to capital 
mobility and financial leverage. Empirical studies of bargaining also 
need to develop a dynamic framework in which bargaining power and wage 
levels are not independent of previous periods (viz partial adjustment 
models) and where information on profitability and inflation may lag 
behind current agreements.
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All these latter points are implicit criticisms of aspects of the 
study presented here, pointing out omissions in the theoretical and 
empirical framework which future work could attempt to remedy. 
Nevertheless, appropriately qualified conclusions can be and have been 
drawn from the descriptive and econometric evidence presented and from 
the theoretical and empirical evidence cited. At a more general level, 
it does appear that conflict and bargaining over surplus is an important 
feature of contemporary capitalist economies and a fruitful area for 
further theoretical and empirical investigation.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER 1
1.1 The rise of non-oil profitability during the recession is first 
noted in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin of June 1983 
(p.168): "Employment income took over 81 per cent of total income 
generated in the manufacturing sector in 1 9 8 1; though later figures 
are not yet available, they will probably show a fall, reflecting 
the improvement in real profitability in the sector in 1982. This 
gain in profitability is unusual in that it occurred without any 
increase in manufacturing production". Then, in the September 1983 
edition, the Bank notes that: "Companies' profit margins appear to 
have widened despite continued competitive pressure on domestic and 
export selling prices" (p.334). In March 1984 they report on the 
profitability of industrial and commercial companies in the third 
quarter of 1983: "the real pre-tax rate of return to non-North Sea 
companies was then close to 7%, more than double its level in early 
1981" (p.16), and in September, the Bank reports (p.353) that: "by 
the first quarter of 1984 it is estimated to have reached 8 .5% - 
above its last peak in 19 78 but still lower than throughout the 
1960s". In the same issue they analyse movements in the post-tax 
rate of return through the 1970s and early 1980s, observing that: 
"the post-tax rate of return has fluctuated around a level similar 
to that seen in the late 1960s despite the marked decline in pre-tax 
profitability" (p.358).
1.2 The Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (September 1984, p.353) notes 
the significant rise in price-cost margins: "Profitability in
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manufacturing industry turned up before there was any substantial 
growth in manufacturing output, and stemmed in large part from gains 
in profit margins".
1.3 I define the real exchange rate as the nominal exchange rate (US
dollars per £ sterling) deflated by the ratio of the US GDP deflator 
to the UK GDP deflator. Indexing to 100 in 1970, I derive the
following series for the real exchange rate (E):
YEAR 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
E 100 1 1 1 106 106 113 114 105
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
126 139 161 188 154 132 116 106
SOURCE: University of Cambridge, Handbook of International Economic 
Statistics, October 1983 and Hill (1984).
CHAPTER TWO
2.1 The theory of contestable markets, as put forward by Baumol (1982), 
denies the possibility of sustaining significant deviations from 
competitive pricing by assuming that threats of retaliation against 
entrants are non-existent or non-effective - entrants can enter and 
exit costlessly before incumbents can alter price. This approach 
assumes away the question of entry deterrence rather than analysing 
the problem.
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2.2 An alternative treatment of the evolution of concentration is 
provided by Davies and Lyons (1982) who combine a model of 
technological factors, which set a minimum level of concentration as 
a result of economies of scale, with a model of random growth and 
entry into the market. However, taking technology as given ignores 
firms' incentive to invest in research and development (and product 
differentiation) precisely in order to gain scale economies. An 
assumption of random growth is essentially anti-theoretic; and the 
model's feature of random entry into the market is based upon an 
assumption that entrants will be able to join the collusive 
oligopoly, ignoring the incentive for incumbents to deter entry by 
threatening and carrying out retaliatory responses to entry.
2.3 So, for instance, even such a critical assessor of Marx as 
Schumpeter (1954, p.686-687) "cannot but be impressed by both the 
analytic and realistic virtues of this conception of capitalist 
evolution". This conception he characterises as follows: "in Marx's 
general schema, social evolution is propelled by a force that is 
immanent or necessarily inherent in the profit economy. This force 
is Accumulation: under pressure of competition the individual 
concern is compelled to invest as much of its profits as possible in 
its own productive apparatus ....rushing down on declining 
average-cost curves and annihilating ('expropriating') the weaker 
ones in the process, capitalist concerns, individually growing in 
size, build up vast powers of production....".
2.4 We can see from equation 2.5 the obvious point that this last result 
does not hold in the extreme case of a zero mark-up, when W/VA=1; 
for then it is by definition impossible to increase wage share.
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2.5 Employers have an Interest both in reducing wages and in increasing 
workers' effort and productivity. As a convenient simplification I 
shall treat effort and productivity as given, and consider only 
conflict over wages and the level of employment. Alternatively, one 
can consider the level of employment to refer to the total 
effort/productive work performed by labour rather than Just the 
number of worker-hours or weeks - so the wage w is the wage paid per 
unit of effort. Of course, productivity changes alter
capital-output ratios and the real size of aggregate income for a 
given level of employment. Subsuming conflict over productivity 
under the notion of efficiency wages does leave the picture 
incomplete; but it allows a clearer presentation of conflict over 
distribution.
2.6 Lags in the reaction of price to wage rises, and in the reaction of 
wages to price rises, have important implications not only for the 
distribution of income, but for the relationship between 
unemployment and inflation. For instance, Layard and Nickell (1985) 
model a pricing equation where prices are reduced by unexpected wage 
rises and a wage equation where real wages are reduced by unexpected 
price rises. If the latter effect is more significant than the 
former, ie. if unanticipated inflation tends to erode wages more 
than profit margins, then Inflation can reconcile in favour of 
employers the contradictions between the level of real wages which 
workers try to win in the labour market and the actual level of real 
wages which results from the employers' pricing decisions. This 
notion lies behind the model of inflation as a resolution of 
conflict, as developed by Rowthorn (1980). But if inflation is 
anticipated in the longer run (eg. if we impose a condition of 
steady, anticipated Inflation as a long-run equilibrium condition,
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viz. Sawyer, 1982) then an increased tendency towards conflict (eg. 
a rise in the underlying strength of labour) will have to be 
balanced by some tendency (eg. a rise in unemployment) which 
produces an offsetting reduction in the tendency towards conflict. 
This treatment of inflation as the reconciliating factor when real 
wages and prices are overdetermined is used also by Marglin (1984).
2.7 See also the analysis by Sugden (1983) of the relationship between 
transnational corporations and the degree of monpoly.
2.8 Such an efficient bargain may offer, or appear to offer, an 
individual employer higher profits than bargaining over the wage 
alone - but I have argued that aggregate real profitability will 
tend to fall if margins are squeezed. Even in the micro-economic 
context, I argue later that employers may wish to resist "efficient 
bargaining".
2.9 Hahnel and Sherman's (1982) reworking of Weisskopf's model shows 
that US real hourly wages move pro-cyclically, supporting the 
reserve army hypothesis.
2.10 See, for example, the survey by Ashworth (1981).
CHAPTER 3
3.1 For example, Roth and Schoumaker (1983) report on actual game
experiments and conclude that predetermined expectations do affect 
bargaining outcomes.
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3.2 It Is the model of bargaining favoured by Aoki (1983) in his 
discussion of bargaining theories in relation to the firm, and it is 
the most commonly used model in the growing literature on union 
employer bargaining.
3.3 There is an implicit assumption here that capital stock and 
productivity are fixed, so this should be seen as a short-term 
profit function, though the assumption of constant capital stock can 
be relaxed when there is efficient bargaining with a rent-maximising 
union.
3.A For instance, Mulvey (1978) looks at union-employer bargaining in 
terms of monopoly/monopsony power and makes the point that unions 
will get a better trade-off between wages and jobs the more 
'essential' is the labour they supply and the smaller their 
contribution to total costs.
3.5 Levinson (1967) makes a similar point with respect to industry
concentration, deducing a generalisation that: "given a similarly 
high degree of union organisational strength, employers in a more 
concentrated industry will be able to resist union pressures more 
effectively than employers in a more competitive industry" and also 
that "the greater the degree of concentration in an industry, the 
greater will be the union's ability to maintain a high degree of 
organisational strength". Taken together these arguments explain 
"the positive correlation found in manufacturing between union 
strength and concentration and the negative coefficient associated 
with the interaction of unionism and concentration" (p.204-5).
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3.6 Abraham and Medoff (1984) find considerable protection against 
lay-off for long-service workers, especially amongst unionised 
workers, in their survey of US non-agricultural and non-construction 
firms. However, as I go on to argue, this does not necessarily 
imply that the median union voter is indifferent to the level of 
employment. Indeed, two recent US studies conclude that unions are 
concerned about job levels. Svejnar (1984) tests a model which 
assumes efficient bargaining over wages and jobs and finds that 
unions bargaining with twelve major US companies between 1954 and 
the late 1970s exhibit "risk-neutral" or even "risk-averse" 
preferences with regard to the trade-off between jobs and wages. 
Pencavel (1984) makes a contrary assumption, namely that unions 
choose their preferred point on the labour demand curve, in his 
study of union wages and employment in composition rooms in the 
newspaper industry in ten US cities between 1946 and 1965. He 
concludes that: "the elasticity of substitution between wages and 
employment in the union's objective function tends to lie between 
zero and unity ....the larger ITU [International Typographical 
Union] locals possess objectives that approximate the rents from 
unionisation".
3.7 There is a further argument why even non-altruistic workers should 
be concerned about the threat of Job losses to fellow workers - an 
argument put forward by Jesus Seade at a Warwick University seminar 
- namely that the median union voter is short-sighted if she presses 
for pay rises irrespective of the threat of Job losses to others; 
for if jobs are lost in this round of bargaining, she will lose her 
position as median voter and may be overruled in future bargaining 
rounds.
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3.8 Discounting the trivial case where workers have no bargaining power 
at all, b=0 .
3.9 We can see that in the limiting-case of risk-loving, as r approaches 
minus infinity, the division of surplus is the same on the labour 
demand curve as on the contract curve. This indeed is the case 
analysed by Oswald (1984) where workers are indifferent to the level 
of employment and the contract curve is the labour demand curve.
Note that, in this case, it is easy to show that the division of 
surplus equals the ratio of bargaining strengths.
3.10 Bargaining over employment levels is of course a quite separate 
issue from employers' power to discipline and hire and fire 
individual workers.
3.11 A case in point is quoted by Ford (1964, p.59): "In its dispute with 
Bournemouth Corporation, the Musician's Union claimed before the 
Industrial Court that 'a proper object of a trade union is to 
establish by agreement with an employer the number of workers to be 
employed'" but the managers claimed that this was "'solely within 
the discretion of the individual managers concerned'". The court 
ruled against the union.
3.12 There is some empirical support for this hypothesis from Neumann, 
Bobel and Haid (1983) who report a significant positive effect of 
financial leverage on price-cost margins in their study of 283 West 
German manufacturing companies between 1965 and 1977. This result 
appears to support my hypothesis, though it may be biased by their 
definition of margins in relation to equity capital plus reserves. 
They do not explain why they Include leverage in their estimation.
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CHAPTER 4
4.1 In practice, this assumption of the independence of the vector X 
from the level of the bargained wage may not be necessary because I 
use proxies for elements of X, to represent collusion and demand 
conditions, which are more likely to be fully independent of the 
wage.
4.2 I make an assumption here that the parameter d is the same across 
all industries. This implies that the relative importance of jobs 
in bargaining is the same in each industry, as determined by unions' 
preferences over wages and Jobs and by employers' preparedness to 
bargain over Jobs. This is not unreasonable given that several 
large unions represent a large proportion of total union membership, 
and we can expect their preferences over wages and Jobs to be 
similar in different industries - though bargained outcomes will 
differ as labour demand and bargaining strength conditions may 
differ widely across industries.
4.3 An alternative explanation for the impact of unionism on wage-share 
is that pushing up wages can alter the composition of costs rather 
than price-cost margins. However, this explanation is at variance 
with Cowling's (1982, p.124, fn.18) observation that the composition 
of costs has been stable since 1945.
4.4 This approach bypasses the problem of specifying the bargaining 
equation and allows us to investigate directly the impact of wage 
premia on price-cost margins. In place of the specification
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CHAPTER A
A.1 In practice, this assumption of the independence of the vector X
from the level of the bargained wage may not be necessary because I 
use proxies for elements of X, to represent collusion and demand 
conditions, which are more likely to be fully independent of the 
wage.
A.2 I make an assumption here that the parameter d is the same across 
all industries. This implies that the relative importance of jobs 
in bargaining is the same in each industry, as determined by unions' 
preferences over wages and jobs and by employers' preparedness to 
bargain over jobs. This is not unreasonable given that several 
large unions represent a large proportion of total union membership, 
and we can expect their preferences over wages and Jobs to be 
similar in different industries - though bargained outcomes will 
differ as labour demand and bargaining strength conditions may 
differ widely across industries.
A.3 An alternative explanation for the impact of unionism on wage-share 
is that pushing up wages can alter the composition of costs rather 
than price-cost margins. However, this explanation is at variance 
with Cowling's (1982, p.12A, fn.18) observation that the composition 
of costs has been stable since 19A5.
A.A This approach bypasses the problem of specifying the bargaining 
equation and allows us to investigate directly the impact of wage 
premia on price-cost margins. In place of the specification
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problem, we now face a possible econometric difficulty in that the 
wage premium is not necessarily independent of the margin. However, 
we do not expect wage premia to be directly influenced by margins, 
but by the level of surplus per worker. So we can expect any 
simultaneous equation bias to be small. Data availability forces me 
to use 1983 wage data in the 1982 price-cost margin equation, so 
avoiding even this small potential bias.
4.5 I discuss later the estimation of the average wage premium.
4.6 I note that this is also the specification implied if workers are 
indifferent to job levels and bargain over the wage alone. In other 
cases, the employers' share of total surplus will be affected by 
workers' risk- or inequality-aversion, represented by the parameter 
r in equation 3.5. However, if we assume this parameter to be 
constant across Industries - see footnote 4.2 - then this estimating 
equation does measure the determinants of bargaining power as 
specified. Alternatively, we can interpret this equation as 
estimating the combined effects of the exogenous variables on 
bargaining power and risk-aversion.
4.7 These arguments apply equally as reasons for not estimating the 
bargaining equation and the price-cost margin equation 
simultaneously, an exercise which would be yet more problematic in 
that it would require specification of industry revenue and cost 
functions in order to relate profit margins to profit levels.
4.8 These measures may well be collinear with the measures of further 
education and training.
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4.9 Similar to the 1975 and 1979 estimates.
4.10 I describe this specification as 'standard' in the sense that many 
wage equations use some or other of the variables which I have 
described as 'bargaining variables' without relating them to the 
size of the employers' surplus.
4.11 The unemployment variable measures the number of registered 
unemployed whose last employment was in that industry. This is not 
necessarily a good measure of the number of people currently seeking 
work in that industry, and we can expect it to be correlated with 
the rate of growth/loss of employment in that industry. Despite 
these problems, it is a useful measure of the extent to which 
unemployment affects different industries and it is to be regretted 
that the series has not been published since May 1982.
4.12 See footnote 5 to chapter 3.
4.13 Or perhaps we need to separate out the different levels of union 
coverage, as in Henley (1984).
4.14 Indeed, on a small random sample of industries, the ranking of 
estimated wage premia using the coefficients from the bargaining 
specification c was found to be the same as that using coefficient 
estimates from specification a.
4.15 I have not corrected for differences in (expected) risk across 
industries, viz. Neumann et al. (1983) and Harris (1984). However, 
the notion of a risk-adjusted return to capital is more relevant to 
their estimation of rates of return on capital, Implying a theory of
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entry barriers, rather than to estimation of margins, based on a 
theory of oligopolistic behaviour.
4.16 The result that wage premia are deducted directly from margins 
rather than being passed on into price implies that margins are set 
by employers with reference to the alternative wage, rather than to 
the actual wage. Indeed, if we calculate margins on the basis of 
the alternative wage and estimate equation 4.5 with these revised 
margins, we find that the coefficient on the wage surplus term 
becomes insignificant (as we would expect); if we drop this term we 
get a better fit (as measured by the residual sum of squares) when 
we use the revised definition of margins rather than actual margins. 
We can see that this is an expected corollary of the primary result 
if we write the estimating equation as:
A - L.w - L (w-w) = m(x) + d.L(w-w)
R R
where A is net revenue (less salaries in some definitions), and R is 
gross or net revenue. Estimating the coefficient d to be equal to 
-1 is equivalent to finding that margins are better explained when 
defined on the alternative wage than on the actual wage. Even when 
R=A (ie. on the definition of PCM3) an estimate of d=-1 is not a 
necessary result due to an identity, but an indication that the 
decomposition of the wage into the alternative wage plus a wage 
premium is economically significant. For if we chose some arbitrary 
vector to replace w, we clearly would not expect to find a 
statistically significant estimate of the coefficient d.
4.17 The measure of profits includes the opportunity cost of capital, 
which should strictly be deducted before arriving at a definition of 
economic surplus. However, I correct for the opportunity cost by
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including estimates of capital stock as an explanatory variable 
(having to ignore differences in capital mobility and gearing 
through lack of data).
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Stackelberg and Cournot solutions to one-period duopoly each rely 
on two particular restrictions which I want to question : i) the 
roles of follower and leader are assigned to the firms rather than 
chosen; other roles are not considered; ii) the "reaction variable", 
usually either price or quantity, is assigned, not chosen.
It is clear that, if its rival acts as a follower, a firm will always 
prefer to be a Stackelberg leader rather than accept the Cournot 
solution. But under what circumstances is a Stackelberg solution 
viable ? I want to show that there will often be cases where both 
firms might prefer to be leaders, or both prefer that the other be 
leader; and then to consider the implications both of deeper strategic 
interplay and of the choice of reaction variable.
First let us ask why one firm might act as a leader, the other as 
follower. Imposing an informational or psychological asymmetry would 
be highly arbitrary. It seems more natural to regard asymmetry in 
duopoly as the result of either a history or a threat of dominance by 
one firm, where one firm is seen to be in a position to dictate the 
play - viz. Dixit's (1979) incumbent who could prevent entry but 
prefers to act as a Stackelberg leader. But it is not necessarily the 
case that a dominant firm will choose to be a leader; nor that the 
subordinate firm must choose to play its allotted role of follower. So 
it is important to examine the circumstances in which firms might 
prefer to be the leader or might prefer that the other be leader.
8 .2
I shall assume throughout : i) that at any Stackelberg point both 
firms choose to sell strictly positive outputs at strictly positive 
prices, i.e. I am not considering blockaded entry; ii) goods are 
strict substitutes as long as prices and quantities are strictly 
positive; iii) I refer only to Cournot reaction functions, where 
conjectural variation is zero; iv) reaction functions are continuous 
when profits are positive; v) firms are profit maximisers with profit 
function for firm i :
M q )  - Qi.Pi(q) ~ Ci (q^) 
or Ili(p) - qi(p).Pi - Ci[qi(p)]
depending on whether firms' decision variables are the vector of 
quantities q or the vector of prices p.
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DIAGRAM 1
A down-aloplng (negative) reaction function in quantity space
RF2 firm 2's reaction function, or Q2(<11 ) •
Si - firm 1 's Stackelberg point on RF2.
1«11 - firm 1 's Stackelberg output.
2. CHOOSING ROLES
PROPOSITION^ If a firm's reaction function slopes downwards, it
will always prefer being a Stackelberg leader to being 
a Stackelberg follower. This applies unreservedly to 
quantity reaction functions, and to price reaction 
functions if the rival does not face a capacity 
constraint.
The following proof makes no assumptions about the firm's profit 
function other than those implied by the specifications above. However 
the proposition can easily be demonstrated in the case of a 
quasi-concave profit function simply by sketching the relevant 
iso-profit lines.
The reaction function in quantity space is illustrated in Diagram 1, 
showing firm 2's optimal (Cournot) reaction to outputs of firm 1. Firm 
two's reaction function is referred to both as RF2 and as q2 <qi).
By assumption firm 1 chooses some non-zero leadership output 1qi to 
give the leadership point Si - C^-qi,q2 (^Ql)3 • We oan show that Si must 
lie to the right of the leader's own reaction function (RF1). i.e. s
q2'(<ll) < 0  ♦ qi[q2(1Ql>] < 1Q1 I
For if this inequality is reversed, i.e. if RF1 passes through some 
point S+ , then we can construct S** as shown. ES«* Oia«*Aai i]
B.k
But JIi(S++) > n-j (S-j+) from the assumption of strict substitutes, 
which implies that Si would not have been firm 1's Stackelberg choice. 
We also know that RF1 cannot pass through Si, since by assumption the 
slope of RF2 is strictly negative. So equation 1 must be true.
So RF1 must pass through some point S” .
But Il2 (S“) > II2 (Si) from the assumption of substitutes.
If firm 2 acts as a Stackelberg leader, S- is Just one of the set of 
points which it can choose. So firm 2 must prefer to be a Stackelberg 
leader. QED.
If firms consider that their rivals are making decisions in terms of 
prices rather than quantities we have to analyse reaction functions in 
price space. The analysis is not so simple as in quantity space 
because although a firm may hold its price constant, as its rival's 
price changes so does the quantity demanded and the effect on the 
firm's profit is ambiguous, depending on whether price exceeds or lies 
below marginal cost.
However, at any set of prices p (at which quantities demanded are 
strictly positive), if a firm's profit is not Increasing in its 
rival's price, it must be Increasing in its own price; and vice versa. 
For the first derivatives of firm i's profit function are ;
ni . J < P >  " t P i  <* O i ' { ) ] . q i . j ( p )
H i . i < P >  -  CPi " c i '  O l . q i  , i  (p) ♦  (p)
Now lli(S+ ) i ni(Si)from the definition of the reaction function.
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DIAGRAM 2
A negative reaction function
region A : 01 >  0, q2 >  0.
region B 01C\Jcr
region C : q; - 0.
ab discontinuity in RF2.
where ni#j(p) represents the partial derivative with respect to pj of 
firm i's profit function; c^'O represents firm i's marginal cost 
function.
Substitutability implies that qi.j > 0 as long as pj is not so high 
that qj - 0. I shall assume that qi.i(p) < 0 if qj > 0. So
Pi > c^'O * ni.j(p) > 0
P i  * C i ' O  ♦  n l . i ( P >  > ® £
if qi.qj > 0
i.e. within the region of price space where quantities are strictly 
positive,, there will always be a price path for a firm along which 
profit rises as one or other price rises.
Diagram 2 shows a downward-sloping price reaction function P2(Pl)*
Note that the price space is divided into four regions, corresponding 
to zero or strictly positive values of output. When p; exceeds some 
limit firm I's sales fall to zero and firm 2 can set a monopoly price. 
From the first order condition which characterises firm 2's reaction 
function we know that, on the reaction function with positive outputs, 
price exceeds marginal cost. Equation 2 and the envelope theorem tell 
us that along the reaction function firm 2's profit is an Increasing 
function of its rival's price (as long as quantities are strictly 
positive). There may, therefore, be some value of p; which is so low 
that firm 2 cannot make positive operating profits, so it chooses to
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produce zero output. I represent this possibility by a discontinuity 
ab in the reaction function, where it Jumps to the zero-output price 
line.
Let firm 1 choose some leadership price ^p^ which gives the 
Stackelberg point S, on firm 2's reaction function in the region A 
where both firms sell strictly positive quantities. First I want to 
show that firm I's reaction function cannot pass through or to the 
left of S,. i.e. :
P j ' ( P i )  < 0 -» PiCpj^Pi] > xPi 3
for, if not, RF1 must pass through some point S~ where n,(S~) 
n,(S,).We can construct an arbitrary reaction function for firm 1 
upwards from S - remembering that profits must be strictly increasing. 
If RF1 meets RF2 at any point above S- then this point must dominate 
S, which cannot then be the leadership point. If however RF1 passes 
through the gap ab in RF2, e.g. at some point c, then we know that 
n,(c) > II, (a). But at c firm 1's price must exceed marginal cost and 
its profit is increasing in its rival's price; so a rise in P2 to 
point a can decrease firm one's profit only if marginal costs rise 
sufficiently steeply, perhaps through a capacity constraint. If we 
rule out this possibility, then 3 above must be true.
So RF1 passes through some point S+. Now RF1 can be constructed 
arbitrarily upwards from S+ until it reaches the region B in the 
diagram at point M where firm 1 is a monopolist.
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DIAGRAM 3
A positive reaction function In quantity apace
We can also construct some line north-east from S, along which n2 must 
be strictly increasing (see 2). This line cannot reach region B where 
firm 2's output and profit both fall to zero. So this constructed line 
must meet firm 1's reaction function (RF1) at a point which firm i 
must strictly prefer to S,. So firm X must prefer being a Stackelberg 
leader to being a Stackelberg follower. QED.
PROPORTION 2 If both firms have upward-sioping reaction functions, 
then if one prefers to be leader the other must prefer 
to be the Stackelberg follower.1
This proposition holds both for price and quantity space. It can be 
seen to be true for quasi-concave profit functions simply by sketching 
iso-profit lines, but I want to show that it is true more generally.
First I need to show that, in quantity space, if a firm's reaction 
function slopes up, its rival's reaction function must pass "to the 
right" of any non-zero Stackelberg point, i.e. :
q2'(qi) > 0  •* qiCQ2(1qi)] > xqi j*
If not, i.e. if RF1 passes through S- in diagram 3, then we can 
construct S—  where n,(S ) > n,(S,) which contradicts the assumption 
that S, is chosen by firm 1 as its leadership point.
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DIAGRAM 4
A positive reaction function In price space
Similarly in price space, if a firm has an upward-sloping reaction 
function its rival's reaction function must pass "to the left" of its 
leadership point, i.e. :
P2'(Pi> > 0  -*■ PiCpg^Pi)] < XPi 5
Referring to Diagram 4, if firm 1 has chosen some leadership point S, 
(where both quantities are strictly positive) and if RF1 passed 
through some point S+ as shown, then we could construct a line 
north-east along which profits of firm 1 must be strictly increasing 
(see 2). This constructed line cannot meet the region where firm I's 
output and profit fall to zero, so it must meet RF2 at some point S++. 
But then S, could not have been the optimal leadership point. So 5 
must be true.
Now we can consider the case where both reaction functions slope up 
and where one firm prefers to lead. In quantity space we can draw the 
reaction functions as in diagram 5a where the leadership position 
chosen by firm 1 is to the left of RF1 and S2 is below RF2.
If firm one prefers to lead, i.e. n,(S,) > n,(S2) , then S2 must lie 
"above" S, (as in diagram 6a) since if we construct point A :
n , ( A ) 2. n , ( s , ) since A  is on RF1
n , ( A ) > n , ( s 2 )
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DIAGRAM 5
Both reaction functions slope up; one firm prefers to lead
a) quantity space
b) price apace
z
b
But firm I's profit is a declining function of its rival's output 
along firm 1*s reaction function (since substitutability implies that 
a decrease in q2 will raise n, if qi is held constant; a fortiori if 
qj can be optimally adjusted). So S 2 must lie above A.
If we construct point B as shown on RF2 (which we know lies above S 2)
n2(B) >, n2(S2) since B is on RF2
But B must lie above S 2 since RF1 and RF2 are positively sloped
-» JI2(B) < n2(s,)
* n2(s,) > n2(s2) QED
The same argument holds in price space - see diagram 5b.
PROPOSITION 3 If two firms face similar cost and demand structures 
which give positive sloping reaction functions, then 
each must prefer being the Stackelberg follower to being
the Stackelberg leader.
The proof is simple if firms’ costs and demands are identical. For if 
one preferred to lead, symmetry Implies that the other must prefer to 
lead as well. Proposition 2 rules out this possibility. We may go on
8.10
to suppose that firms with positive-sloping reaction functions with 
similar but not necessarily identical costs and demands will also each 
prefer that the other lead.
Why might firms prefer to follow ? The intuitive answer is that 
generally each firm's profit increases if its rival raises price or 
decreases output. If a firm is known to have a positive reaction 
function the rival will be deterred from lowering price or raising 
output by the threat of retaliation. But this "threat" is only 
operative if the firm is expected to act as a follower. So a firm may 
sometimes choose to be a follower in preference to being a leader.
PROPOSITION *4 If firms can choose to act either as follower or leader, 
the Cournot solution is not a Nash equilibrium. The 
Stackelberg solutions are Nash equilibria in choice of 
roles; but firms will conflict between the two 
Stackelberg solutions if they have similar profit 
functions or if both their reaction functions are 
down-sioping.
At the Cournot solution each firm acts as a follower. Given that its 
rival is following, either firm could do better by acting as leader 
(unless reaction functions have zero slopes). Given that one firm is 
acting as leader, the other's optimal choice is to follow; and vice 
versa. But I have shown previously that if the Stackelberg solutions
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DIAGRAM 6
ranking Cournot and Stackelberg outcomes have non-zero outputs then, in either of the two eases referred to 
here, the firms will necessarily prefer different solutions. If 
reaction functions are negative, each will want to lead. If firms are 
similar and reaction functions are positive, each will want the other 
to lead.
In the case where both reaction functions slope down and intersect at 
a unique, stable Cournot position, we can rank four possible outcomes 
as follows (see diagram 6).
In quantity space (6a) the two Stackelberg solutions S, and S 2 must be 
as shown. We know that (for firm 1) >* Sj (where > denotes strict
preference) from Proposition 1. The choice of the Cournot point C is 
feasible but rejected when firm i leads, so Sj >j C . But Sj is beyond 
C on i's reaction function, so C >i Sj. If both firms produce at their 
leadership levels, the outcome SS (Stackelberg Warfare) is clearly 
worse than accepting the rival's leadership. So we can conclude s
Si >i C >i Sj >i SS 6
The same result holds for negative reaction functions in prices (6b).
If quantity reaction functions slope up and the profit functions are 
similar enough for each firm to prefer the other to lead, and if there 
is a unique Cournot equilibrium, the rankings can be deduced from 
diagram 6c.The same result holds in price space for quasi-concave 
profit functions (see 6d).
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S j  > | SS S j  >| c 7
We get here the perhaps surprising result that with upward sloping 
reaction functions a (unique) Cournot solution is worse for a firm 
than either Stackelberg solution or leadership warfare.
In fact equations 6 and 7 tell the same story if we translate firms' 
roles from the categories of 'leader' or 'follower' into the 
categories of 'strong' and 'weak'. With negative reaction functions 
each prefers leadership if the other will comply, so in this case I 
label leadership the 'strong' role. If firms are similar and reaction 
functions are positive I call the follower role strong. Denoting an 
outcome where firm i is strong and its rival weak by "SW", etc, 
equations 6 and 7 translate into these rankings :
SW >i WW WS SS 8
It appears that there is no obvious solution here, where firms can 
choose their roles. In a repeated game setting each firm will have an 
incentive to convince its rival that it is going to stick to its 
preferred role, for if a firm is known to act strongly, its rival's 
best response is to comply. It may well be firms' perceived abilities 
to withstand a period of Stackelberg warfare which determines the 
outcome.
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It is apparent that a particular solution concept, the Nash 
equilibrium, leads to widely different results depending on whether 
firms' decisions are over price/quantity or over roles of follower and 
leader. These can be regarded as alternative levels of strategic 
conjecture and behaviour, each implying a particular context of 
information and expectations. An obvious extension of strategic play 
for a firm would be to present to a self-styled leader a pattern of 
behaviour - a putative reaction function - which will induce the 
leader to make a favourable decision. For instance, if a firm thinks 
that its rival is observing its behaviour in order to deduce its 
reaction function, it may choose to present a positive-sloped 
"reaction function" with the intention that its rival should choose to 
be a leader. This would constitute a strategy of threats and 
inducements : "If you hurt me by raising your output / lowering your 
price, I will retaliate in kind." Price wars and predatory pricing can 
be understood as firms presenting and testing out eachothers' reaction 
functions and eachothers' ability to stick to their preferred role 
despite temporary losses.
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3. PRICES OR QUANTITIES
So far I have not questioned whether firms set prices or quantities, 
nor in what circumstances their reaction functions slope up or down.
It is common to present quantity reaction functions sloping down and 
price reaction functions sloping up, although the opposite situations 
are feasible.
The duopoly game as I have considered it is played in prices or 
quantities not according to how each firm makes decisions, but 
according to how it conjectures its rival makes decisions. For 
example, if one firm conjectures that its rival will hold price 
constant, it makes no difference (at least if the firm is certain 
about cost and demand conditions) whether it considers a range of 
possible prices and estimates the demand and profit that will ensue, 
or whether it considers a range of outputs and estimates the ensuing 
prices and profit. In either case the firm will settle on the 
profit-maximising price/output configuration. Whether it proceeds to 
announce a fixed price or to auction a fixed quantity is not relevant. 
What is relevant is whether it expects that its rival will hold price 
or quantity constant (in the case where the firm is acting as a 
follower).
If technology and conditions in factor markets dictate a high cost to 
changing output, then a follower might reasonably expect its rival to 
hold output constant. Constant price might be a reasonable conjecture 
when selling strategies require price stability. But in many cases
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there may be a substantial degree of arbitrariness in such 
conjectures. Indeed one firm might be conjecturing in prices whilst 
its rival conjectures in quantities !
Price and quantity games usually yield a different outcome to a given 
solution concept, e.g. to the Cournot solution. Moreover, the slope of 
a firm's reaction function may often be negative in quantities but 
positive in prices <- and I have argued earlier that negative reaction 
functions make the Stackelberg solution concept particularly 
questionable.
The slope of firm i's reaction function at a point (in price or 
quantity space) is given by the negative of the ratio of the second 
derivatives : - n^j / H u  . Since IIn is required to be negative to
satisfy the second order conditions for profit maximisation, the slope 
of the reaction function has the same sign as the cross partial. Of 
course the sign of the slope may vary. For simplicity I have only 
considered monotonic reaction functions.
In the case of quantities, - qi-Pi.lj(fl) + pi.j(<l)-
Substitutability Implies that the second term is negative, so the 
quantity reaction function has a positive slope iff Pi.ij> “Pi.j^qi >
0 and it has an unambiguously negative slope if the cross partial of 
the demand term is zero.
In the case of prices :
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ni.ij(a> ■ <pi ~ ci')'Qi.ij ♦ Q i.jd ~
where ci"() is the second derivative of firm i's cost function. If 
the cross partial derivative of the demand function - Qi.ij(p) ■- is 
non-negative, the price reaction function slopes up unless marginal 
costs are falling sufficiently rapidly.
Why should price and quantity reaction functions tend to have opposite 
slopes ? Intuitively we can see that a follower alters its decision 
variable to get an optimal trade-off between price (or profit-margin) 
and quantity. If the leader's decision variable is quantity, a rise in 
that variable causes the follower's dependent variable (price) to 
fall. To redress the fall in price, the follower will have to lower 
quantity - i.e. the follower in a quantity game usually moves in the 
opposite direction to the leader. On the other hand, if the leader 
raises price, the follower's dependent variable (quantity) rises. To 
redress the rise in quantity, the follower has to change price in the 
samd direction as the leader's move; so price reaction functions 
usually slope upwards.
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*1. CONCLUSIONS
If firms have similar histories and face similar costs and demands, 
there is little reason to expect either a Cournot or a Stackelberg 
solution to be generally viable.
Although the Cournot solution is a Nash equilibrium in choices over 
output (price), it is not so if firms make choices over roles. For if 
a firm is going to act as a follower, it must benefit its rival to act 
as leader.
If firms have negative reaction functions and/or similar profit 
functions, I have argued that the Stackelberg solution is not 
generally satisfactory. Without predetermined asymmetry each firm has 
an incentive to act 'strongly', to take its preferred role and force 
its rival to accept the non-preferred role. Of course if both firms 
take the preferred role they inflict mutual damage (see equation 8).
It can be argued that they may settle for each taking the 
non-preferred role in order to minimise mutual damage. This would mean 
the Cournot solution with negative reaction functions; the "leadership 
warfare" solution with similar positive reaction functions. But since 
the Cournot solution is not a Nash equilibrium in choice of roles, it 
would obtain only as a compromise or collusive solution. In which case 
firms might be expected to seek some more profitable solution through 
implicit or explicit collusion. The Cournot solution might be a lower 
bound to feasible arrangements; the threat of price war would provide 
the incentive to collude.
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In some specific market situations, however, the Stackelberg solution 
does seem reasonable. If both firms have positive reaction functions 
(most likely to occur if they view eachother as making price rather 
than quantity decisions) and if there is sufficient asymmetry in costs 
or demand for one firm to prefer to lead, then one Stackelberg 
solution will not only be a Nash equilibrium in choice of roles, it 
will be strictly preferred by both firms to the other Stackelberg 
solution and to the Cournot solution.
Alternatively, Stackelberg seems a plausible solution to a situation 
where one firm believes that its rival expects and is able to win a 
price war. For if so, the firm expects that its rival will act 
strongly come what may; in which case the firm will prefer to comply 
by accepting the weak role (which might be leader or follower 
depending on the slopes of the reaction functions). Such a situation 
may pertain where a firm has a history of market dominance which gives 
it incentive to fight price wars, expecting them to be short-lived as 
in the past; or where a firm is seen to have a greater capacity than 
its rival both to inflict and to endure short-term losses, due perhaps 
to conglomerate- or government-backed financial support.
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FOOTNOTE
1. Ono (1980) proves this result in the case of an upward-sioping 
price reaction function and a concave profit function. The proof 
presented here is more general in that it refers to both price and 
quantity reaction functions and does not assume concavity.
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